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he risks confronted by grain
and cotton farmers are of par-
ticular interest, given the changing
role of the Government after pas-
sage of the 1996 Farm Act. With
the shift toward less government
intervention in the post-1996 Farm
Act environment, a more sophisti-
cated understanding of risk and
risk management is important to
help producers make better deci-
sions in risky situations and to
assist policymakers in assessing
the effectiveness of different types
of risk protection tools. In response,
this report provides a rigorous, yet
accessible, description of risk and
risk management tools and strate-
gies at the farm level.
Risk is uncertainty that affects an
individual’s welfare, and is often
associated with adversity and loss.
There are many sources of risk in
agriculture, ranging from price and
yield risk to the personal risks
associated with injury or poor
health. In dealing with risky situa-
tions, risk management involves
choosing among alternatives to
reduce the effects of the various
types of risk. It typically requires
the evaluation of tradeoffs between
changes in risk, changes in expect-
ed returns, entrepreneurial free-
dom, and other variables.
Several surveys have been conduct-
ed asking about the types of risk
most important to farmers. These
surveys reach similar conclusions.
A 1996 USDA survey, for example,
indicates that producers are most
concerned about changes in govern-
ment laws and regulations (institu-
tional risk), decreases in crop yields
or livestock output (production
risk), and uncertainty in commodi-
ty prices (price risk). In general,
producers of major field crops tend
to be more concerned about price
and yield risk, while livestock and
specialty crop growers are relative-
ly more concerned about changes in
laws and regulations.
While concerns about risk vary
across types of producers, other fac-
tors are also important in deter-
mining the risk inherent in a pro-
ducer’s situation. Yield risk, for
example, varies regionally, and
depends on soil type, climate, the
use of irrigation, and other vari-
ables. Yield risk tends to be low in
California, where irrigation is wide-
spread, and higher in dryland pro-
ducing areas in the Great Plains.
In contrast to yield risk, price risk
for a given commodity tends not to
vary geographically, and depends
on such factors as commodity stock
levels and export demand.
Farmers have many options in
managing agricultural risks. They
can adjust the enterprise mix
(diversify) or the financial struc-
ture of the farm (the mix of debt
and equity capital). In addition,
farmers have access to many
tools—such as insurance and hedg-
ing—that can help reduce their
farm-level risks. Off-farm earnings
are a major source of income for
many farmers that can help stabi-
lize farm household income. Indeed,
most producers combine the use of
many different strategies and tools.
Because farmers vary in their atti-
tudes toward risk, risk manage-
ment cannot be viewed within a
“one size fits all” approach. That is,
it is not wise to say that “All
Midwestern corn farmers should
hedge 50 percent of their crop in
futures,” or that “No farmer should
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plan to obtain more than two-
thirds of his or her income from a
single commodity.” Different farm-
ers confront different situations,
and their preferences toward risk
and their risk-return tradeoffs have
a major effect on decisionmaking in
each given situation. A large,
industrialized operation, for exam-
ple, may hire marketing expertise
to directly use hedging and options,
while a smaller farmer may prefer
to forward contract with other par-
ties better able to hedge directly.
Although farmers in similar situa-
tions can differ greatly in their
response to risk, surveys provide
an overall view of producer choices.
The results of a 1996 survey, con-
ducted shortly after passage of the
1996 Farm Act, indicate that opera-
tors in the largest gross income cat-
egories (more than $250,000 annu-
ally) are more likely to use virtual-
ly all risk management strategies
than small-scale operators. Keeping
cash on hand for emergencies and
good buys was the number one
strategy for every size farm, for
every commodity specialty, and in
every region.
Evaluating the effectiveness of dif-
ferent strategies and tools requires
an understanding of the risk-return
tradeoffs of individual producers.
Several major points can be made,
however, that generally apply to
risk management. Most of the tools
discussed in this report tend to
reduce intrayear income uncertain-
ty, but may have only small or neg-
ligible effects on multiyear uncer-
tainties. In addition, some strate-
gies—such as the combined use of
insurance and forward pricing—
tend to complement each other in
reducing risks.
In short, understanding risk in
farming is important for several
reasons. First, most producers are
averse to risk when faced with
risky outcomes. Someone who is
risk averse is willing to accept a
lower average return for lower
uncertainty, with the tradeoff
depending on the person’s level of
risk aversion. Thus, strategies can-
not be evaluated solely in terms of
average or expected return, but
also must consider risk. Second,
understanding risk helps farmers
and others develop strategies for
mitigating the possibility of










arming is a financially risky
occupation. On a daily basis,
farmers are confronted with an
ever-changing landscape of possi-
ble price, yield, and other outcomes
that affect their financial returns
and overall welfare. The conse-
quences of decisions or events are
often not known with certainty
until long after those decisions or
events occur, so outcomes may be
better or worse than expected.
When aggregate crop output or
export demand changes sharply,
for example, farm prices can fluc-
tuate substantially and farmers
may realize returns that differ
greatly from their expectations.
The risks confronted by grain and
cotton farmers are of particular
interest given the changing role of
the Government after passage of
the 1996 Farm Act. The Act elimi-
nated deficiency payments which,
between 1973 and 1995, provided
program crop producers with price
and income support in years of low
prices. Now, participating crop pro-
ducers instead receive contract
payments, which are fixed
amounts scheduled to decline over
time between 1996 and 2002.
Unlike deficiency payments, these
contract payments do not vary
inversely with market prices. The
1996 Farm Act also eliminated
annual supply management pro-
grams, providing producers with
the flexibility to plant any crop
(with certain restrictions for fruits
and vegetables) on any acre. The
Act also reduced government inter-
vention in dairy markets.
This shift toward less government
intervention in the post-1996 Farm
Act environment creates a need for
a more sophisticated understand-
ing of risk and risk management.
In response, this report provides a
rigorous, yet accessible, description
of risk and risk management tools
and strategies. It describes risk at
the farm level, examining situa-
tions facing individual producers.
It is designed for risk program
managers, extension educators,
farmers and other business people,
and others interested in risk and
risk management issues.
Understanding risk is a key ele-
ment in helping producers make
better decisions in risky situations,
and also provides useful informa-
tion to policymakers in assessing
the effectiveness of different types
of risk protection tools.
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R
isk is uncertainty that affects
an individual’s welfare, and is
often associated with adversity and
loss (Bodie and Merton). Risk is
uncertainty that “matters,” and
may involve the probability of los-
ing money, possible harm to human
health, repercussions that affect
resources (irrigation, credit), and
other types of events that affect a
person’s welfare. Uncertainty (a sit-
uation in which a person does not
know for sure what will happen) is
necessary for risk to occur, but
uncertainty need not lead to a risky
situation.
For an individual farmer, risk man-
agement involves finding the pre-
ferred combination of activities
with uncertain outcomes and vary-
ing levels of expected return. One
might say that risk management
involves choosing among alterna-
tives for reducing the effects of risk
on a farm, and in so doing, affecting
the farm’s welfare position. Some
risk management strategies (such
as diversification) reduce risk with-
in the farm’s operation, others
(such as production contracting)
transfer risk outside the farm, and
still others (such as maintaining
liquid assets) build the farm’s
capacity to bear risk. Risk manage-
ment typically requires the evalua-
tion of tradeoffs between changes
in risk, expected returns, entrepre-
neurial freedom, and other vari-
ables. The following examples illus-
trate risk management in farming
and the types of tradeoffs faced by
farmers:
• Enterprise Diversification—
Consider Farmer Smith, who is
debating the most appropriate
enterprise mix on his operation.
In particular, Smith is contem-
plating switching 200 acres from
corn to soybeans within his exist-
ing operation of corn, hay, and
dairy. By adding this new crop,
Smith is less at risk that the
farm will generate low revenue
because, in his location, income
from soybeans is less variable
than income from corn, and
because individual commodity
returns do not move exactly in
tandem (they are less than per-
fectly correlated). Smith must
consider this risk reduction
against the expected net returns
associated with the new enter-
prise, weighing any potential
decline in net returns against
the lower income variability that
he believes will be provided by
such an additional crop.
• Crop Insurance—Consider
Farmer Jones, who farms where
the potential for drought is a
constant worry and yield vari-
ability is high. Jones can pur-
chase insurance to cover a large
portion of the potential loss, or
can self-insure and absorb any














Risk is the possibility of adversity or loss, and refers to
“uncertainty that matters.” Consequently, risk management
involves choosing among alternatives to reduce the effects of
risk. It typically requires the evaluation of tradeoffs between
changes in risk, expected returns, entrepreneurial freedom,
and other variables. Understanding risk is a starting point
to help producers make good management choices in situa-
tions where adversity and loss are possibilities.
W Wh ha at t  I Is s  R Ri is sk k? ?losses caused by low yields. In
investigating the purchase of
crop insurance, he finds that the
annual premium is quite high
due to the significant yield vari-
ability in his area. As a result,
Farmer Jones must consider the
risk-return tradeoffs in deciding
whether or not to purchase
insurance and, if he decides to
buy insurance, the level of cover-
age that best suits his risk man-
agement needs.
• Production Contracting—
Consider Farmer Johnson, who
is considering whether to enter
into a production contract with a
large broiler integrator. The
integrator retains control over
the chicks as they are raised by
the producer, and prescribes spe-
cific feeds, other inputs, and spe-
cial management practices
throughout the production cycle.
In return for handing over man-
agement decisions, the produc-
er’s income risk is greatly
reduced, market access is guar-
anteed, and access to capital is
ensured. Johnson must weigh
these potential benefits against
his reduced entrepreneurial
freedom and the risk of contract
termination on short notice.
As can be seen through these illus-
trations, managing risk in agricul-
ture does not necessarily involve
avoiding risk, but instead, involves
finding the best available combina-
tion of risk and return given a per-
son’s capacity to withstand a wide
range of outcomes (Hardaker,
Huirne, and Anderson). Effective
risk management involves antici-
pating outcomes and planning a
strategy in advance given the like-
lihood and consequences of events,
not just reacting to those events
after they occur. That is, the four
main aspects of risk management
involve (1) identifying potentially
risky events, (2) anticipating the
likelihood of possible outcomes and
their consequences, (3) taking
actions to obtain a preferred com-
bination of risk and expected
return, and (4) restoring (if neces-
sary) the firm’s capacity to imple-
ment future risk-planning strate-
gies when distress conditions have
passed (Hardaker, Huirne, and
Anderson; Patrick; Barry).
Because farmers vary in their atti-
tudes toward risk and their ability
to address risky situations, risk
management cannot be viewed
within a “one size fits all”
approach. That is, it is not wise to
say that “All midwestern corn
farmers should hedge 50 percent of
their crop in futures,” or that “No
farmer should plan to obtain more
than two-thirds of his or her
income from a single commodity.”
Different farmers confront differ-
ent situations and structural char-
acteristics, and as explained in this
report, their preferences toward
risk and their risk-return tradeoffs
have a major effect on decision-
making in each given situation. A
large, industrialized operation, for
example, may hire marketing
expertise to directly use hedging
and options, while a small family
farm may prefer to forward con-
tract with other parties better able
to hedge directly.
Understanding risk in farming is
important for two reasons. First,
most producers are averse to risk
when faced with risky outcomes.
Someone who is risk averse is will-
ing to accept a lower average
return for lower uncertainty, with
the tradeoff depending on the per-
son’s level of risk aversion. This
means that strategies cannot be
evaluated solely in terms of aver-
age or expected return, but that
risk must also be considered.
Second, identifying sources of
uncertainty helps farmers and oth-
ers address the most important
strategies for mitigating risk, and
aids in circumventing extreme out-
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everal surveys have asked farm-
ers about the most important
types of risk that they confront in
their farming operations. These
types of questions are typically part
of a larger survey that inquires
about producers’ risk management
strategies, and offers respondents a
list of concerns that they can score
in terms of importance. Scores gen-
erally are not ranked relative to one
another, meaning that producers
independently analyze each concern
on the list.
In 1996, USDA’s Agricultural
Resource Management Study1
(ARMS), a nationwide survey of
farm operators, questioned farmers
as to their degree of concern about
factors affecting the operation of
their farms. The ARMS is probabili-
ty-based, and results can be expand-
ed to reflect the U.S. farm sector.
The concerns cited in the survey
varied from “uncertainty in com-
modity prices” to “ability to adopt
new technology.” Mean scores for
each concern were estimated by
assigning a value to each measure
of importance, with “not concerned”
receiving a value of 1.00 and “very
concerned” receiving a value of 4.00.
Wheat, corn, soybean, tobacco, cot-
ton, and certain other producers
answering the survey were more
concerned about yield and price
variability than any of the other
categories (table 1). This may be
partly due to the 1996 Farm Act,
which greatly reduced government
intervention in markets for pro-
gram crops (wheat, corn, cotton, and
other selected field crops), and may
have heightened producers’ wari-
ness concerning price risk.
Producers of other field crops, nurs-
ery and greenhouse crops, beef cat-
tle, and poultry were relatively
more concerned about changes in
laws and regulations, perhaps
reflecting trepidation about changes
in environmental and other policies.
Across all farms, the ARMS results
indicate that producers’ degree of
concern was greatest regarding
changes in government laws and
regulations (with a score of 3.02),
decreases in crop yields or livestock
production (with a score of 2.95),
and uncertainty regarding commod-
ity prices (with a score of 2.91).
Other surveys have also examined
producers’ risk perceptions, most
often focusing on crop production in
specific geographic areas. These
other surveys, despite the limited
location and time period of the
analysis, generally support the
ARMS findings that price and yield
risk are the most important con-
cerns facing producers of major field
crops. One of the most comprehen-
A 1996 USDA survey indicates that producers are most con-
cerned about changes in government laws and regulations
(institutional risk), decreases in crop yields or livestock out-
put (production risk), and uncertainty in commodity prices
(price risk). In general, producers of major field crops tend
to be more concerned about price and yield risk, while live-
stock and specialty crop growers are relatively more con-
cerned about changes in laws and regulations.
1The ARMS survey was formerly known
as the Farm Costs and Returns Survey
(FCRS).
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toward risk was conducted in 1983
at a land-grant university (Patrick
and others, 1985). This survey, cov-
ering 12 States, was designed to
elicit the most important types of
variability faced by farmers and to
determine the importance of differ-
ent types of variability across dif-
ferent regions. Weather and output
prices were cited as the most
important sources of crop risk,
regardless of location. Producers
also marked inflation, input costs,
diseases and pests, world events,
and safety and health as other
important sources of risk.
Interesting differences, however,
appeared by farm-type grouping.
For example, farmers in the South-
east, where mixed (crop and live-
stock) farming is important, and
corn, soybean, and hog producers in
the Midwest, gave less importance
to variability from commodity pro-
grams than did cotton or small
grain growers. Midwestern corn,
soybean, and hog producers gave
much greater importance to family
plans as a source of variability than
did the other farm-type groups.
Producers’ circumstances also
affected perceptions of risk in the
1983 Patrick survey. Using a
slightly different sample than
above, Patrick found that the
greater the debt-to-asset ratio, the
greater the importance given to
risks associated with the cost of
credit on crop farms. Risks associ-
ated with hired labor increased in
importance as farm size increased.
The producer’s level of education
appeared to be relatively unimpor-
tant in influencing the importance
given to different sources of vari-
ability (Patrick).
More recently, participants in
Purdue’s 1991 and 1993 Top
Farmer Crop Workshops were ques-
tioned about their attitudes toward
farm risks. They rated crop price
and crop yield variability as the top
sources of risk in 1991, but ranked
them second and third in 1993
(Patrick and Ullerich; Patrick and
Musser). Concern about injury, ill-
ness, or death of the operator was
the highest rated source of risk in
1993, significantly higher than in
1991 (table 2). The importance of
changes in government environ-
mental regulations, land rents, and
technology also increased signifi-
cantly between 1991 and 1993.
Respondents did not give much
importance to livestock price or pro-
Farmers participat-







price and yield 
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Table 1—Farmers' degree of concern about factors affecting the continued operation of their farms
How concerned are you about each
factor’s effect on the continued 


































































































































































































































































































Decrease in crop yields 
or livestock production 3.35 3.51 3.2 2.98 3.16 3.68 2.53 3.05 2.85 2.78 3.09 3.53 3.20 3.4 2.41 2.95
Uncertainty in commodity prices    3.41 3.83 3.4 2.93 3.15 3.75 2.48 2.88 2.82 2.63 2.96 3.31 3.09 3.54 2.47 2.91
Ability to adopt new technology      2.52 2.38 2.39 2.33 2.21 2.77 1.92 2.34 2.09 2.24 2.25 2.63 2.60 2.45 2.12 2.23
Lawsuits 2.43 2.47 2.03 2.46 1.89 2.78 2.07 2.39 2.66 2.06 2.36 2.70 2.32 2.36 2.00 2.26
Changes in consumer preferences   2.65 2.55 2.39 2.40 2.40 2.86 2.13 2.44 2.59 2.69 2.58 3.01 2.79 2.76 2.30 2.47
for agricultural products     
Changes in Government laws          3.31 3.36 3.15 2.79 2.77 3.54 2.88 2.97 2.75 3.09 3.03 3.23 3.34 3.31 2.88 3.02
and regulations        
11 = Not concerned, 2 = Slightly concerned, 3 = Somewhat concerned, 4 = Very concerned.
Source: Perry, Janet, editor, "Adaptive Management Decisions--Responding to the Risks of Farming," unpublished working paper, 






to price risks among
growers.







































duction variability, likely reflecting
the limited importance of this enter-
prise on their operations.
Other surveys of producers in the
Midwest and Great Plains have
found similar results. Farmers and
ranchers in Nebraska indicated in
the mid-1990’s that output price
risk and yield risk were the most
important sources of risk (Jose and
Valluru). On a 1-10 scale, the
respondents rated output price fluc-
tuations (6.07), input price fluctua-
tions (5.98), and drought (5.73) as
the most important sources of risk.
Although hail damage was rated
high in importance (6.58), the num-
ber of farmers who selected hail as
the most important risk factor was
low. Survey research focusing on
Kansas lender-to-farming risks has
provided similar findings (Mintert).
When California growers were
questioned, important regional vari-
ations appeared. A 1992/93 survey
of 569 California growers, which
used a ranking scheme similar to
the ones in the Patrick studies,
reveals that output risks are sec-
ondary to price risks among grow-
ers in that State (Blank, Carter,
and McDonald). These growers
ranked output price and input costs
as first and second, respectively,
among their risk concerns. These
results largely reflect the low yield
risk faced in California in most sit-
uations, due largely to the wide-
spread use of irrigation.
Because of the apparent impor-
tance of yield and output price risk
to many producers, particularly in
the Midwest and Great Plains,
these two risks are the focus of the
following section, which examines
the measurement of risk. Disaggre-
gate (farm- and county-level) data
are available to measure the price
and yield risk confronted by pro-
ducers across the country. Thus, the
following section quantifies the
price and yield risks for producers
in different locations, using corn as
an example crop.
Table 2—Mean and standard deviation of importance ratings of sources of risk by Top Farmer Crop Workshop 
participants, 1991 and 19931
1991 1993
(n = 80) (n = 61)
Standard Standard
Sources of risk Mean deviation  Mean deviation
Changes in government commodity programs 3.83 1.08 3.66 1.03
Changes in environmental regulations 3.81 1.03 4.13** .78
Crop yield variability 4.21 .91 4.13 .78
Crop price variability 4.31 .87 4.16 .86
Livestock production variability2 2.86 1.40 2.68 1.34
Livestock price variability2 3.17 1.54 2.75 1.37
Changes in costs of current inputs 3.70 .89 3.89 .84
Changes in land rents 3.18 1.16 3.56** .96
Changes in costs of capital items 3.66 .94 3.77 .82
Changes in technology 3.54 1.03 3.84* .97
Changes in interest rates 3.48 1.09 3.52 1.09
Changes in credit availability 3.05 1.29 3.21 1.23
Injury, illness, or death of operator 3.86 1.30 4.39** .94
Family health concerns -- -- 4.05 .91
Changes in family relationships 3.36 1.42 3.73 1.29
Changes in family labor force 2.96 1.28 3.11 1.25
-- = Not applicable. n = Number. * The difference between years is statistically significant at the 10-percent confidence level. ** The difference between years
is statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
11 = Not important; 5 = Very important. 2In 1991, only 65 and 66 of 80 farmers responded to the livestock production and price variability questions. Had the
nonrespondents been coded as a 1 (not important), the means would have been 2.50 and 2.79 for livestock production and price variability, respectively.
Source: Excerpted by ERS from Patrick, George F., and Wesley N. Musser, Sources of and Responses to Risk: Factor Analyses of Large-Scale Cornbelt
Farmers. Staff Paper No. 95-17, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics, December 1995.The sources ofriskin
agriculture range
from price and yield
riskto financial and
contracting risk.







































Sources of Risk in Farming
Some risks are unique to agriculture, such as the risk of bad weather
significantly reducing yields within a given year. Other risks, such as
the price or institutional risks discussed below, while common to all
businesses, reflect an added economic cost to the producer. If the
farmer’s benefit-cost tradeoff favors mitigation, then he or she will
attempt to lower the possibility of adverse effects. These risks include
the following (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson; Boehlje and Trede;
Baquet, Hambleton, and Jose; Fleisher):
Production or yield risk occurs because agriculture is affected by
many uncontrollable events that are often related to weather, includ-
ing excessive or insufficient rainfall, extreme temperatures, hail,
insects, and diseases. Technology plays a key role in production risk in
farming. The rapid introduction of new crop varieties and production
techniques often offers the potential for improved efficiency, but may
at times yield poor results, particularly in the short term. In contrast,
the threat of obsolescence exists with certain practices (for example,
using machinery for which parts are no longer available), which cre-
ates another, and different, kind of risk.
Price or market risk reflects risks associated with changes in the
price of output or of inputs that may occur after the commitment to
production has begun. In agriculture, production generally is a lengthy
process. Livestock production, for example, typically requires ongoing
investments in feed and equipment that may not produce returns for
several months or years. Because markets are generally complex and
involve both domestic and international considerations, producer
returns may be dramatically affected by events in far-removed regions
of the world.
Institutional risk results from changes in policies and regulations
that affect agriculture. This type of risk is generally manifested as
unanticipated production constraints or price changes for inputs or for
output. For example, changes in government rules regarding the use of
pesticides (for crops) or drugs (for livestock) may alter the cost of pro-
duction or a foreign country’s decision to limit imports of a certain crop
may reduce that crop’s price. Other institutional risks may arise from
changes in policies affecting the disposal of animal manure, restric-
tions in conservation practices or land use, or changes in income tax
policy or credit policy.
Farmers are also subject to the human or personal risks that are
common to all business operators. Disruptive changes may result from
such events as death, divorce, injury, or the poor health of a principal
in the firm. In addition, the changing objectives of individuals involved
in the farming enterprise may have significant effects on the longrun
performance of the operation. Asset risk is also common to all busi-
nesses and involves theft, fire, or other loss or damage to equipment,
buildings, and livestock. A type of risk that appears to be of growing
importance is contracting risk, which involves opportunistic behavior
and the reliability of contracting partners.
Financial risk differs from the business risks previously described in
that it results from the way the firm’s capital is obtained and financed.
A farmer may be subject to fluctuations in interest rates on borrowed
capital, or face cash flow difficulties if there are insufficient funds to
repay creditors. The use of borrowed funds means that a share of the
returns from the business must be allocated to meeting debt pay-
ments. Even when a farm is 100-percent owner financed, the opera-
tor’s capital is still exposed to the probability of losing equity or net
worth.Y Yi ie el ld d  v va ar ri ia ab bi il li it ty y  i is s
h hi ig gh he er r  a at t  t th he e  f fa ar rm m
l le ev ve el l  t th ha an n  a at t  t th he e
S St ta at te e  o or r  n na at ti io on na al l
l le ev ve el l..
































Y Yi ie el ld d  R Ra an nd do om mn ne es ss s  V Va ar ri ie es s
R Re eg gi io on na al ll ly y
Y
ield variability for a given crop
differs geographically and
depends on soil type and quality,
climate, and the use of irrigation.
Yield variability is often measured
by an indicator known as the “coef-
ficient of variation,” which meas-
ures randomness relative to the
mean (or average) value in the
yield series. Using this measure,
variability in corn yields, for exam-
ple, ranges from about 0.2 to about
0.4 across U.S. farms (fig. 1). These
estimates were obtained by combin-
ing 10 years of individual farm-
level yield observations (obtained
from USDA’s Risk Management
Agency (RMA) records) with longer
series of county yield observations
from USDA’s National Agricultural
Statistics Service (NASS).2
As can be seen from the map, yield
variability tends to be lowest in
irrigated areas and in the central
Corn Belt, where soils are deep and
rainfall is dependable. Much corn
production in Nebraska, for exam-
ple, is irrigated, and yield variabili-
ty is, as a result, quite low. Yield
variability is also quite low in Iowa,
Illinois, and other Corn Belt States,
where the climate and soils provide
a nearly ideal location for corn pro-
duction. In areas where corn
acreage tends to be fairly low and
in areas far removed from the cen-
tral Corn Belt, yield variability is
generally higher.
Yield variability can be measured
using farm-, State-, or national-
level data. Estimates tend to be
lower when variability is meas-
ured at the higher State or nation-
al levels of aggregation than at the
farm level of aggregation, as
shown in the map. This is because
random deviations tend to offset
each other when averages are
taken across farms. Also, condi-
tions across the region of aggrega-
tion may vary widely. Farmers’
risks can be seriously underesti-
mated by using yield variabilities
measured at the county level or at
higher levels of aggregation.
M Me ea as su ur ri in ng g  P Pr ri ic ce e  a an nd d  Y Yi ie el ld d  R Ri is sk k
Price and yield risk, the most important types of risk faced
by many producers, have interesting characteristics. Yield
risk varies regionally and depends on soil type, climate, the
use of irrigation, and other variables. In contrast, price risk
for a given commodity depends on such factors as commodi-
ty stock levels and export demand. As illustrated below, crop
prices tend to be more volatile than livestock prices, reflect-
ing the yield risk inherent in crop production. For a more
detailed understanding of risk measurement and how his-
torical information can be used to estimate future risk, see
appendix 1.
2Yield variances were estimated by coun-
ty for 1995 by regressing 1956-95 NASS
yields on time using a generalized least
squares estimator, which corrected for yield
heteroscedasticity. Variances of differences
between farm yields and NASS county yields
were estimated for all farms in the RMA
records using 1985-94 observations for the
two data sets. Farm yield variances by coun-
ty were estimated as the sum of the estimat-
ed county yield variance and the average
variance of farm-county yield differences for
farms in the county. Covariances between
farm-county yield differences and county
yields were assumed to be zero, which is
true, on average, for all farms in a county.P Pr ri ic ce e  R Ra an nd do om mn ne es ss s  D Di if ff fe er rs s  
A Am mo on ng g  C Co om mm mo od di it ti ie es s  a an nd d
C Ch ha an ng ge es s  O Ov ve er r  T Ti im me e
While yield expectations before
planting generally follow trends,
price expectations often fluctuate
substantially from year to year
depending on commodity stock lev-
els, export demand, and other fac-
tors. Futures price quotes serve as
useful proxies for price expecta-
tions for commodities traded on
futures exchanges. For example, a
September quote for the Kansas
City wheat futures contract that
matures the following July can be
interpreted as the market’s expec-
tation in September of the value of
hard red winter wheat in that next
July.3
Price randomness can be estimated
by measuring futures price quote
changes from one trading date to
another. Thus, one measure of price
risk for winter wheat at planting
time is the standard deviation (or
coefficient of variation) of price
changes from September to July in
the July wheat futures price. That
is, the difference between the
September 1 quote and the next
July 1 quote on the July futures
contract can be obtained for several
years, and the standard deviation
(or coefficient of variation) calculat-
ed on that annual series of price dif-
ference observations.
Price variability or risk can be
measured using ratios of successive
prices, Pt / Pt-1 , instead of differ-
ences, Pt - Pt-1 , as used in the
example above. Ratios offer several
advantages. First, the use of ratios
may eliminate the need to make
adjustments for inflation, provided
that inflation rates are approxi-
mately constant over the period
analyzed. Second, ratios are unit
free, which facilitates comparisons
among commodities. Third, measur-






































3A futures contract is an agreement
entered into on an exchange (such as the
Chicago Board of Trade or the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange) between a seller who
commits to deliver and a buyer who com-
mits to pay for a commodity. Exchange
trading and standardization foster competi-
tion, and futures contract quotes are among
the best current estimates of prices expect-







Estimated farm-level corn yield coefficient of variation by county, 1995
Notes: Shaded areas include counties with at least 500 acres planted to corn. Lower corn yield variability
indicates that farm yields fall within a narrower range. Based on farm-level data, 1985-94, and long-term 
county-level trend.
Source: Constructed by ERS from USDA, NASS electronic county yield files, 1997, and USDA, RMA
electronic experience and yield record database.allows the comparison of volatilities
estimated over time intervals of dif-
ferent lengths. For example, the
price volatility estimated with daily
data for a given month can be com-
pared with the volatility estimated
for a year using this procedure.
Futures quotes provide a vehicle
for observing price volatility
changes over the growing season.
To illustrate, volatilities in Decem-
ber corn futures prices were esti-
mated by month using a 10-year
average of the annualized standard
deviation of log (P t / P t-1) for “t”
ranging over all trading days of the
month.4 In this example, volatility
in December corn prices tends to
be relatively low from the preced-
ing December until just prior to
planting time in April (fig. 2).
Volatility increases at planting
time and is quite high during the
critical months of the growing sea-
son as information (particularly
weather information) emerges and
affects prices. Volatility is lower
again in September and the follow-
ing months, when yields have been
largely determined.
Price volatility differs among com-
modities. To estimate volatility for
those commodities not traded on
futures markets, price expectations
must be approximated in other
ways. The preceding year’s price is
one of the simplest proxies for the
expected price in a given year.
Figure 3 reports estimates of price
volatilities, based on annual obser-
vations, for 20 commodities. The
volatilities shown are the standard
deviations of the logarithms of
ratios of the current year’s price to
the preceding year’s price for 1987-
96. Price variability changes over
time, of course, as market condi-
tions and government programs
change, but relative price variabili-
ties for the different commodities
tend to be similar between decades
(Heifner and Kinoshita). In this
example, crop prices were more
volatile than livestock prices,
largely reflecting the importance of
yield risk in crop production.
Those crops exhibiting the highest
volatilities (exceeding 20 percent)
include dry edible beans, pears,
lettuce, apples, rice, grapefruit,
and grain sorghum. Volatilities for














































Source: Estimated by ERS from Chicago Board of Trade data.
Figure 2
Volatility of December corn futures by month, averages 
for 1987-96
4For example, the January volatility esti-
mate was constructed by averaging over the
10 years the annualized standard devia-
tions of logarithms of daily December
futures settlement price relatives, log(Pt /
Pt-1), over the trading days in each January.less than 10 percent, while volatili-
ties for the other commodities fell
in the 10- to 20-percent range.
Price variability changes not only
within the year, but also between
years due to year-to-year differences
in crop prospects over the growing
season, changes in government pro-
gram provisions, and changes in
global supply and demand condi-
tions. Figure 4 shows estimates of
corn price volatility by decade, based
on annual observations and the log
(P t / P t-1 ) procedure described ear-
lier. Corn price variability was quite
high during the 1920’s and 1930’s,
largely due to the collapse of grain
prices in the post-World War I peri-
od and very low yields in 1934 and
1936. Volatility was low during the
1950’s and 1960’s, a period charac-
terized by high government support,
fairly stable yields, and consistent
demand. The 1970’s realized sizable
purchases by Russia early in the
decade, and poor crops in 1983 and
1988 contributed to variability in
the 1980’s. Since 1990, variability
has been near long-term average
levels. The same pattern applies to
the other grains as well.
Although price volatility (as well
as price levels) can vary substan-
tially over time, prices are highly
correlated geographically. Price dif-
ferences between locations are
more or less held constant by the
potential for transporting com-
modities from low-price areas to
high-price areas, while price differ-
ences between grades and classes
are similarly constrained by the
possibility of substituting one
grade or class for another. How-
ever, prices for grades or classes
that normally sell at a premium
on a more limited market, such as
high protein spring wheat, may be
more variable than prices for the
bulk of the commodity.
Hauling commodities is profitable
whenever the price differential
between two points exceeds haul-
ing costs. These spatial price rela-
tionships are re-established daily
for those commodities traded on
futures exchanges as local buyers
adjust the prices they offer to
farmers to maintain desired rela-
tionships with the futures price.
For example, consider a central
Illinois elevator operator in
Grain prices tend to
be more volatile than
livestockprices,with
some fruits and veg-
etables also exhibit-
ing quite high year-
to-yearvolatilities
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Price volatility, selected commodities, 1987-96
Percent
Source: Estimated by ERS from USDA, NASS,  Agricultural Prices,  various issues.January, who sees the March
futures price for corn decline. If
the operator did not respond by
reducing the price to producers,
the elevator may end up paying
more to producers than the corn
could be sold for in March.
In contrast to prices, yields are
much less highly correlated geo-
graphically. Yield differences
between locations vary from year
to year due to varying weather
conditions in different locations. In
1988, for example, a major drought
greatly reduced corn and soybean
yields in the Midwest. As a result,
the yield differential between the
central Corn Belt (Iowa and
Illinois) and the Southeast was
much less than in years of wide-
spread normal weather.
Y Yi ie el ld ds s   a an nd d   P Pr ri ic ce es s   T Te en nd d   T To o   M Mo ov ve e  
i in n  O Op pp po os si it te e  D Di ir re ec ct ti io on ns s
Prices for agricultural commodities
at the national or world level tend
to be high when yields are low, and
vice versa, because total demand
for food changes only moderately
from year to year, while supply can
fluctuate considerably due to
weather in major producing coun-
tries. Consumers bid up the price
for crops in short supply, while
crops in abundant supply clear the
market only at low prices. When
two variables, such as price and
yield, tend to move in opposite
directions, they are said to be neg-
atively correlated.
The magnitude of price-yield corre-
lation, which measures the strength
of the relationship between price
and yield, varies depending on the
level of the comparison. Yield and
price on a farm, for example, need
not be related because the output of
one farm does not noticeably affect
market prices. However, yields
among farms within a region tend
to move together. As a result, indi-
vidual farm yields in major produc-
tion areas tend to be positively cor-
related with national yields and,
therefore, negatively correlated with
price. A negative yield-price correla-
tion means that a farmer’s revenue
is less variable from year to year
than it would be otherwise. The
more negative the correlation, the
greater the “offsetting” relationship
(or “natural hedge”) that works to
stabilize revenues.
Estimates of the farm price-yield
correlation for corn in selected
counties in the United States indi-
cate that the correlation tends to
be more strongly negative in the
In majorproducing
areas,the tendency
forprice to be high
when yields are low
(and vice versa) pro-















































Volatility of corn prices by decade
Source: Estimated by ERS from USDA, NASS, Agricultural Prices, various issues, and other 
historical price data published by USDA. Corn Belt than in bordering areas
of production (fig. 5). Thus, the nat-
ural hedge is more effective in the
Corn Belt, and natural movements
in price and yield work to inherent-
ly stabilize incomes to a greater
extent in that area than elsewhere.
In areas outside major producing
locations (such as in the Southeast
or along the east coast), the natu-
ral hedge is much weaker, meaning
that low yields and low prices (or
conversely, high yields and high
prices) are more likely to occur
simultaneously. Wheat generally
exhibits lower yield-price correla-
tions and weaker natural hedges
than corn because production is
less geographically concentrated.
The magnitude of the natural
hedge has implications for the
effectiveness of various risk-reduc-
ing tools. A weaker natural hedge
(with a slightly negative correla-
tion between price and yield), for
example, implies that forward pric-
ing by hedging in futures or by
selling forward on the cash market
is more effective in reducing
income risk than when a strong
natural hedge exists, other factors
held constant. In such situations,
fixing a sales price for the crop
works to establish one component
of revenue, reducing the likelihood
of simultaneously low (or high)
prices and yields. As a result,
hedging corn can, at times, be
more effective in reducing risk in
those areas outside the major pro-
ducing regions of the Corn Belt.
Because income risk depends on
factors other than the price-yield
correlation, however, the effective-
ness of hedging in reducing risk is
more complicated. In particular,
yield variability is an important
factor. Corn yields are typically
more variable outside the Corn
Belt, and hedging effectiveness
declines as yield variability in-
creases. Because yield variability
tends to outweigh the impacts of
the price-yield correlation, hedging
effectiveness tends to be higher in
the Corn Belt than in less robust
producing areas. The interaction of
yield variability, price variability,
and the price-yield correlation in
influencing the effectiveness of risk
management tools are important
factors affecting producers’ choice
of the risk management strategies
discussed in the next section.
The tendencyfor
corn yields and










































Farm-level corn yield-price correlation by county, 1974-94
Note: Shaded areas include counties with at least 500 acres planted to corn.
Source: Constructed by ERS from USDA, NASS electronic county yield files, 1997, and USDA, RMA
electronic experience and yield record database.D Di iv ve er rs si if fi ic ca at ti io on n  i is s  a a
f fr re eq qu ue en nt tl ly y  u us se ed d  r ri is sk k
m ma an na ag ge em me en nt t  s st tr ra at te e- -
g gy y  t th ha at t  i in nv vo ol lv ve es s  p pa ar r- -
t ti ic ci ip pa at ti in ng g  i in n  m mo or re e
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T
he price and yield risks dis-
cussed earlier, along with a
farmer’s attitude toward risk, have
a major impact on the choice of
risk management strategies and
tools. In analyzing the risk-return
tradeoffs associated with different
approaches, a producer must con-
sider his or her expected return to
different choices and the variance
in returns. Economists have used
several approaches to capture
these tradeoffs, which vary in how
they describe a farmer’s “world
view” and how flexible they are in
specifying risk attitudes (see
appendix 2 for details).
E En nt te er rp pr ri is se e  D Di iv ve er rs si if fi ic ca at ti io on n
Diversification is a frequently used
risk management strategy that
involves participating in more
than one activity. The motivation
for diversifying is based on the
idea that returns from various
enterprises do not move up and
down in lockstep, so that when one
activity has low returns, other
activities likely would have higher
returns. A crop farm, for example,
may have several productive enter-
prises (several different crops or
both crops and livestock), or may
operate disjoint parcels so that
localized weather disasters are
less likely to reduce yields for all
crops simultaneously.
Many crop farms in the Corn Belt,
for example, produce both corn and
soybeans. By producing both crops
instead of only one, the farm is
less at risk of having low revenues
because revenues from the two
crops are not perfectly positively
correlated. In some years, low corn
revenues may be counterbalanced
by relatively high soybean rev-
enues. Diversification in farming
has many similarities to the man-
agement of financial instruments.
Mutual fund managers, for exam-
ple, tend to hold many stocks, thus
diversifying and limiting the losses
of a particular stock doing poorly.
The extent of farm diversification
in U.S. agriculture is a difficult
concept to measure. USDA analy-
sis has measured diversification
using an entropy index, which
accounts for both the mix of com-
modities and the relative impor-
tance of each commodity (meas-
ured by its estimated value) to
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5 5
Farmers have many options in managing agricultural risks.
They can adjust the enterprise mix (diversify) or the finan-
cial structure of the farm (the mix of debt and equity capi-
tal). In addition, farmers have access to various tools—such
as insurance and hedging—that can help reduce their farm-
level risks. Indeed, most producers combine the use of many
different strategies and tools. Producers must decide on the
scale of the operation, the degree of control over resources
(including how much to borrow and the number of hours, if
any, worked off the farm), the allocation of resources among
enterprises, and how much to insure and price forward.
5The ordering of topics in this section
does not reflect their relative importance.
In addition, the length of discussion associ-
ated with a particular topic is not meant to
indicate importance, but reflects the com-
plexity of the topic and diversity of the 
literature.farm businesses (Jinkins). The
entropy index spans a continuous
range from 0 to 100. The value of
the index for a completely special-
ized farm producing one commodi-
ty is 0. A completely diversified
farm with equal shares of each
commodity has an entropy index of
100. These entropy indexes for
individual producers can be aggre-
gated to provide weighted average
entropy indexes by farm type, farm
size, and other classifications.
Based on the Agricultural
Resource Management Study
(ARMS), USDA’s entropy index
work indicates that cotton farms
(with an average index of 50) are
among the most diversified, pro-
ducing substantial quantities of
cotton, cash grains, fruits and veg-
etables, and in some cases, live-
stock (table 3). Poultry farms,
where 96 percent of the value of
production was from poultry in
1990, were the least diversified,
likely in part due to the impor-
tance of production contracts. Such
contracts can reduce producers’
risk, reducing income variability
and lessening producers’ interest
in diversification as a risk man-
agement tool (Dodson). In the
Northern Plains and Corn Belt,
farms tended to be less diversified
than in other parts of the country,
particularly when compared with
farms in the Southeast (Jinkins).
In addition, data from the ARMS
survey indicate that a large por-
tion of commercial farming opera-
tions specialized in one or two
enterprises during the period
1987-91.6 On average, one-third of
all commercial U.S. farms received
nearly all production from just two
enterprises during that period.
Further, about one-third of aggre-
gate farm production on commer-
cial farms was from those engaged
in only two enterprises (Dodson).
Many factors may contribute to a
farmer’s decision to diversify. The
underlying theory suggests that
farmers are more likely to diversi-
fy if they confront greater risks in
farming, are relatively risk averse,
and face small reductions in
expected returns in response to
diversification. Other factors may
also be important. Continuing the
corn and soybean example dis-
cussed earlier, planting corn after
soybeans may reduce the need for
fertilizer because of the nitrogen-
fixing properties of soybean plants,
and planting both corn and soy-
beans may spread out labor and
machine use over critical times in
the planting and harvesting sea-
sons. In situations where livestock
is part of the enterprise mix, the
operator may be kept busy
throughout the year, and crop and
animal byproducts may be used
more fully (Beneke).
Depending on the farm’s situation,
however, the costs of diversifying
may outweigh the benefits, and
specializing may be the preferred
strategy. Diversifying often
requires specialized equipment (for
example, different harvesting
attachments), and may be limited
by managerial expertise and labor,
the productive capacity of the
land, and the market potential in
the surrounding area (Dodson).
Diversifying requires a broader
range of management expertise
than does producing only one com-
modity, and does not typically
allow for intensive management.
As technologies become more com-
plicated, such intensive manage-
ment and greater farm specializa-




farms are among the
mostdiversified,
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6Commercial farms in this specific paper
were defined as those that received at least
$50,000 in annual sales, and where the
operator supplied at least 2,000 hours of
labor annually and designated farming as
his or her primary occupation. This defini-
tion is more restrictive than is commonly
assumed.As a result, farmers face tradeoffs
when examining diversification as
a strategy versus specialization.
Specializing can refine the expert-
ise needed for a particular produc-
tive activity, and may also lead to
the economies of scale that lower
per unit production costs, increas-
ing the profitability of the opera-
tion. Indeed, a producer’s decision
to specialize (or diversify) may be
motivated purely by expected prof-
its, with no consideration given to
reducing risk. Conversely, the ben-
efits associated with diversifying
arise through the potential offset-
ting revenue interactions among
enterprises, and the complemen-
tarity of equipment and activities
that are used within the farming
operation (Scherer).
Empirical analyses of diversifica-
tion in farming have usually
focused on factors influencing
enterprise choices. As an example,
a study of over 1,000 crop farms in
the San Joaquin Valley of
California examined the relation-
ship between diversification and
such variables as farm size and
wealth. The authors were interest-
ed in the tradeoffs between risk
reduction and potential size
economies in a given activity. They
found that wealthier farmers are
more specialized, perhaps because
they are less risk averse than
farmers having lower net worths
(Pope and Prescott). Similarly, they
found that corporate farms (with
diversified ownership and limited
liabilities) are more specialized, as
are operators of smaller farms (as
measured by cropped acreage) and
younger (or less experienced) oper-
ators. Young farmers may start
small and specialized operations,
and perhaps become more diversi-
fied as they expand their opera-
tions. Farm size (measured by
acres cropped) had a positive effect
on diversification.
The effects of multiple enterprises
on reducing risk have also been
analyzed. Schoney, Taylor, and
Hayward examined crop enterprise
mixes for Saskatchewan farmers,
and found that the gross incomes
among crops were highly correlat-
ed. As a result, they concluded that
little risk reduction was gained by
diversifying beyond two or three
crops. In addition, they found that,
although several crops typically
had a risk-reducing effect on the
portfolio, these benefits were typi-
cally outweighed by the lower
gross incomes associated with such
levels of diversification.
Several diversification studies
have also looked at combining live-
stock and crop enterprises on an
operation, with the results depend-
ing on the time period of the
analysis and other factors. Held
and Zink, for example, found that
adding livestock to a hypothetical
The benefits associ-
ated with diversify-
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farming operation.




























Table 3—Diversification measurement using entropy indexes, 1990
Extent of Value of Average enterprises
measure of production from in the
Commodity diversification major  commodity operation
Entropy
index Percent Number 
Cotton 50 62 2.5
Tobacco 42 76 2.2
Cash grains 39 76 1.9
Vegetables, fruits, and nuts 39 80 1.9
Nursery, greenhouse 32 57 1.2
Beef, hogs, and sheep 25 85 1.8
Dairy 24 85 2.4
Poultry 9 96 1.5
Source: Excerpted by ERS from Jinkins, John, “Measuring Farm and Ranch Business Diversity,” Agricultural
Income and Finance Situation and Outlook Report, AFO-45, U.S. Dept. Agr., Econ. Res. Serv., May 1992, 
pp. 28-30.eastern Wyoming irrigated crop
farm could increase gross margin
by 7 percent and reduce the coeffi-
cient of variation from 0.63 to
0.42. Woolery and Adams indicated
that diversified land use, combined
with livestock, could increase net
income and reduce relative income
variability for South Dakota and
Wyoming farms. Other studies
have reached mixed results as to
the risk-return tradeoff (see
Persaud and Mapp; Sonka and
Patrick). Despite any benefits that
may accrue to enterprise diversifi-
cation, the opportunities are often
limited by resources, climatic con-
ditions, market outlets, and other
factors (Sonka and Patrick).
Geographical diversification
(farming at several noncontiguous
locations) may also mitigate risks
in crop production by reducing the
chances that local weather events
(such as hail storms) will have a
disastrous effect on income.
Nartea and Barry examined this
form of diversification using
Illinois corn and soybean data,
and found that risk was not
reduced significantly until land
parcels were separated by at least
30 miles. They accounted for the
costs associated with farming
across widely dispersed plots (for
example, moving equipment and
people and monitoring crop condi-
tions), and concluded that widely
dispersed tracts typically create
unfavorable risk-return tradeoffs
for producers. When widely dis-
persed parcels are observed, it is
likely because of farmers’ desire to
expand their operations, and their
difficulty in finding additional
tracts of farmland that are close
to their farming bases. Those most
likely to gain from geographic dis-
persion of parcels are institutional
investors with large acreages who
do not have to transport equip-
ment and who use tenants to farm
their holdings.
V Ve er rt ti ic ca al l  I In nt te eg gr ra at ti io on n
Vertical integration is one of sever-
al strategies that fall within the
umbrella of “vertical coordination.”
Vertical coordination includes all
of the ways that output from one
stage of production and distribu-
tion is transferred to another
stage. Farming has traditionally
operated in an open production
system, where a commodity is pur-
chased from a producer at a mar-
ket price determined at the time of
purchase. The use of open produc-
tion has declined, however, and
vertical coordination has increased
as consumers have become
increasingly sophisticated and
improvements in technology have
allowed greater product differenti-
ation (Martinez and Reed; Allen).
A vertically integrated firm, which
retains ownership control of a com-
modity across two or more levels of
activity, represents one type of ver-
tical coordination (Mighell and
Jones).7
There are many examples of verti-
cal integration in farming. Farmers
who raise corn and hay as feed for
their dairy operations are vertical-
ly integrated across both crop and
livestock production. Similarly, cat-
tle producers who combine raising
a cow-calf herd, backgrounding the
animals to medium weights, and




































7Other types of vertical coordination
reflect differing degrees to which a firm at
one stage of production exerts control over
the quality or quantity of output at other
stages (Martinez and Reed). When produc-
tion contracts are used, for example, the
contractor (or integrator) typically retains
control over the commodity and most
inputs, and the farmer usually receives an
incentive-based fee for production services.
In this case, the producer retains little con-
trol over production decisions. When mar-
keting contracts are used, in contrast, a
firm commits to purchasing a commodity
from a producer at a price formula estab-
lished in advance of the purchase, and the
producer retains a large degree of decision-
making control. Both production and mar-
keting contracts are discussed in subse-
quent sections in this report.are vertically integrated. As these
examples illustrate, vertical inte-
gration can encompass changing
the form of the product (corn into
livestock), or combining stages in
the production process under own-
ership by one entity (as in the cat-
tle example).
From the farmer’s perspective, the
decision to integrate vertically
depends on many complex factors,
including the change in profits
associated with vertical integra-
tion, the risks associated with the
quantity and quality of the supply
of inputs (or outputs) before and
after integration, and other fac-
tors. In particular, the relationship
between vertical integration and
risk involves an evaluation of the
expected returns and the variance
and covariance of the farmer’s
return on investment for the cur-
rent activity and the integration
alternative (Logan). If the correla-
tion is positive and large across
activities, the gains in risk effi-
ciency from vertical integration
may be relatively low. In contrast,
a negative correlation across activ-
ities implies that integrating verti-
cally may well reduce risk for the
farmer by internalizing processes
within the operation.
In practice, vertical integration in
agriculture often involves owner-
ship of both farm production and
processing activities, particularly
in certain parts of the livestock
sector (table 4). Vertical integra-
tion is fairly common in the turkey
industry, for example, where about
30 percent of production takes
place on farms that perform multi-
ple functions. On the largest oper-
ations, the enterprise mix may
include a feed mill, a hatchery, a
grow-out operation, a slaughter
facility, and a packing plant. In
such cases, integration moves both
backward into inputs (feed manu-
facturing) and forward into the fin-
ished, consumer-ready product.
Similarly, egg producers with large
operations may own their own feed
mill, hatchery, laying operation,
and freezing/drying plant for the
processing of egg products
(Manchester).
Vertical integration is also com-
mon in certain specialty crops, par-
ticularly for fresh vegetable and
potato operations (table 4). In
these industries, vertical integra-
tion often encompasses not only
production of the crop, but also
sorting, assembling, and packaging
products for retail sales. Large,
vertically integrated vegetable
growers, for example, often both
pack and sell their own vegetables,
displaying their private brand
names on packages, and at times
Vertical integration
is much more com-







































Sheep and lambs 12 28
Field crops:
Food grains 1 1
Feed grains 1 1
Specialty crops:
Processed vegetables 10 9
Fresh vegetables 30 40
Potatoes 25 40
Citrus 9 8
Other fruits and nuts 20 25
Total farm output 5 8
Source: Martinez, Steve W., and Al Reed, From Farmers to Consumers: Vertical Coordination in the Food
Industry, AIB-720, U.S. Dept. Agr., Econ. Res. Serv., June 1996.investing in research targeted at
developing new varieties.
Incentives prompting an operation
to adopt this type of vertically
integrated strategy include the
need for extensive quality control
(through control of cultural prac-
tices and planting dates) and the
desire for brand-name identifica-
tion of products, signaling known-
quality produce to buyers
(Powers).
While the above examples relate to
individual operations, farmers may
join together in a cooperative
organization that is vertically inte-
grated across functions.8 Examples
of farmer-owned, vertically inte-
grated cooperatives include Ocean
Spray, which is owned by about 950
cranberry and citrus growers in
the United States and Canada and
markets fresh products and bottled
juices (Shee). Other vertically inte-
grated cooperatives include Land
O’Lakes (owned by dairy growers)
and Sunkist (owned largely by
California citrus growers).
There are also examples of grain
farmers who have cooperatively
integrated into processing and
other functions. Wheat growers in
the Fairmount, North Dakota, area
jointly invested in the construction
of Dakota Valley Mills in late 1997,
a farmer-owned mill supplied with
wheat from local producers
(Sosland Publishing Company,
Sept. 1997). Similarly, a Kansas-
based farmer cooperative, Twenty-
first Century Grain Processing,
secured an option in early 1997 to
buy a New Mexico flour mill.
Producer members who participate
in this venture deliver wheat under
a marketing agreement to different
points in Kansas and Oklahoma for
transport to the New Mexico
milling site (Sosland Publishing
Company, Feb. 1997; Fee).
The Dakota Growers Pasta
Company, which is run by produc-
ers in a three-State area in the
upper Midwest and includes a mill
and pasta plant, is similar in con-
cept to the Twenty-first Century
venture just discussed. Each
Dakota Growers farmer buys a
share of the company and enters
into a contract for delivery of a
pre-determined quality and quan-
tity of wheat by a certain date
each year (Martinez and Reed). If
the average open-market price for
a given period exceeds the contract
price, a farmer’s payment is
increased above the initial contract
amount. Conversely, if the average
market price is less than the con-
tract price, the firm makes up the
difference. Premiums are paid for
wheat of exceptional quality, and
growers can purchase wheat from
company-held stocks in severe
yield-loss years. By operating in
such a manner, the Dakota
Growers Pasta Company is not
only vertically integrated into
milling and pasta production, but
also relies on marketing contracts
(see later discussion) among its
farmer-members.
As noted earlier, the incentives for
vertical integration can arise
either from producers or from buy-
ers further down the marketing
chain who realize an opportunity
to enhance their potential profits
or reduce their risk. A farmer (or
group of farmers) may vertically
integrate “downstream” (forward
in the marketing channel), for
example, to assure a market for
their commodity and to capture a
greater share of the value that is
associated with the production
process. By doing so, they may
enhance their profits by lowering
transactions costs and by using
management and other resources
more efficiently. Risk can also be
reduced by guaranteeing a market
outlet and by avoiding the uncer-
tainties of selling and purchasing
intermediate commodities in








































8For more information on cooperatives,
see Frederick. Although the discussion here
focuses on farmer cooperatives that also
engage in processing, many other types of
cooperatives exist.processor may vertically integrate
“upstream” (backwards in the mar-
keting channel) to exercise greater
control over the quality and timing
of deliveries and the quality of
inputs used in the production
process. Again, reduced risk and/or
greater profits may result.
The risk-reducing benefits associ-
ated with vertical integration
depend to a great extent on the
nature of the industry. Typically,
the benefits associated with inte-
gration increase as production and
marketing interrelationships
become more complex and when
breakdowns in marketplace com-
petition are most likely (such as
opportunistic behavior by contract-
ing parties). For perfectly competi-
tive industries, all firms are sub-
ject to price fluctuations caused by
supply and demand shifts—
whether or not they are vertically
integrated—and integration can-
not provide protection from such
risks. In such industries, the bene-
fits to integration may be small.
When imperfect markets exist, in
contrast, firms can benefit by some
combination of improved informa-
tion access, internalized transac-
tions costs, and efficiencies in mar-
ket exchange (Perry, 1989). As a
result, firms tend to integrate
when the costs incurred in using
the market price mechanism
exceed the costs of organizing
those activities within the man-
agement control of a single opera-
tion (Scherer).
While vertical integration can lead
to reduced risks and/or enhanced
profits for some firms or growers,
others may find such a strategy
unattractive. Depending on the
size of the firm and the extent of
the proposed integration, the bene-
fits associated with specialization
and scale economies can be greatly
reduced or lost, particularly in per-
fectly competitive markets. For
growers in such markets who
choose to vertically integrate, the
gain may be primarily through
enterprise (or business) diversifi-
cation (Perry, 1989). In addition,
the size and scope of the operation
can have a major impact on inte-
gration choice.
Empirical applications have exam-
ined the linkage between vertical
integration and farm-level risk.
One such study, focusing on cattle
production in the Texas rolling
plains, illustrates the importance
of size of firm and income growth
on integration choice (Whitson,
Barry, and Lacewell). This study,
responding to concerns about price
uncertainty and the changing
structure of the livestock industry,
evaluated the risk-return effects of
selling fed calves or holding them
through subsequent stages in the
production process. It included a
weaned calf stage, a stocker phase
(grazing on wheat pasture), a cus-
tom feeding phase (bypassing the
stocker phase and custom feeding),
and other options.
The authors found that, at low-
income levels, the preferred
sequence involved production of
weaned calves with subsequent
placement in a feedlot, a result
consistent with negative covari-
ances. As growth in ranch income
increased, however, a wheat pas-
ture activity was included in the
vertical sequence to increase
income and meet increased cash
flow requirements over a 5-year
horizon. The manager’s willingness
to accept risk and constraints to
his or her ability to borrow were
critical in determining the final
integration choice.
P Pr ro od du uc ct ti io on n  C Co on nt tr ra ac ct ts s
Production contracts typically give
the contractor (the buyer of the
commodity) considerable control
over the production process (Perry,
1997). These contracts usually
specify in detail the production
inputs supplied by the contractor,
the quality and quantity of a par-







































kdelivered, and the compensation
that is to be paid to the grower. As
an example, a broiler integrator
(contractor) usually retains control
over the chicks as they are raised
by the producer, as well as pre-
scribes specific inputs and special
management practices throughout
the production cycle. In return for
relinquishing control over decision-
making, growers—particularly hog
and broiler growers—are typically
compensated with an incentive-
based fee. According to USDA’s
Agricultural Resource Manage-
ment Study, commodities valued at
approximately $18 billion were
produced under production con-
tracts in 1997.
Firms commonly enter into pro-
duction contracts with farmers to
ensure timeliness and quality of
commodity deliveries, and to gain
control over the methods used in
the production process. Production
contracting is particularly favored
when specialized inputs and com-
plex production technologies are
used, and the end product must
meet rigid quality levels and pos-
sess uniform characteristics.
Production contracting is also
favored when oversupply and
undersupply have been problems,
the risk-return tradeoffs are
advantageous to both the producer
and the contracting firm, produc-
tion technologies are specific, uni-
form, and knowledge-based, cen-
tralized management is feasible,
and the commodity is highly per-
ishable (Kliebenstein and
Lawrence; Barry, Sonka, and
Lajili; Farrell; Harris). In addition,
integrators may prefer to keep
fixed capital assets (such as build-
ings) off of their balance sheets for
liquidity purposes (Barry).
Because the broiler industry pos-
sesses many of these attributes,
production contracting in this
industry is particularly common.
Indeed, about 99 percent of the
value of broiler output was pro-
duced under production contracts
in 1997 (table 5). Such contracting
is also commonly used in the egg
and hog industries. For hogs, the
use of production contracts has
increased rapidly in the past 5
years, as the number of large, spe-
cialized operations has accelerated
and size economies and new health
technologies have encouraged
greater concentration of animals.
These contracts ensure that pack-
ers receive a consistent supply of
high-quality hogs, allow processing
firms to operate at close to optimal
capacity, and allow the marketing
system to be more responsive than
in the past to changes in consumer
preferences (Martinez, Smith, and
Zering).
Two basic types of production con-
tracts are used, which differ in the
amount of control, risk, and uncer-




lyfound in the broil-
er,egg,and hog
industries.




























Table 5—Value of selected commodities produced under production 
contracts, 1997
Value of production under







Total value of production 
under production contracts, 
all commodities1 12 18,215
1Includes $1,627 million in the crop category and $16,588 million in the livestock category.The total value of
agricultural production is $191,724 million.
Source: USDA, ERS, 1997 Agricultural Resource Management Study, special analysis.contracts and resource-providing
contracts. The production manage-
ment contract is commonly used
for processing vegetables (sweet
corn, snap beans, and green peas).
With these contracts, the buyer
gains additional control over deci-
sions that would be made solely by
the grower in the absence of a con-
tract, including planting schedules
and seed varieties (Powers). By
assuming this degree of control,
the contractor increases the likeli-
hood of receiving a commodity that
has specifically desired character-
istics, and nearly all price risk is
shifted to the contractor through
the establishment of an agreed-
upon price upon entry into the
contract. Some price risk remains
with the farmer, however, due to
quality considerations, which may
result in either a discount or a pre-
mium relative to the established
contract price (Lucier). When crops
fail, growers receive no payment
under these contracts and, hence,
bear the production risk associated
with crop shortfalls.
The second type of contract is the
resource-providing contract, which
usually offers contractors a greater
degree of control than do produc-
tion management contracts. These
contracts are often used when spe-
cialized inputs and management
are required to ensure final-prod-
uct attributes, and are particularly
common in the broiler industry.
Under such an arrangement, the
broiler producer generally provides
land, housing facilities, utilities,
and labor, and covers operating
expenses (repairs, maintenance,
and manure disposal). The contrac-
tor usually provides the chicks,
feed, veterinary services, manage-
ment, and transportation.
Significant production decisions—
such as the size and rotation of
flocks, the flock’s genetic charac-
teristics, and the capacity of chick-
en houses—are made by the inte-
grator (Perry, 1997). Thus, the
grower is essentially a custodian of
the production operation for the
integrator.
Much attention in recent years has
been focused on contracting in the
broiler industry and the implica-
tions for producers’ risks and
returns. In this industry, payments
are based on a grower’s perform-
ance efficiency relative to all grow-
ers in his or her group or “round,”
and involve two components. The
first component is the “base pay-
ment,” which is a fixed amount per
pound of live meat produced. The
second component is the “incentive
payment,” which depends on the
grower’s efficiency in feed conver-
sion, the poultry mortality rate for
that grower, and the weight of that
grower’s finished birds relative to
all growers in the round. These
factors are weighted in a calcula-
tion that determines the grower’s
“settlement cost.” If the settlement
cost for all contractor flocks har-
vested within a specified period in
the round is greater than the indi-
vidual grower’s cost, he or she
receives a bonus. In contrast, a
penalty is incurred if the grower’s
settlement cost is high relative to
all other farmers in the round.
Several important risk-related fea-
tures are associated with these
“relative performance” contracts.
Because grower payments depend
largely on production outcomes—
and not feed or broiler prices—
growers do not explicitly bear any
price risk. Furthermore, the rela-
tive nature of the contracts means
that, in the presence of favorable
growing conditions (like ideal
weather), the costs of all growers
in the round are lower and, hence,
no single grower receives a larger
per pound payment. Although
growers do not bear this type of
“common” production risk faced by
all growers in their round, they do
bear the “idiosyncratic” risk specif-
ic to their operation. For example,
an operation that experienced an
unusual disease outbreak and a
higher mortality rate would have a

































khigher settlement cost—and a
penalizing incentive payment—rel-
ative to other growers in the
round. Because of these factors,
this type of production contract
shifts price and common output
risk from individual growers to
integrators, with growers retaining
the idiosyncratic risk specific to
the efficiency of their own opera-
tion (Knoeber and Thurman).
The risk implications associated
with production contracts are
highly conditional on the specific
contract terms. One recent study
of the broiler industry examined
the risk-shifting associated with
the type of relative-performance
contract (a “contract with rounds”)
discussed previously, comparing
the results to a “contracts without
rounds” situation and to an “inde-
pendent grower” situation
(Knoeber and Thurman). They
defined the payment in the con-
tract-without-rounds case as a
fixed payment plus the amount by
which the grower’s feed conversion
performance varies from a fixed
standard that did not change over
time. The “independent” case
assumed that the grower pur-
chased inputs and sold broilers at
market prices, and had not con-
tracted with an integrator.
In that analysis, 89 percent of the
growers realized risk reduction
that was significantly greater in
the relative performance contract
situation than in the contract-
without-rounds case. This is
because relative production con-
tracts eliminate the risk common
to all growers in the round as well
as price risk, leaving only the idio-
syncratic risk specific to produc-
tion on a given operation. In con-
trast, the without-rounds con-
tracts—where payments are made
on a fixed standard representing
the average settlement cost for all
growers for the entire sample—
eliminate only price risk. Knoeber
and Thurman also concluded that
relative and without-rounds con-
tracts reduced risk by 97 and 94
percent, respectively, compared
with the independent grower case.
In both situations, the reduction in
price risk accounted for the major
risk-shifting component.
More recently, Martin analyzed the
risk reduction associated with pro-
duction contracts in the North
Carolina pork industry. Martin’s
research found that the risk-shift-
ing capacity of relative production
contracts was significantly greater
for 36-70 percent of contract grow-
ers compared with without-rounds
contract growers. This is weaker
evidence than realized by Knoeber
and Thurman, and may partly be
explained by the greater homo-
geneity associated with broiler
production. Broilers usually are
both placed on farms and market-
ed at uniform weights, while hogs
may be placed on farms at 30-60
pounds and marketed at weights
varying from 220-280 pounds.
Because there is less output varia-
tion common to all growers in the
hog industry, relative contracts
have less of an impact on grower
risk when compared with without-
rounds contracts. Martin also
found that without-rounds con-
tracts shifted 90 percent of the
grower’s income risk to the inte-
grator when compared with the
independent-grower situation,
with 93.5 percent of income risk
shifted in the case of relative pro-
duction contracts.
In addition to risk-shifting capaci-
ty, production contracts have other
advantages for growers, as well as
for contractors. For contractors, the
use of production contracts can
result in sufficient input supply
control (without the need for verti-
cal integration), as well as
improved response to consumer
demand. Evidence suggests that
farmers enter production contracts
to guarantee market access,
improve efficiency, and ensure
access to capital (Perry, 1997). Most
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2 23 3price risks when compared with
risks on the open market. The com-
bination of lower market risks and
less variable incomes was a major
reason cited by farmers for using
production contracting in at least
one survey (Rhodes and Grimes).
This suggests that farmers are well
aware of the risk-shifting capacity
just illustrated. In addition,
depending on contract terms, farm-
ers can benefit from technical
advice, managerial expertise, and
access to technical advances (such
as high-quality breeding stock)
that may not otherwise be readily
available (Perry, 1997).
Despite such advantages, however,
production contracting has been
criticized. Some observers argue
that production contracting can
limit the entrepreneurial capacity
of growers, and others cite the
risks of contract termination on
short notice (Hamilton; Charlier;
Harris). Contractors may require
upgrades to buildings and other
infrastructure that are unexpected
by the grower, resulting in an
investment risk. In addition, some
growers under a relative perform-
ance system believe that they are
at an unfair disadvantage, arguing
that companies may not have the
incentives to maintain strict accu-
racy in the accounting and alloca-
tion of inputs among growers, and
that absolute standards (as in the
“contracts-without-rounds” case)
may be most equitable and trans-
parent (Jenner). Issues between
growers and integrators have led to
lawsuits on various occasions, and
Iowa, Kansas, and Minnesota have
adopted some form of legislation
regulating production contracting
in agriculture (Johnson and Foster;
Plain; Hamilton and Andrews).
M Ma ar rk ke et ti in ng g  C Co on nt tr ra ac ct ts s
Marketing contracts are either ver-
bal or written agreements between
a buyer and a producer that set a
price and/or an outlet for a com-
modity before harvest or before the
commodity is ready to be marketed
(Perry, 1997). Since ownership of
the commodity is generally
retained by the grower while the
commodity is produced, manage-
ment decisions (such as varieties or
breeds, or input use and timing)
typically remain with the producer.
This latter characteristic—respon-
sibility for management deci-
sions—is critical in distinguishing
marketing contracts from produc-
tion contracts (table 6).
Marketing contracts can take
many forms. They are at times
used by grain farmers to forward
price a growing crop with a coun-
try elevator, where they are
referred to as cash forward con-
tracts. The contract terms vary
across contracts, but typically
establish a price (or contain provi-
sions for setting a price at a later
date) and provide for delivery of a
given quality (or grade) within a
specified time period. A “flat price”
(or fixed price) forward contract
may, for example, state that a
farmer will deliver 10,000 bushels
of No. 2 yellow corn to the local
elevator at harvest for a price of
$3.25 per bushel. Premiums and
discounts may be established for
grain that does not meet specified
quality standards. Flat price con-
tracts are one of the most common
types of forward contracts. The
price typically is the elevator’s
“bid price” for all farmer-delivered
grain. This “bid price” is based on
a current futures quote, less a
“basis” adjustment that reflects
marketing costs between the local








































9Country elevators entering into such
marketing contracts generally hedge their
positions using futures markets. Hedging
provides an offset to any price-level
changes associated with the marketing con-
tracts that elevators negotiate with produc-
ers, and transfers price-level risk to basis
risk (uncertainty in the relationship
between futures and cash prices). See later
discussion of price-level and basis consider-
ations in the "hedging" section.The variety of marketing contracts
available to grain farmers has
increased over time, and nomen-
clature and contract terms vary by
location. Basis contracts, for exam-
ple, are another type of marketing
contract, which provide for the
price to be determined by applying
a specified difference (basis) to a
particular futures contract price to
be observed later, usually when
desired by the farmer. This assures
the farmer an outlet, for later own-
ership transfer, while allowing
gains or losses from changes in the
futures price. Other contracts
transfer ownership immediately
while postponing payment, such as
delayed payment and delayed
price contracts. These contracts
may offer farmers tax advantages,
while allowing the elevator to ship
the grain and open up storage
space. Among these contracts,
delayed (deferred) payment con-
tracts specify the price to be paid,
while delayed price contracts
(sometimes called “deferred price”
or “price later” contracts) provide
that price will equal the elevator’s
bid price, or the futures price
adjusted for basis at a time select-
ed by the farmer.
In contrast, minimum-price con-
tracts guarantee the producer a
minimum price for harvest delivery,
based on futures price quotes at the
time the contract is established,
with the incorporation of a pricing
formula that gives farmers the
opportunity to sell at a higher price
if futures prices increase before the
contract expires (Catania). When
hedge-to-arrive (HTA) contracts are
used, the futures price is fixed in
the contract, but the basis is left
undetermined until a later time.
HTA’s have effects similar to
futures hedges for the farmer,
except that no commissions or mar-
gin deposits are required and the
farmer deals with a local buyer
instead of a broker. (For a compre-


































Table 6—Comparison of marketing and production contract characteristics
Marketing contracts Production contracts 
Contractor: Contractor:
Buys a known quantity and quality of  Arranges to have a specific quality and 
the commodity for a negotiated price quantity of commodity produced
(or pricing arrangement)
Doesn’t own the commodity until it’s  Usually owns the commodity being 
delivered produced
Has little influence over production  Makes most of the production decisions
decisions
Contractee (operator): Contractee (operator):
Has a buyer and a price (or pricing Provides a service and other fixed 
arrangement for commodities  inputs (land, buildings, etc.) for a fee
before they are harvested)
Supplies and finances all or most  Supplies a small part of the total
of the inputs needed to produce  production inputs needed
the commodity
Owns the commodity while it’s being  Usually does not own the commodity
produced
Makes all or most production decisions Makes few, if any, of the production 
decisions
Assumes all risks of production but reduced Bears few price or market uncertainties
price risk and limited production risks
Receives largest share of total value  Receives a fee for production that does
of production not reflect the full market value of the
commodity
Source: Excerpted by ERS from USDA, NASS, Costs and Returns Report Interviewer’s Manual, 
December 1996.types of contracts and areas of risk
exposure, see Kemp; Wisner.)
Most types of contracts do not
completely eliminate price risk
(table 7). The exception is flat-
price contracts, which establish an
exact price to be paid to the grow-
er upon delivery and thus com-
pletely eliminate price risk. In con-
trast, nearly all other forward
marketing contracts fix either the
basis (for example, 10 cents under
the Chicago Board of Trade
November soybean contract) or the
level of the futures price at the
time the contract is negotiated, but
not both. For those contracts that
establish the basis, the risk of
price-level variation is retained by
the producer until the time of crop
delivery and final sale. Conversely,
fixing only the futures price in the
contract (as with HTA contracts)
leaves the farmer with basis risk.
When HTA’s are rolled over to suc-
cessive months, the producer also
incurs the risk associated with
spreads across different futures
contract months.
Farmers who forward contract a
growing crop bear yield risk in
addition to price risk. As a result,
farmers generally are advised to
forward price substantially less
than 100 percent of their expected
crop until yields are well
assured.10 Difficulties associated
with overcontracting arise if poor
weather results in low yields, and
producers contracting a large pro-
portion of their crop need to buy
“replacement” bushels at an uncer-
tain cash price to meet the terms
of delivery on their forward con-
tract. If the farmer’s shortfall is
caused by a severe drought, cash
prices at the time such replace-
ment bushels must be purchased,
either as part of contract renegoti-
ation or to meet delivery terms,
may be quite high. When the crop
size is known, producers can safely
forward contract up to 100 percent
of their crop. Deferred (or delayed)
price contracts usually are not
negotiated until the grain is deliv-
ered to the country elevator (when
yield risk no longer exists). When
such contracts are used, however,
both futures price and basis risks
typically are faced by the producer
(table 7).
To illustrate the risks associated
with a simple forward contracting
situation, consider a farmer with
irrigated corn acreage who
expects, with considerable certain-
ty, a crop of 50,000 bushels. This
Table 7—Most marketing contracts do not completely eliminate market risk1
Market risks remaining
Type of marketing Guaranteed
contact Futures Basis Spread minimum
Flat price2 4
Basis 4
Deferred price 44 3
Minimum price 444 4
HTA (basic) 4
HTA (multiple crop) 44
HTA= Hedge-to-arrive contract.
1The extent to which yield risk is an issue depends on when the contract is entered. Deferred price contracts,
for example, can be entered into before the crop is harvested (when yield risk is an issue) or after harvest
(when crop size is known and yield risk is zero).
2For definitions of the different types of contracts, see the glossary.
3Some deferred price contracts specify the basis, which eliminates basis risk for farmers.
4Downside risk is eliminated.
Source: Adopted by ERS from Kemp, Todd E., editor, Hybrid Cash Grain Contracts: Assessing, Managing, and
Controlling Risk, a White Paper by the Risk Evaluation Task Force on Hybrid Cash Contracts, National Grain
and Feed Association, Washington, DC, 1996.
Farmers generally



































10The minimum-risk amount to cash for-
ward contract typically is slightly larger
than the minimum-risk futures hedge
because basis risk is avoided. See subse-
quent discussion of optimal hedging.farmer is considering two options
and plans to finalize his decision
in a few days (the end of April),
just before planting time. The
options involve either (1) selling
the crop in October, right after
harvest, for the cash market price,
or (2) entering a flat price contract
with the local elevator for October
delivery. The probability distribu-
tion of cash prices in October,
based on the farmer’s expectations,
is shown in figure 6, and the eleva-
tor at the time of the decision is
offering flat price contracts for
harvest delivery. The fixed price
offered under the contract is
shown by the vertical line. The fig-
ure illustrates both the downside
protection and the upside potential
forgone if the farmer chooses the
contracting approach. Because the
farmer in this simple example has
no yield uncertainty, 100 percent
forward contracting completely
eliminates revenue risk (since the
price for the entire crop is fixed). If
the producer forward contracts
and cash prices turn out higher at
harvest than the contract price, a
profit opportunity has been lost,
but income is no less than expect-
ed. (For other examples, see Jolly.)
Marketing contracts are used not
only for pricing field crops, but
also in the specialty crops sector
(table 8). Among specialty crops,
they appear most often in grower
sales of fruits, fresh pre-cut veg-
etables, and processed vegetables
(Powers). In the pre-cut vegetable
industry, for example, prepackaged
shredded lettuce and cabbage,
diced celery, and sliced carrots are
used in large quantities by food
establishments, institutions, and
retailers. Purchasing pre-cut fresh
vegetables can reduce costs to
these buyers if sufficiently less
labor is required in food prepara-
tion. These buyers usually negoti-
ate marketing contracts that speci-
fy a tentative free-on-board price,
quality, and delivery schedule for a
6- to 12-month period. The tenta-
tive contract price is based on the
expected price during the agree-
ment’s duration, and may be rene-
gotiated if warranted by market
conditions (Powers).
Although less common, marketing
contracts are also used in the live-
stock sector. Fed cattle, for exam-
ple, can be forward priced using a
cash forward contract—an agree-




butalso in the spe-
cialtycrops and live-
stocksectors.
































Source: Hypothetical example developed by ERS.
Forgone upside potential
Figure 6
Flat price contracts provide downside protection, but forgo
upside potentialer to deliver a specified number of
cattle, in a designated future
month, to a packer. Two types of
contracts are typically used.
Similar to the situation for field
crops, “flat price” contracts specify
the price at the time the contract
is negotiated between the two par-
ties. In contrast, “basis” contracts
specify the basis level (the cash
price minus the futures price) at
the time the contract is signed,
allowing the cattle feeder to wait
until a later time to fix the futures
price, perhaps after the price level
has increased. The final contract
price is calculated by adding the
basis specified in the contract to
the futures price on the day the
cattle are priced (Elam).
Although the price risks associated
with the different types of market-
ing contracts vary, some types of
risks are common to all contracts.
All growers who enter into forward
contracts face the risk of default by
the merchandiser offering the con-
tract, who may be unable to meet
the financial obligation associated
with the contract. In addition, pro-
ducers and merchandisers may
have different understandings of
the contract terms and the poten-
tial financial impact (Kemp). As a
result, legal risks may be confront-
ed by farmers, as was the case for
numerous individuals who had
entered into HTA contracts in 1995.
Few empirical analyses have
examined the reduction in price
risk associated with the use of dif-
ferent marketing contracts, partly
because time-series data capturing
contract prices are generally not
available to researchers. However,
futures price data for field crops
and livestock are readily available
from exchanges. Because of the
structure of most forward con-
tracts for field crops and livestock,
the use of futures prices in esti-
mating optimal hedging amounts
and risk reduction provides a close
approximation to the analogous
estimates that would exist in an




































Table 8—Value of selected commodities produced under marketing 
contracts, 1997
















Sorghum for grain 6 86
Soybeans 9 1,672
Sugar beets 82 973
Sunflowers 8 51
Vegetables 24 3,374
Total value of production under 
marketing contracts, all commodities1 22 41,610
1Includes $21,323 million in the crop category and $20,287 million in the livestock category.The total value of
agricultural production is $191,724 million.
Source: USDA, ERS, 1997 Agricultural Resource Management Study, special analysis.H He ed dg gi in ng g  i in n  F Fu ut tu ur re es s
Futures contracts provide farmers
(as well as processors, merchandis-
ers, and others) with a method for
reducing their risks. Futures con-
tracts were almost exclusively
traded on commodity prices in the
past, although innovations in
recent decades also have intro-
duced contracts on interest rates,
foreign exchange rates, price
indexes, and crop yields. A primary
use of futures involves shifting
risk from a firm that desires less
risk (the hedger) to a party who is
willing to accept the risk in ex-
change for an expected profit (the
speculator). Also, hedgers with
opposite positions in the market
trade with each other, and specula-
tors with opposing views of the
market may also trade.
A futures contract is an agreement
priced and entered on an exchange
to trade at a specified future time a
commodity or other asset with spec-
ified attributes (or in the case of
cash settlement, an equivalent
amount of money). The U.S.
exchanges that trade agricultural
futures contracts are the Chicago
Board of Trade; the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange; the Kansas
City Board of Trade; the
Minneapolis Grain Exchange; the
New York Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa
Exchange; and the New York
Cotton Exchange. Trading is con-
ducted either through “open outcry”
on the floor of the exchange or elec-
tronically. The December corn con-
tract traded on the Chicago Board
of Trade, for example, specifies lots
of 5,000 bushels for No. 2 yellow
corn and a December delivery peri-
od. Contracts for major field crops
(including corn, wheat, soybeans,
cotton), four types of livestock and
animal products (live cattle, feeder
cattle, live hogs, and pork bellies),
and sugar and frozen concentrated
orange juice have been traded for
years. More recently, futures con-
tracts for rice, boneless beef, and
dairy products have been intro-
duced. Because contracts are stan-
dardized, the only issue to be nego-
tiated at trading time is price.
Enforcing contract terms is a key
function of the exchanges where
trading occurs, and guaranteeing
contracts is a key function of the
exchange clearinghouse.
Most futures contracts are offset by
opposite trades before delivery time,
with each party to the transaction
selling (or buying) a futures con-
tract that was initially bought (or
sold). For example, if a farmer
(through his or her brokerage house
and its trader on the Chicago Board
of Trade) sells a corn contract in
May for December delivery, his or
her position may be offset by buying
a December corn contract at any
time before the end of the delivery
period, which is about December 20.
Such an offset usually occurs
because the major motive in trading
futures is to hold a temporary posi-
tion, and then trade for money, and
not to physically deliver or acquire
a commodity (Hieronymus). Most
hedgers offset because making or
taking delivery on futures would be
more costly than delivering through
normal channels, while speculators
generally do not want to own the
actual commodity.
Because futures contracts are com-
mitments to trade in the future,
actual delivery and payment are
not required until the contract
matures. However, both buyers and
sellers are required to make mar-
gin deposits with their brokers to
guarantee their respective commit-
ments. Because the margin deposit
is small (typically 5-10 percent of
the underlying value of the con-
tract), speculators (who provide liq-
uidity) are attracted to the market.
The exchanges set minimum mar-
gins by contract, which can be
raised by brokers to provide the
protection they deem necessary.
Using the December corn contract
as an example, and assuming a
$2.00 per bushel price quote, a cat-






































2 29 9(5,000 bushels) makes a $10,000
commitment. With a 10-percent
margin, the feeder must post
$1,000 with his or her broker. A
“margin call” occurs when the price
of the contract moves against the
trader, say to $1.90 in this exam-
ple. When a margin call occurs, the
producer must post additional mar-
gin with his or her broker to cover
the loss and restore the deposit.
Similarly, when the price moves
favorably for the trader by a speci-
fied amount, money can be with-
drawn from the margin deposit.
Because futures prices reflect val-
ues of commodities at futures
delivery points, the local cash
prices confronted by farmers usu-
ally vary from futures contract
quotes at a given point in time.
The differences between futures
and cash prices are termed “basis,”
and reflect differences in price
across space (due to transportation
costs), time (which are associated
with storage costs), or quality
(such as differences in protein pre-
miums for wheat). The basis is cal-
culated as the difference between
the cash price (at a given location
and at a given point in time) and
the futures price (associated with
a specified exchange and contract
month).11 The basis varies over
time, and reflects only transporta-
tion costs and quality differences
as the contract reaches maturity.
As seen below, hedging largely
eliminates price level uncertainty,
but not basis uncertainty, which
generally has a smaller variance.
Two categories of hedging exist:
“long” hedging (where a futures
contract is purchased) and “short”
hedging (where a futures contract
is sold). Either type of hedge
involves holding a futures position
in anticipation of a later transac-
tion in the cash market, and in
both cases, the futures position is
opposite to the cash position.
Because futures and cash prices
tend to move up and down togeth-
er, losses and gains in the two
markets tend to offset each other,
leaving the hedger with a return
near what was expected (the ini-
tial futures price plus the end-of-
period basis—see later discussion).
Thus, hedging helps protect the
business from changes in price lev-
els. Farmers may choose to hedge
in many different situations,
including the following:
• Storage hedging—Farmers or
merchants who own a commodi-
ty can protect themselves from
declines in the commodity’s
price by short hedging. This
involves selling futures con-
tracts as the commodity is har-
vested or acquired, holding the
resulting short futures position
during the storage period, and
buying it out when the cash
commodity is sold. Losses
(gains) in the value of the cash
commodity due to unexpected
price changes will be largely off-
set by gains (losses) in the value
of the futures position leaving
the owner of the commodity
with approximately the expected
return from storage.
• Production hedging—Crop and
livestock producers can protect
themselves from declines in
prices of expected outputs by
short hedging. This generally
involves selling futures con-
tracts at the beginning of or
during the growing or feeding
period, holding the resulting
short futures position until the
product is ready to sell, and buy-
ing the futures as the output is
sold. Losses (gains) in the value
of the output due to unexpected
price changes tend to be offset






































11Basis is sometimes calculated as cash
price minus futures price and sometimes as
futures price minus cash price, as mutually
understood by the parties involved. Cash
prices may be quoted relative to the
futures, such as "10 cents over" or "20 cents
under" the futures price. In this report,
basis is calculated as cash minus futures,
so that an "under" basis has a negative sign
and an "over" basis has a positive sign.the futures position. However,
yield variability reduces the
risk-reducing effectiveness of
hedging for crop growers and
generally makes it inadvisable
to sell futures equal to more
than one-half to two-thirds of
the expected crop.
• Hedging expected purchases—
Livestock feeders anticipating
the purchase of corn or feeder
cattle can protect themselves
from price increases by long
hedging. This involves buying
corn or feeder cattle futures con-
tracts to match anticipated
requirements and selling the
resulting long futures positions
as these inputs are purchased
on the cash market. Increases
(declines) in the cost of feeders
or feed due to unexpected price
changes will be partly offset by
gains (losses) in the value of the
futures position leaving the
feeder with approximately the
expected costs of inputs.
Feeders’ overall price risks may
be further reduced by selling
futures on prospective outputs,
as discussed above.
To better understand the impor-
tance of basis risk in hedging, con-
sider the example of a corn produc-
er with irrigated acreage who is
considering the pricing of his
growing crop. Because the produc-
er irrigates and faces few other
natural perils, he knows the size of
his crop with a great deal of cer-
tainty and is concerned only with
price risk. If the farmer does not
hedge, his risk is solely associated
with the harvest cash price (P2),
which can also be calculated as the
harvest futures price (F2) plus the
harvest basis (B2). Thus, the
farmer’s net return in a cash-sale-
at-harvest situation (Ru) can be
calculated as the cash price (F2 +
B2) at harvest multiplied by actual
production (Y2 ), minus production
costs (C):
Ru = [(F2 + B2) * Y2 ] - C.
Suppose now that the producer
places a short hedge (for example,
sells a futures contract) to reduce
the risk of a price decline and a
lower sales price for his growing
crop. The expected final net return
at harvest (Rh) is based on the
cash price at harvest (F2 + B2),
and the profit or loss associated
with the farmer’s futures market
position (F1 - F2). The farmer’s
actual level of production is desig-
nated as Y2 in the following equa-
tion, and the quantity hedged is 
h * Y1, where h is the hedge ratio
and Y1 is expected production:
Rh = [(F2 + B2) * Y2 ] +
[(F1 - F2) * (h * Y1)] - C.
Assuming that output is known
with certainty at the time the
hedge is placed, and that actual
production equals the quantity
hedged (for example, Y2 = h * Y1),
gives the following:12
Rh = [(F2 + B2) * Y2] + 
[(F1 - F2) * Y2] - C,
or:
Rh = [Y2 * (F1 + B2 )] - C.
This last equation indicates that
the price component of the farmer’s
net return depends on the futures
price at the time the hedge is
placed plus the harvest basis.
Because the futures price is known
with certainty at planting, and out-
put is known with certainty in this
example, the only risk faced by the
farmer is the risk associated with
the harvest basis. Thus, price level
risk is eliminated by this anticipa-
tory hedge, and the only risk faced
by the grower is basis risk (the
uncertain nature of B2).
The existence of basis risk is a key
factor distinguishing the risk asso-
ciated with futures hedging and
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and onlyconfronts
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12This example also applies to a storage
hedge, where output is known with 
certainty.ward contracts (see previous sec-
tion). When a producer enters into
a “flat price” forward contract with
his or her local elevator, for exam-
ple, the basis risk he or she faces
is zero. In addition, forward con-
tracts are generally less standard-
ized than futures contracts, and
specific terms may vary across ele-
vators. Physical delivery to the
local elevator at harvest is gener-
ally required, and no margin calls
exist when cash forward contracts
are used (table 9).
Using a numerical example to
illustrate hedging, suppose the
corn producer discussed earlier
wishes to reduce his income uncer-
tainty by selling a futures contract
at planting time. Because the
farmer irrigates his corn crop, he
is not concerned about yield risk,
and the hedge quantity is assumed
to equal actual output. The farmer
in this example observes a $2.75
per bushel futures price at plant-
ing time. He expects a harvest
basis of -$0.25, giving an expected
cash price of $2.75 plus -$0.25, or
$2.50 per bushel (table 10). Two
outcomes are shown in the table, a
$0.25-price decrease between
planting and harvest, and a $0.25-
price rise. In both cases, the real-
ized harvest basis is -$0.25, as
expected.13 With hedging, the
return per bushel is $2.50 in both
cases. This return can be calculat-
ed as (1) the futures price at plant-
ing time ($2.75) plus the harvest
basis (-$0.25 in both scenarios), or
(2) the cash price at harvest ($2.25
or $2.75, depending on the sce-
nario) plus the gain or loss from
the futures market position
(+$0.25 or -$0.25).
Reality differs from the example
illustrated above in that neither
basis nor yields can be anticipated
with certainty, even for an irrigat-
ed farm. Table 11 illustrates such
yield and price risk for a 500-acre




































Table 9—A comparison of “flat price” cash forward contracts and 
futures hedging
“Flat price”
Characteristic cash forward contracts Futures hedging
Competitiveness of price Depends on margin
taken by elevator Yes
Basis risk No Yes
Default risk Some No
Ease of recontracting
or offset  Depends Yes
Physical delivery Yes Seldom
Margin calls No Yes
Source: For more information, see Heifner, Richard G., Bruce H. Wright, and Gerald E. Plato, Using Cash,
Futures, and Options Contracts in the Farm Business, AIB-665. U.S. Dept. Agr., Econ. Res. Serv., April 1993.
Table 10—Effects of hedging on a hypothetical corn grower’s return per bushel
Price decrease Price increase
Cash/futures price scenario scenario
Dollars per bushel
Cash price expected at harvest 2.50 2.50
Cash price realized at harvest 2.25 2.75
Futures price at planting 2.75 2.75
Futures price at harvest 2.50 3.00
Futures return to the producer +0.25 -0.25
Net price realized with hedging 2.50 2.50
Source: Hypothetical example developed by ERS.
13The level of the basis varies with prox-
imity to major markets, and in major corn
growing areas, tends to be between $0.10
and $0.30 per bushel below the futures
price at harvest.return from a cash sale at harvest
(with no short hedge) ranges from
-$55,500 to +$70,000 across the six
scenarios. Now suppose that the
farmer weighs his alternatives and
decides to hedge in the spring. He
anticipates that his output will not
likely fall below 30,000 bushels in
any given year, and thus considers
his optimal hedge level to be six
contracts (at 5,000 bushels per
contract). At harvest time, he lifts
his short hedge by buying back his
futures contract, and sells his cash
crop in the marketplace. He
receives the proceeds from the
cash sale of the crop (less produc-
tion costs of $150,000) plus the
gains or losses associated with the
futures transaction (less commis-
sion charges of $420). Over the six
scenarios, the producer’s net
return, including the return to the
hedge, varies from -$48,000 to
+$68,080. The variability in
returns indicates that the return
to hedging is less variable (as
measured by either the range of
outcomes or the standard devia-
tion) than is associated with a
cash-sale only strategy. The
expected return over time, howev-
er, is approximately identical in
both cases.
As can be seen by this example,
the estimation of hedging amounts
and risk reduction is much more
complicated in the presence of
yield risk. Generally, the effective-
ness of hedging in reducing risk
diminishes as yield variability
increases and the correlation
between prices and yields becomes
more negative. Although hedging
can reduce income uncertainty for
many farmers, it never completely
eliminates such uncertainty.
In addition to the considerations
discussed previously in this sec-
tion, hedging involves possible
costs for interest forgone on mar-
gin deposits and for bias in futures
prices. These costs generally are
small relative to the value of the
positions taken, but they partly
offset the risk-reducing benefits
from hedging (see box on “The
Cost of Forward Pricing”). The pos-
sibilities that expected incomes
can actually be increased by hedg-
ing are discussed in a later section
of this report.
An extensive literature addresses
farmer hedging. Much of this liter-
ature analyzes the risk reduction
associated with hedging and the
calculation of optimal (generally
risk-minimizing) hedge ratios,
which specify the proportion of the
commodity that would be hedged
to minimize risk. When output is
certain, risk-minimizing hedge
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ofyield risk.




























Table 11—Returns to a cash sale at harvest and a futures hedge for a hypothetical corn producer
Net return
Harvest Spring Harvest Revenue from cash sale Net return Difference
Scenario Production cash price futures futures from crop at harvest  with hedging in returns
Bushels Dollars per bushel Dollars
1 80,000 2.60 3.20 2.85 208,000 58,000 68,080 10,080
2 80,000 2.75 2.90 3.00 220,000 70,000 67,000 -3,000
3 50,000 3.15 2.70 3.40 157,500 7,500 -13,500 -21,000
4 50,000 2.80 3.15 3.05 140,000 -10,000 -7,000 3,000
5 30,000 3.15 3.65 3.40 94,500 -55,500 -48,000 7,500
6 30,000 3.30 3.65 3.55 99,000 -51,000 -48,000 3,000
Average
net return -- -- -- -- -- 19,000 18,580 -420
-- = Not applicable.
Note: This illustration assumes that a producer has a 500-acre farm.The average yield for those acres varies across scenarios, from 160 bushels per acre in
scenarios 1 and 2 to 100 bushels per acre in scenarios 3 and 4 to 60 bushels per acre in scenarios 5 and 6.The producer hedges six contracts at 5,000
bushels per contract.The commission on the purchase and sale of the contract is $35. For a total of six round-turn transactions, the cost is 6 * $70, or $420.
The farmer’s production costs total $150,000.
Source: Hypothetical example developed by ERS.slightly less than, 1.0 (100 percent
of the commodity would be
hedged).14 In contrast, when out-
put is uncertain (such as would be
the case for a growing season
hedge when a producer does not
irrigate), the hedge quantity is
usually substantially less than 100
percent of expected output. This
situation exists due to the correla-
tion between random production
and random price. Because these
variables are negatively correlated
in most cases, a “natural hedge”
stabilizing revenue is inherent in
the system and the optimal strate-
gy is to hedge a quantity lower
than the producer’s expected out-
put (McKinnon).
Many optimal hedge models exist,
and vary in their assumptions
about futures and cash price deter-
mination, the unbiasedness of
futures prices, risk aversion, and
other factors (Berck; Miller and
Kahl; Rolfo; Plato; Ward and
Fletcher). In one study, Grant, for
instance, examined the risk-mini-
mizing optimal hedge for corn and
soybean farmers in Iowa,
Nebraska, and North Carolina in
the presence of price and yield
risk. His findings indicated that
selling futures equal to 50-80 per-
cent of expected production mini-
mizes revenue risks for most corn
and soybean producers in those
States. These hedges would, on
average, eliminate less than 50
percent of producers’ revenue vari-
ance over the growing season due
to basis and yield risk. Because
selling futures involves costs for
commissions and interest forgone
on margin deposits and a 20-per-
centage-point reduction in the
optimal hedge has a relatively
small effect on risk reduction,
Grant concluded that the best
strategy may be for farmers to
hedge between 30 and 50 percent
of their expected crop.
Recently, studies have explored
other aspects of hedging. Lapan
and Moschini examined the hedg-
ing problem, and assumed that
price, output, and basis are ran-
dom variables. Their findings indi-
cate that, unlike earlier results
using different approaches, the
optimal hedge depends on the level
of a producer’s risk aversion.
Further, they conclude that the
effects of unhedgeable basis risk
are exacerbated by yield risk.
Other studies have, among other
topics, examined the effectiveness
of futures in providing revenue
protection over a period of several
years (Plato; Gardner, 1989).
Futures and options contracts
have been traded on crop yields as
well as prices. The Chicago Board
of Trade introduced Iowa corn
yield futures and options trading
in 1995. Subsequently, trading in
corn yields for four other Corn Belt
States and the United States was
added (Chicago Board of Trade,
1998; Grenchik and Campbell).
Yield futures contracts remaining
open at maturity are settled by
cash payments based on USDA’s
National Agricultural Statistics
Service (NASS) yield estimates.
Although yield futures and options
contracts provide potential hedg-
ing vehicles for crop insurers as
well as farmers, trading volume
has been low. Relatively low corre-
lations between individual farm
yields and State yields limit the
effectiveness of such contracts in
shifting farmers’ yield risks. In
addition, insurers appear to find
the reinsurance provided by USDA
through the Standard Reinsurance
Agreement under the Federal crop
insurance program satisfactory for
shifting risk (Maurice; Lehman).
Recent research that examines
hedging in both price and yield
futures found that a risk-minimiz-
ing firm can reduce its income
variance by simultaneously hedg-
ing in both price and yield futures
(Vukina, Li, and Holthausen;
Futures and options
contracts have been
traded on crop yields
as well as prices.




























14When output is known, basis risk gen-
erally causes the optimal hedge to be less
than 1.0.McNew; Heifner and Coble, 1996).
Vukina, Li, and Holthausen found
that such hedging in both types of
contracts can be more effective
than using price futures alone,
with the effectiveness of the two-
instrument hedge depending on
the volatility of the yield contract.
As the variance of the underlying



































The Cost of Forward Pricing
When hedging with futures, farmers must pay commissions and forgo
interest or higher earning potential on money placed in margin
deposits. Those who use cash forward contracts may incur such costs
indirectly, to the degree that local buyers lower prices paid to cover
their hedging costs. Moreover, the prices obtained by hedgers may dif-
fer from the price expected at delivery by the amount that speculators
require as compensation for standing by to take hedgers’ trades and/or
for bearing risks.
Commissions for futures trading vary by brokerage house and by size
of trade, but typically the commission to both buy and sell is less than
one-half percent of the value of the contract. Margin requirements also
vary. For example, if the margin deposit averages 10 percent for 6
months, the interest forgone on the money at a 6 percent interest rate
would be 0.1 x 6/12 x 0.06 = 0.3 percent. Traders who meet margin
requirements by depositing government securities with their brokers
avoid such interest costs, although they may sacrifice some income by
holding securities that yield lower returns than could be earned with
other investments.
Farmers avoid directly paying commissions or making margin deposits
by forward contracting with local buyers. However, elevators and other
firms who buy from farmers generally incur hedging costs that must
be covered. Such firms usually avoid interest costs on margin deposits
by depositing government securities. Moreover, forward contracting
assures them a flow of commodities through their facilities, which may
increase their returns.Thus, they may or may not seek to recover their
commission costs by paying slightly lower prices to farmers.
Futures markets facilitate forward pricing because short-term specu-
lators (“scalpers”) are present to take the opposite sides of sell or buy
orders as they arrive from traders outside the exchange. Scalpers then
quickly trade out of their positions with the expectation of a small
profit, say one-quarter to one-half cent per bushel. This profit, which
compensates scalpers for helping make the market liquid, constitutes
a modest cost for hedgers.
Futures prices also may be less than expected cash prices because
speculators require a risk premium for carrying hedgers’ risks. Keynes
suggested that such risk premiums could be expected in markets
where short hedging exceeds long hedging. Dusak later pointed out
that any such bias should be small because low transactions costs
allow such risks to be spread very efficiently. Empirical studies indi-
cate that futures price biases are small or nonexistent for most com-
modities, particularly for the grains, where active long hedging helps
balance short hedging (Zulauf and Irwin; Bessembinder; Kolb).
However, the issue is not fully resolved.
In summary, forward pricing involves costs that appear modest com-
pared with the risk reduction obtained for most farmers, but that may
make forward pricing more attractive to farmers who are very risk
averse.hedging in both price and yield
futures declines relative to hedg-
ing in price futures alone. They
also concluded that hedging effec-
tiveness depends critically on the
price and yield bases.
F Fu ut tu ur re es s  O Op pt ti io on ns s  C Co on nt tr ra ac ct ts s
A commodity option gives the hold-
er the right, but not the obligation,
to take a futures position at a speci-
fied price before a specified date.
The value of an option reflects the
expected return from exercising
this right before it expires and dis-
posing of the futures position
obtained. If the futures price
changes in favor of the option hold-
er, a profit may be realized either
by exercising the option or selling
the option at a price higher than
paid. If prices move so that exercis-
ing the option is unfavorable, then
the option may be allowed to
expire. Options provide protection
against adverse price movements,
while allowing the option holder to
gain from favorable movements in
the cash price. In this sense,
options provide protection against
unfavorable events similar to that
provided by insurance policies. To
gain this protection, a hedger in an
options contract must pay a premi-
um, as one would pay for insurance.
Options markets are closely tied to
underlying futures markets.
Options that give the right to sell a
futures contract are known as
“put” options, while options that
give the right to buy a futures con-
tract are known as “call” options.
The price at which the futures con-
tract underlying the option may be
bought (for a call option) or sold
(for a put option) is called the
“exercise” or “strike” price. As an
example, suppose a wheat producer
purchases a put option having a
strike price of $3.00 per bushel. If
futures prices move to $2.80, the
option may be exercised for a net
profit of $0.20 ($3.00-$2.80), minus
the premium paid for the option. If
the harvest cash price is $2.70 per
bushel, the farmer’s return is $2.90
per bushel ($2.70 plus $0.20),
minus the premium.
The effects on realized returns
from hedging with futures and put
options are compared for a range
of possible futures price outcomes
in figure 7. In this example, corn is
stored in November and sold in











































Futures price at end of storage period, $/bu.
Put option hedge
Source: Hypothetical example developed by ERS.
Cash sale at end 
of storage period
Figure 7
Effects of futures and options hedging on exposure to price 
variation at marketing time, a storage example
Futures hedgehedge ratio is 1.0. The May futures
price is $2.80 per bushel at the
beginning of the storage period
and the expected May basis is 
-$0.20. By hedging with futures,
the farmer obtains an expected
return for the corn in storage of
$2.80 - 0.20, or $2.60. Alternative-
ly, the farmer can buy an at-the-
money put option with a $2.80
strike price for a $0.20 premium.
The put guarantees a price equal
to the strike price, minus the pre-
mium, minus the basis, or $2.80 
- 0.20 - 0.20 = $2.40, while allow-
ing the farmer to gain if the
futures price rises above $3.00 in
May. By not hedging, the farmer
gets the futures price minus the
basis. The figure shows that the
range of possible prices is greatest
with the cash sale and least with
the futures hedge. Unlike futures
hedging, the put does not limit the
potential profits associated with
increasing prices, but the price
must rise more than the premium
cost before a profit is realized.
The premium paid for an option
typically consists of “intrinsic”
value and “time” value. The intrin-
sic value reflects the difference
between the underlying futures
price and the strike price. If the
price of the underlying futures
contract is $2.90 per bushel, for
example, and the strike price is
$2.70, then the holder of a call
option could gain $0.20 by exercis-
ing the option immediately.
Consequently, the premium in this
case must be at least $0.20 per
bushel, and the option is “in the
money.” If the strike price is above
the futures price, the intrinsic
value of the call option is zero and
the put is said to be “out of the
money.” When the strike price
equals the futures price, the option
is “at the money.”
The time value of an option, in
contrast, depends on several fac-
tors, including the volatility of the
underlying futures contract, the
time until the option expires, the
interest rate, the strike price, and
the underlying futures price. Time
value refers to the money that
buyers are willing to pay for the
possibility that the intrinsic value
of an option will increase over
time. An option on a futures con-
tract with very low volatility, for
example, will have a small time
value because traders do not
expect the intrinsic value to
change to a great extent over time.
If the futures price is volatile, in
contrast, the probability is high
that the option’s intrinsic value
would increase and traders would
be willing to pay more for the
chance of such a gain (Sarris). In
addition, intrinsic value depends
on the time until the option’s expi-
ration. The greater the time hori-
zon, the greater the intrinsic value
because price uncertainty is
greater. Observed options prices
can be used to provide information
about anticipated price variability
(see box, p. 40).
Table 12 illustrates the situation
for a central Illinois producer on
March 15 who plans to produce 500
acres of corn and hedge with put
options. The December futures
price is $3.00 per bushel at plant-
ing time and the premium for at-
the-money puts is $0.20 per bushel.
His expected yield is 150 bushels
per acre, and his production costs
are estimated at $150,000. Because
the farmer expects his production
to fall no lower than 50,000
bushels, he buys 10 put contracts
(5,000 bushels per contract * 10
contracts = 50,000 bushels), and
selects a strike price of $3.00. The
cost associated with this purchase
is $10,000 in premiums (at an
assumed cost of $0.20 per bushel),
and $350 in commissions (10 con-
tracts at $35 per contract).
As a simplifying assumption, sup-
pose that the producer makes his
decision on October 20 as to the
sale of the option. If the futures
price that day is $3.00 (equal to



































3 37 7intrinsic value (since the option is
at the money), and an assumed
time value of $0.07 per bushel
(reflecting the probability that the
futures price will decline before
the option expires, raising the
option’s intrinsic value). Using this
estimate, the producer’s return to
the purchase of the option is the
time value on October 20 at $3,500
($0.07 * 50,000 bushels), less the
premium cost of $10,000, and the
commission cost of $700 (10 con-
tracts * $35 per trade * 2 trades),
or -$7,200. If the producer had sold
his crop at the harvest cash price,
his return would have been
$37,500, instead of the $30,300
($37,500 - $7,200) earned in this
hypothetical put option situation.
The farmer’s return to buying
options depends largely on the
futures price at harvest. With a
high futures price in October (say,
$3.75), the producer’s loss associ-
ated with the option is even high-
er, while a low futures price (say,
$2.50) would result in a higher
gain than in the cash-sale-at-har-
vest-only case. In an efficient mar-
ket, the producer’s return from
buying put options over a series of
many years is expected to equal
the return to either hedging with
futures or simply selling the crop
at harvest, except for commis-
sions. Although returns are
approximately the same in all
three cases, hedging with either
put options or futures reduces
uncertainty about return.
Several studies have explored the
risk-return properties of options as
they affect the farm firm. Many of
these studies have found options to
be a potentially useful method for
stabilizing returns (Heifner and
Plato; Curtis, Kahl, and
McKinnell). Various surveys have
also found that options are used to
at least the same extent as
futures, including a study of the
Iowa cattle sector (Sapp). In addi-
tion, large-scale Corn Belt produc-
ers participating in Top Farmer
Crop Workshops in 1994 and 1995
indicated that they used options as
frequently, or more frequently,
than hedging and to price a signifi-
cant portion of their crops (Patrick,
Musser, and Eckman). In a 1988
survey of Iowa producers, about 11
percent of the grain producers
responding indicated that they
used hedging and about 11 percent
indicated that they used options
Manystudies have
































Table 12—An illustration of net returns to a corn farmer who uses put options
to protect against price risk
Item Revenues, costs, and net returns Dollars
1 Revenue from crop sale on October 20:
(75,000 bushels * $2.50/bushel) 187,500
2 Total production costs 150,000
3 Net return from crop sale 37,500
4 Premium for put option paid on March 15:
(10 put options * 5,000 bushels * $0.20 premium/bushel) 10,000
5 Return from put sale received on October 20:
(10 put options * 5,000 bushels * $0.07/bushel) 3,500
6 Commissions on put purchase and sale:
(2 * 10 put options * $35 commission) 700
7 Net return from put hedge
(5 - 4 - 6) -7,200
8 Net return from cash sale and put hedge
(3 + 7) 30,300
Note: The put option has a $3.00 strike price and a $0.07 time value on October 20. Although net returns from
the hedge in this example are negative, the example could as easily have been constructed to show a positive
net return. (See discussions in the text regarding the expected return to forward pricing.)
Source: Hypothetical example developed by ERS.(Edelman, Schmiesing, and Olsen).
Hog and fed cattle producers, how-
ever, were more likely to hedge
than to use options.
The conclusions of the literature,
however, are not definitive as to
the effectiveness of options con-
tracts in reducing risk, based on
different underlying assumptions.
One study, for example, analyzes
production, hedging, and specula-
tive decisions in futures and
options markets given the pres-
ence of basis risk (Lapan,
Moschini, and Hanson). These
researchers, assuming no produc-
tion risk, found that options are a
redundant hedging tool when
futures and options markets are
unbiased and when cash prices are
a linear function of futures prices.
They indicate that the optimal
hedging strategy involves using
only futures contracts (the returns
of which are linear in futures
prices) because they dominate
options contracts (the returns of
which are nonlinear in futures
prices). If futures prices or options
premiums are biased, however, the
results indicate that options, used
along with futures, provide the
optimal strategy for insuring
against price risk. They conclude
that options are more appealing as
a speculative tool to exploit private
information about price distribu-
tions than as a hedging tool.
Intrigued by a comparison of sur-
vey findings with the Lapan,
Moschini, and Hanson research,
Sakong, Hayes, and Hallam ques-
tioned the conditions under which
producers find options useful for
hedging. Introducing both output
and price uncertainty, these
authors found that it is almost
always optimal for farmers to buy
put options and to underhedge on
the futures market. Their results
lend support to the practice of
hedging the minimum expected
yield on the futures market, while
hedging the remainder of expected
output against downside price risk
using put options. These
researchers also found that their
results are strengthened if the pro-
ducer expects local production to
influence national prices and if
risk aversion is higher at low
income levels.
M Ma ai in nt ta ai in ni in ng g  F Fi in na an nc ci ia al l  R Re es se er rv ve es s
a an nd d  L Le ev ve er ra ag gi in ng g
Leveraging refers to the producer’s
use of debt to finance the opera-
tion. Increasing the degree of
leverage increases the likelihood
that in a year of low farm returns
the producer will be unable to
meet his or her financial obliga-
tions, and heightens the potential
for bankruptcy. Thus, in general,
highly leveraged producers operate
in an environment of greater
financial risk than do producers
who choose a less highly leveraged
farm structure.15
A producer’s choice of debt (rela-
tive to equity) depends on many
factors, including the farmer’s
risk aversion, the size and type of
operation, the farmer’s market
relationships with input suppliers
and output purchasers, lenders’
willingness to provide loans, and
the availability of government
programs for managing risk.
Increasing the farm’s leverage
(that is, borrowing) increases the
capital available for production,
allowing expansion of the busi-
ness, but also entails incurring a
repayment obligation and creates
the risk of loan default because of
the risks inherent in the farming
operation. Because of these many
factors, a farmer’s use of debt to
finance the operation interacts
with both the production and
marketing risks faced by the pro-
ducer (Barry and Baker; Gabriel
and Baker).
Highlyleveraged pro-




who choose a less
highlyleveraged
farm structure.




























15An increase in leveraging means that the
farmer is at increased risk. In contrast,
farmers who increase their use of most
other risk management tools covered in the
accompanying sections—such as hedging



































Commodity Options Quotes Provide Estimates of
Anticipated Price Randomness
Information about anticipated price variability within a given year
can be obtained from commodity options quotes. The value of a com-
modity option depends on the volatility of the underlying futures
price, the futures price level, the strike price, the interest rate, and
the time to maturity (Black). Holding the last four variables con-
stant, a higher volatility implies a higher price for both puts and
calls. Volatility cannot be observed until after the fact. However, if
an options price is observed along with the last four variables, an
“implied volatility” can be calculated. Such implied volatilities
embody the current judgments of traders—who have money on the
line—as to the actual volatility likely to be realized.
To examine traders’ ability to anticipate volatility in corn and soybean
prices, the actual volatility was regressed on implicit volatility for the
years 1987-95 using the December corn contract and the November
soybean contract. The actual volatility (the dependent variable) was
calculated using the log (P t / P t-1) procedure applied to futures prices
from the end of each month to the last trading day preceding the
futures delivery month. For the February estimate of corn price
volatility, for example, actual volatility was captured by the standard
deviation of the daily log of relative futures prices from March 1 to
November 30. Implicit volatility (the independent variable) was calcu-
lated by applying the Black formula to at-the-money puts and averag-
ing over the trading days in the month (for February, using the previ-
ous example). The R2 from this equation is illustrated in the accompa-
nying figure for each month prior to expiration of the December corn
contract and the November soybean contract. The chart indicates that
options traders can anticipate price volatility from May and June
through the growing season, but not very well prior to planting time
when such information would be most valuable.
Farmers and marketers can potentially use implied volatilities in
making planting and storage decisions. Implied futures price volatili-
ties, together with futures quotes, the producer’s expected yields, and
the producer’s expectation of yield variability, may indicate that
planting corn, for example, would result in higher and less volatile
returns than planting soybeans (or vice versa). Farmers or marketers
who are storing a crop may be able to make more use of implied price
volatility information than those who are making planting decisions
because output risk can be disregarded when storing.









Source: Estimated by ERS from Chicago Board of Trade prices.
Proportion of corn price volatility to harvest anticipated by 
options traders by monthThe risk management decision
confronting a farmer who must
choose the degree of leverage can
be illustrated using the portfolio
approach. Table 13 illustrates the
effect of borrowing on the variabil-
ity of returns to owned equity,
where the expected rate of return
to farming (Ra) is 12.5 percent and
the interest rate for both borrow-
ing and saving (id) is assumed to
be 7.5 percent. The standard devi-
ation of farming returns (sa) is 5
percent, and the standard devia-
tion of the risk-free asset (sd) is
zero. The higher rate of return to
farming is consistent with the
assumption that returns must be
higher than the risk-free rate of
return or risk-averse individuals
would not invest in farming.
The first column of the table
reports various levels of debt-to-
equity ratios. A negative debt-to-
equity ratio reflects a farm that
has invested a portion of its equity
in risk-free savings at a 7.5-per-
cent return. In contrast, a positive
debt-to-equity ratio indicates that
the operator has borrowed to
expand the operation. The expect-
ed return to equity capital (Re) is:
Re = (Ra * Pa) - (id * Pd)
In the equation, Pa and Pd are pro-
portions of the two assets relative
to equity, with the holdings of the
risky asset (Pa) plus holdings of
the risk-free asset (Pd) equaling
1.0 in the total portfolio. Leverag-
ing implies negative holdings of
the risk-free asset, resulting in a
minus sign in the equation. This
information is used in the second
and third columns, which illus-
trate the tradeoff between expect-
ed returns and the variability of
returns, with the standard devia-
tion of the return to equity calcu-
lated as the weighted standard
deviation of the risky asset:
se = sa Pa
As an example, consider a debt-to-
equity ratio of 0.25. In this case,
holdings of the risky asset are 1.25
and holdings of the risk-free asset
are -0.25. Thus, the expected
return is calculated as (1.25 *
0.125) - (0.25 * 0.075), or 13.75
percent. The standard deviation of
the return to equity is (0.05 *
1.25), or 6.25 percent.
As shown in the table, the -0.5
debt-to-equity ratio results in the
lowest expected return and the
lowest level of risk. In this situa-
tion, the producer holds the
greatest proportion of his or her
assets in the low-return risk-free
investment, and the smallest pro-
portion in the higher return risky
asset. As more capital is invested
in the higher risk, higher return
farming operation, expected







































Table 13—An example of the effect of borrowing on the variability of returns 
to owned capital
Standard deviation of 










Note: The expected return to farming equals 12.5 percent, with a standard deviation of 5 percent.The expect-
ed interest rate is 7.5 percent, with a standard deviation of zero.
Source: Adapted by ERS from Barry, Peter J., and C. B. Baker, “Financial Responses to Risk in Agriculture,”
Risk Management in Agriculture, ed. Peter J. Barry, Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1984, pp. 183-199.standard deviation of returns to
equity. Thus, the more aggressive-
ly the farmer borrows, the more
highly leveraged the farm
becomes and, in this example, the
greater the risk and the greater
the expected return.
Various research studies have
examined producers’ use of lever-
aging. For example, a recent study
examined the sources of capital
used by farm operators across the
United States, averaging data
from the 1991-93 Agricultural
Resource Management Study
(ARMS). Over the 3 years, lenders
were found to supply 10 percent of
the $638 million in total capital
managed by commercial farms.
Most commercial farm capital was
held either as owned equity (55
percent) or was leased (35 per-
cent), generally from landlords
(table 14). As anticipated, reliance
on debt and leased capital financ-
ing declined as wealth and age
increased (Koenig and Dodson).
In another study, use of debt
repayment capacity, measured as
the ratio of actual debt relative to
the maximum amount of debt sup-
ported by net cash income avail-
able for loan payments, was ana-
lyzed for various sales class sizes
(Ryan). Use of debt repayment
capacity was found to increase
across all commercial farm size
classes between 1991 and 1994,
especially in the smallest category
(defined as $40,000 to $99,999). In
this category, use rose from less
than 50 percent in 1991 to over 70
percent in 1994.
For those producers who are high-
ly leveraged, understanding and
managing price and yield risk can
assume heightened importance.
This is because highly leveraged
farmers must be concerned about
meeting their financial obligations,
and high yield and price risk in
such situations may increase the
likelihood of insolvency and bank-
ruptcy. Thus, farmers’ decisions
about leveraging (and hence, the
financial risk they confront) must
be considered in the context of the
business risks they confront on
their operations.
Several studies have examined
this interaction between price and
yield (business) risk and producer
behavior with regard to financial
risk. In particular, one line of
research has addressed the topic





































Table 14—Sources of capital for various groups of commercial farm operators, 1991-93 average
Young commercial1 Older commercial2
Low- Low- All
Item resource Aspiring Wealthy resource Traditional Wealthy commercial
Percent
Share of total managed
capital that is:
Leased capital 69 52 27 60 34 21 35
Debt capital 17 12 10 15 10 8 10
Owner capital 14 36 62 25 56 71 55
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Farms
Number of farms 40,260 66,845 33,062 180,194 240,105 67,576 562,866
Dollars
Average total managed
capital per farm 543,361 805,375 1,937,478 587,534 952,741 2,827,468 1,133,906
1Young farmers are under 40 years of age.The category definitions are low resource (less than $150,000 net worth), aspiring ($150,000-$500,000 net worth),
and wealthy (greater than $500,000 net worth).
2Older farmers are over 40 years of age.The category definitions are low resource (less than $250,000 net worth), traditional ($250,000-$1 million net worth),
and wealthy (greater than $1 million net worth).
Source: Excerpted by ERS from Koenig, Steven R., and Charles B. Dodson, “Sources of Capital for Commercial Farm Operators,” Regulatory, Efficiency, and
Management Issues Affecting Rural Financial Markets, Proceedings of the NC-207 Regional Committee, Staff paper SP0196, ed. Bruce L. Ahrendsen,
Fayetteville: University of Arkansas, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, January 1996, pp. 70-83.the producer’s financial leveraging
strategy in the presence of govern-
ment farm programs that help
stabilize prices and/or yields. In
this context, “risk-balancing”
refers to adjustments in business
and financial risk that result from
an exogenous shock (such as a sta-
bilizing policy) that affects the
existing balance. The seminal
work in this area was conducted
by Gabriel and Baker, who devel-
oped a conceptual framework that
linked production, investment,
and financing decisions via a risk
constraint. Their model indicated
that, in the aggregate, farmers
make financial adjustments lead-
ing to decreased (or increased)
financial risk in response to a rise
(or fall) in business risk. Thus,
farm policies that create a lower
risk business environment might
induce financial choices that
increase total farm risk.
In further investigating “risk bal-
ancing,” other research has exam-
ined the impacts of income-sup-
porting farm policies on leverage.
Collins, for example, developed a
structural model of a risk-averse
producer’s overall debt-equity deci-
sion, supporting Gabriel and
Baker’s conclusions that risk-
reducing farm policies may well
increase financial risk-taking
behavior on the part of producers.
Collins also concluded that, for
risk-averse producers, greater risk-
taking behavior also may be asso-
ciated with policies intended to
raise expected farm income. Other
work has shown that risk-reducing
and income-enhancing policies
may, due to increased leveraging,
increase the likelihood of farmers
losing part of their equity or going
bankrupt (Featherstone, Moss,
Baker, and Preckel). Further,
research that includes more com-
plex specifications, such as tax
laws, credit subsidies, and other
factors, reach similar conclusions
(Moss, Ford, and Boggess;
Ahrendsen, Collender, and Dixon).
In addition to approaches that
have examined the links between
financial risk and business risk,
other research has examined opti-
mal farm decisionmaking, includ-
ing links that span financial, mar-
keting, and production considera-
tions. The underlying tenet of this
line of research is that certain
marketing strategies often work to
stabilize business risk, and also to
reduce the risks associated with
debt repayment by ensuring more
predictable incomes. Thus, a
farmer may choose either a for-
ward contracting, hedging, or other
business risk strategy accommo-
dating lenders’ preferences for
greater liquidity (see next section)
and loan repayment certainty
(Barry and Baker). These models
often are based on risk program-
ming and stochastic simulations,
and typically assume risk aversion
on the part of the producer.
Several of these studies have
focused on hedging (a financial
strategy for which data are readily
available) and its relationship to a
producer’s use of leverage. These
studies generally conclude that
hedging tends to increase as the
farm’s debt level rises. Using an
optimal hedging model that explic-
itly accounts for the financial
structure of the farm, one such
theoretical article concludes that
hedging is positively related to
debt because hedging reduces busi-
ness risk, offsetting to some extent
the increased financial risk associ-
ated with leveraging (Turvey and
Baker, 1989).
Empirical research tends to sup-
port these findings, including stud-
ies focusing on a hypothetical corn
and soybean farm in Indiana
(Turvey and Baker, 1990) and
Florida orange growers (Moss and
van Blokland; Moss, Ford, and
Castejon). A survey of Indiana
farmers also indicates that highly
leveraged farmers are more likely
to hedge than other producers

































4 43 3could increase their net returns
and/or reduce their risk (Shapiro
and Brorsen). Farmer’s use of
leveraging (and the resulting debt
payment obligations) is closely
related to liquidity management,
the topic of the next section.
L Li iq qu ui id di it ty y
Another aspect of financial risk
management is liquidity, which
involves the farmer’s ability to gen-
erate cash quickly and efficiently
in order to meet his or her finan-
cial obligations (Barry and Baker).
The liquidity issue relates to cash
flow and addresses the question:
“When adverse events occur, does a
farmer have assets (or other mone-
tary sources) that can easily be
converted to cash to meet his or
her financial demands?”
Asset liquidity depends on the
relationship between the firm’s
assets and the expected cash pro-
ceeds from the sale of each of those
assets (Barry, Baker, and Sanint).
An asset is perfectly liquid if its
sale generates cash equal to, or
greater than, the reduction in the
value of the firm due to the sale.
Illiquid assets, in contrast, cannot
be quickly sold without a produc-
er’s accepting a discount, reducing
the value accruing to the firm by
more than the expected sale price.
Examples of liquid assets include
grain in storage, cash, and compa-
ny stock holdings, while illiquid
assets include land, machinery,
and other fixed assets. Factors that
influence liquidity include mar-
ketability of the asset, the length
of time allowed for liquidation
before the cash is needed, transac-
tions costs, and the asset’s income-
generating role in the firm (Barry,
Baker, and Sanint; Pierce).
Liquidity management is interre-
lated with risk responses in pro-
duction and marketing, and also
with the farm’s degree of leverage.
The more highly leveraged the
farm, everything else being equal,
the greater the need for careful
liquidity management in order to
make timely payments on loans
and other farm financial obliga-
tions. Some of the methods that
farmers use to manage liquidity,
and hence their financial risk,
include the following:
• Selling Assets—A producer’s
willingness to sell assets is an
important financial response to
risk, particularly in crisis situa-
tions (Barry and Baker). If a
farmer faces a low net income in
a given year, selling liquid
assets (such as stored grain or
nonfarm assets, such as stocks)
is a first step in meeting expens-
es for the year. Holding liquid
assets, however, may be costly
because they typically earn
lower returns than when used in
the production process (assum-
ing the economic viability of the
operation). If the use of liquid
assets is not adequate to meet
financial demands, additional
steps—such as the sale of less
liquid assets—may be necessary.
Because many farmers are heav-
ily invested in illiquid assets,
such as land, livestock, and
machinery, maintaining liquidity
to meet shortfalls in returns
may at times be difficult.
• Managing the Pacing of
Investments and Withdrawals—
Maintaining flexibility in the
timing of farm investments and
withdrawals is also a response to
financial risk. In low income
periods, for example, a producer
may postpone the purchase of
new machines and other equip-
ment. This is an approach
favored by many producers dur-
ing times of adversity. It avoids
large financial outlays during
such periods, builds equity,
reduces indebtedness, and allows
the strengthening of profitability
in a rapidly expanding farm








on loans and other
obligations.



























k• Holding Liquid Credit
Reserves—Producers commonly
maintain liquid credit reserves
to manage their financial risk.
Credit reserves reflect unused
borrowing capacity, and general-
ly reflect additional capital from
lenders in the form of an open
line of credit. Maintaining credit
reserves avoids the costs associ-
ated with liquidating assets to
meet cash demands, and the pos-
sible later reacquisition of those
assets when the adversity has
passed (Barry and Baker). In
addition, drawing from credit
reserves when needed does not
disrupt the farm’s asset struc-
ture, the transactions costs are
typically low, and institutional
sources of funds are generally
available to producers in rural
areas (Barry, Baker, and Sanint).
Several implicit costs are, how-
ever, associated with such
reserves. For example, they rep-
resent an opportunity cost from
forgone leveraging. Further,
interest must be paid on new
loans, and noninterest charges
(such as loan fees) are at times
used by lenders to compensate
for establishing lines of credit
(Barry, Baker, and Sanint).
Farmers’ reliance on the last strate-
gy listed above—accessing credit
reserves to obtain liquidity during
times of adversity—introduces risk
in terms of lenders’ responses.
Lenders’ decisions regarding the
availability of credit are directly
affected by a farm’s capital struc-
ture (the degree to which the farm
is leveraged), conditions in the agri-
cultural sector (such as the level of
market prices), and financial mar-
ket conditions (such as interest
rates) (Barry, Baker, and Sanint).
Partly due to significant loan loss-
es in the 1980’s, agricultural
lenders increasingly have empha-
sized credit quality and manage-
ment of credit risk in their loan
portfolios. Both price responses
(risk-adjusted interest rates) and
nonprice responses (differential
loan limits, security requirements,
or loan supervision requirements)
may be employed to address credit
risk (Miller, Ellinger, Barry, and
Lajili). In a 1992 survey of more
than 1,000 banks in Illinois,
Indiana, and Iowa, respondents
indicated that they were quite able
to distinguish between high- and
low-risk borrowers, and to monitor
their performance. Of the respon-
dents, 70 percent indicated that
they differentially priced loans to
finance farm production, and 59
percent differentially priced loans
secured by farm real estate. A
smaller percentage of respondents
indicated the use of risk-adjusted



































Table 15—Selected price and nonprice responses of respondent banks in
Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa, 1992
Price and nonprice response Indication of use
Percent
Differential loan pricing on loans to finance
agricultural production 70
Differential loan pricing on loans secured by
farm real estate 59
Risk-adjusted loan pricing on loans to finance
agricultural production 57
Risk-adjusted loan pricing on loans secured by
farm real estate 40
Charging of fees on agricultural loans 43
Source: Excerpted by ERS from Miller, Lynn H., Paul N. Ellinger, Peter J. Barry, and Kaouthar Lajili, “Price and
Nonprice Management of Agricultural Credit Risk,” Agricultural Finance Review 53 (1993): 28-41
16Commercial banks may use differen-
tial rates for other reasons than credit risk.
Complexity of pricing, a bank's capital posi-
tion, bank size, and risk-distinguishing
ability generally are associated with the
use of differential and risk-adjusted pricing
(Miller, Ellinger, Barry, and Lajili).In addition, lenders may require
that producers use one or more
risk management strategies to
increase the likelihood of timely
payments on financial obligations.
Indeed, lenders’ recommendations
can have an important influence
on producers’ risk management
decisions. A survey of Texas
lenders and producers in the late
1980’s, for example, indicated that
the use of risk management prac-
tices—including hedging, forward
contracting, crop insurance, farm
program participation, and diversi-
fication—resulted in lenders view-
ing loan requests more favorably
(Knight, Lovell, Rister, and Coble).
Using a logit model, this research
also found that lenders can greatly
increase the probability of their
borrowers adopting certain risk
management practices if the use of
those practices is recommended by
the lender.
Regardless of lender recommenda-
tions, empirical research provides
evidence of the effectiveness of
such risk management strategies.
As discussed earlier, studies show
that the use of hedging or options
reduces financial risk and
improves cash flow, potentially
lowering a farmer’s credit risk
(Turvey and Baker, 1989). Because
of this risk reduction, high-debt
producers with low credit reserves
would be expected to hedge more
than low-debt producers with large
credit reserves (Turvey and Baker,
1990). Turvey and Baker’s results
support the notion that lenders
will benefit from producers’ hedg-
ing (and presumably, their use of
other risk management strategies)
because it decreases portfolio riski-
ness (Heifner, 1972a).
L Le ea as si in ng g  I In np pu ut ts s  a an nd d  H Hi ir ri in ng g
C Cu us st to om m  W Wo or rk k
Producers can also manage their
farming risks by either leasing
inputs (including land) or hiring
workers during harvest or other
peak months. Leasing refers to a
capital transfer agreement that
provides the renter (the actual
operator) with control over assets
owned by someone else for a given
period, using a mutually agreed-
upon rental arrangement (Perry,
1997). Farmers can lease land,
machinery, equipment, or livestock.
Leasing has similarities with
leveraging (a topic discussed previ-
ously in this section), in that both
are methods used to expand con-
trol over resources. In addition,
both commit the farmer to regular
payments. Leasing appears, how-
ever, to have some advantages.
One advantage is that control can
be gained over long-life inputs
(such as land and machinery),
without making long-term pay-
ment commitments. In addition,
leasing provides producers with
flexibility in allocating their asset
portfolios—a producer can be in
either the farming business or the
land ownership business, without
being in both.
Leasing has potential advantages
to those who are renting. Leasing
improves the renter’s flexibility to
respond to changing market condi-
tions. In addition, leasing reduces
the long-term fixed payments on
borrowed capital that may strain
liquidity in years of reduced out-
put, and can reduce both financial
and production risk for the renter
(Sommer and others, 1998). In
essence, leasing limits fixed costs,
providing greater flexibility for the
renter to adapt. It also offers a
way to enter farming or to manage
the size of the operation without
requiring large investments of cap-
ital. One disadvantage, however, is
that renting may limit the short-
term borrowing capacity of an
operation because of the absence of
collateral to back a loan (Sommer
and others, 1998).
Advantages may further accrue
from the perspective of the owner.
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kasset to receive a return on his or
her investment, and may reduce
risk when a share rental arrange-
ment is used if the owner is confi-
dent of the renter’s management
ability. In the case of a cash
lease, the owner’s income risk is
reduced substantially.
Leasing of land is common in U.S.
agriculture. According to USDA’s
ARMS data, about 9 percent of U.S.
farm operators leased all of their
land in 1995, 36 percent operated
on at least some rental land, and
55 percent owned all of the land
that they operated (Sommer and
others, 1998). The ARMS results
also indicated that full-owner
farms (those that rented neither
land nor other production assets)
accounted for proportionally small-
er shares of acreage, income, and
sales than part-owner farms that
rented land and other assets (fig.
8). Farms that rented land and
other productive assets operated
more than twice the U.S. average
acreage, and had income and sales
3.5 to 4 times the national average.
Although apparently increasing in
recent years, leasing of nonreal
estate assets is at a lower level
than of farmland (Barry; also see
Koenig and Dodson).
Land rental arrangements can fall
either in the category of “share
renting” or “cash renting.” With
share renting, the landlord and
tenant share in the operation’s
returns and each provides a prede-
termined set of inputs. The two
parties usually share input costs in
the same proportions as outputs
and share the risk of yield variabil-
ity. They typically have equal say
in management decisions, although
the tenant usually carries out most
of the production decisions. Often,
the owner provides land, while the
renter provides machinery and
labor. In practice, the renter (as
well as the owner) may have sever-
al such arrangements.
The risk benefit of this type of
arrangement is derived from the
financial sharing of potential loss-
es between the partners. If net
returns are negative in a particu-
lar year, for example, losses are
spread across the participants in
the share rental arrangement. In
essence, share leasing is a highly
risk efficient form of financing, in
that the operator’s rental obliga-
tion moves in a perfectly correlat-









































Gross value of sales
Percent
Source:  Sommer, Judith E., Robert A. Hoppe, Robert C. Green, Penelope J. Korb, 
Structural and Financial Characteristics of U.S. Farms, 1995:  20th Annual Family Farm 
Report to Congress, AIB-746, U.S. Dept. Agr., Econ. Res. Serv., November 1998.
Figure 8
Distribution of farms, acres operated, gross cash income, and 
gross value of sales by tenure class, 1995
Land rental arrange-
ments can be classi-
fied as either“share
renting”or“cash 
renting.”ed way with receipts from the
operation, thus stabilizing the
after-rent income position relative
to a fixed-payment cash lease.
Share-rental arrangements can be
difficult to manage, however, and
the trend has been away from
share leasing to cash leasing.
Some of the impetus for this trend
is on the part of landowners, par-
ticularly if the owner is absentee
and questions arise regarding the
renter’s practices and skills. The
owner may decide that his or her
income risk is too great and that
monitoring the management skills
of the renter is too time consum-
ing, and may instead opt for a cash
rental arrangement. Some of the
impetus for this trend is also from
operators. It is easier to bid for
additional tracts of land using
cash bids than share bids, and
cash leasing avoids the sharing of
management responsibilities with
several landlords.
With cash renting, the tenant rents
the land for a pre-specified, fixed
amount per acre. Cash renting
affords the renter flexibility, as in a
share-rent agreement. All of the
yield and price risk are absorbed
by the renter in a cash renting
arrangement, and none remains
with the owner, who receives only
the agreed-upon cash rent payment
(Perry, 1997). In addition, the
renter typically provides inputs
other than the land (including the
machinery), reducing the fixed
costs committed by the landowner.
To better match rental arrange-
ments with the needs of landlords
and tenants, “hybrid” contracts are
now being used. These “flexible”
cash rents incorporate the risk-
sharing advantages of share leases,
without the sharing of responsibili-
ties (Barry).
Research suggests that accounting
rates of return may vary systemat-
ically with a farm’s tenure posi-
tion, but that these differences do
not necessarily have implications
for performance in terms of eco-
nomic rates of return. Accounting
rates of return for owned farmland
have been low historically, with
empirical research indicating that,
as tenancy increases, accounting
rates of return to assets and lever-
age positions tend to increase
(Ellinger and Barry). Differences
across tenure classes largely
reflect the nondepreciability of
farmland and its inherently low
rate of return and low debt-carry-
ing capacity because part of the
returns to land ownership occur as
capital gains rather than as cur-
rent income (Barry and Robison).
Low accounting rates of return
may mask underlying economic
rates of return, and provide pro-
ducers with liquidity problems
that worsen with the degree of
financial leverage.
Owners who hire custom help
(who provide skilled labor and
their own equipment) can lower
the costs associated with commit-
ting capital to fixed inputs.
Producers may, at times, find that
hiring workers full-time for the
entire year may be costly when
those workers are only essential
during harvest or other peak
months. With the use of custom
workers (or hired or contract
labor), the owner has a great deal
of flexibility, potentially lowers his
or her costs, and obtains special-
ized labor (Perry, 1997). The use of
such arrangements, however, may
increase the owner’s risk because
he or she would have less control
over resources than if equipment
were owned outright or workers
hired full-time.
I In ns su ur ri in ng g  C Cr ro op p  Y Yi ie el ld ds s  
a an nd d  C Cr ro op p  R Re ev ve en nu ue es s
Insurance is often used by crop
producers to mitigate yield (and
hence, revenue) risk, and is obvi-
ously prevalent outside of agricul-
ture. Property, health, automobile,





yield and price risk.



























kforms of insurance regularly pur-
chased by individuals to mitigate
risk. For an individual, the use of
insurance involves the exchange of
a fixed, relatively small payment
(the premium) for protection from
uncertain, but potentially large,
losses. When losses occur, virtually
all types of insurance policies
require a deductible, meaning that
the individual must assume a por-
tion of the value of the loss.
Indemnities compensate individu-
als for losses up to the level of the
insurance guarantee, which is
based on the deductible chosen by
the insured (within ranges set by
policy terms).
A key characteristic of an insur-
ance market involves the concept
of risk pooling. Risk pooling
involves combining the risks faced
by a large number of individuals
who contribute through premiums
to a common fund, which is used to
pay the losses due any individual
in the pool (Ray). More specifically,
when an insurance company sells
policies to many different individu-
als who have less than perfectly
correlated risks, the total portfolio
will be less risky than the average
of the individual policies. This is
because, at any point in time, the
odds of all insureds in the pool
having a claim are extremely low.
Thus, the insurer diversifies non-
systemic (uncorrelated) risks
across the insurance pool
(Goodwin and Smith; Miranda).
In part because of several “market
failure” arguments, the
Government operates the multi-
peril crop insurance (MPCI) pro-
gram. One market failure argu-
ment is based on the idea that
many of the natural disaster risks
associated with crop production
(such as drought, flooding, and dis-
ease) are correlated across wide-
spread geographical areas. As a
result, it has been argued that
pooling risks on a scale that is fea-
sible for most private insurers is
difficult (Miranda and Glauber;
Ray).17 Others argue that private
multi-peril insurance fails because
other types of producer responses
to risk—such as diversification
and smoothing of consumption
over time through savings and bor-
rowing—greatly reduce the addi-
tional effect of insurance in
smoothing consumption, and make
insurance unattractive to farmers
when offered at competitive mar-
ket prices (Wright and Hewitt).
In addition, research has shown
that moral hazard and adverse
selection are problems that signifi-
cantly affect the viability of multi-
ple peril crop insurance (Ahsan,
Ali, and Kurian; Chambers;
Goodwin and Smith). Moral hazard
is present when an insured individ-
ual can increase his or her expect-
ed indemnity by actions taken
after buying insurance. Adverse
selection occurs when a farmer has
more information about the risk of
loss than the insurer does, and is
better able to determine the fair-
ness of premium rates. Both moral
hazard and adverse selection affect
the actuarial soundness of insur-
ance, and pose a particularly diffi-
cult dilemma in multi-peril crop
insurance. A lack of extensive pro-
ducer-specific yield-risk informa-
tion, which is needed to control
adverse selection, has been a prob-
lem historically, and monitoring
farmers’ protection against losses,
which is the basis for controlling
moral hazard, is also difficult.
Empirical research has used vari-
ous data sets and approaches, and
provides evidence of moral hazard
in multi-peril crop insurance (Just
and Calvin, 1993a; Coble, Knight,




































17This argument has been countered by
those who argue that a wide array of rein-
surance options are available in interna-
tional markets that allow systematic risks
to be diversified. Goodwin and Smith, for
example, state that, "Such markets are
more than able to permit a sufficient
degree of diversification to permit risks
that appear to be systematic to individual
markets to be spread across a wider range
of activities and markets."adverse selection (Just and Calvin,
1993b; Goodwin; Luo, Skees, and
Marchant; Quiggin, Karagiannis,
and Stanton).
In contrast to multi-peril crop
insurance, certain other agricul-
tural risks—such as the risks asso-
ciated with hail damage or the
death of livestock—are insured by
private companies with no govern-
ment subsidization or reinsurance
(see box for information on live-
stock insurance, p. 53). Unlike
multiple peril crop insurance,
these markets are generally char-
acterized by risks that are nonsys-
temic across producers, similar to
the risks underlying liability, auto-
mobile, life, and other types of pri-
vate-market insurance.
The Federal multi-peril crop insur-
ance program has been the focus of
interest in recent years, and the
Federal Crop Insurance Reform
Act of 1994 increased the level of
the premium subsidy provided to
producers, as well as grower par-
ticipation. With passage of the
1994 Act, Congress introduced cat-
astrophic (CAT) coverage, for
which growers do not pay a premi-
um. Rather, producers who choose
to obtain CAT must pay an admin-
istrative fee.18 CAT policies pay for
losses below 50 percent of a pro-
ducer’s average yield (based on a
4- to 10-year “actual production
history,” or “APH,” yield series for
the grower). When losses qualify,
indemnity payments are made at a
rate of 55 percent of the maximum
price set by USDA’s Risk
Management Agency (RMA).19
Growers can select among a wide
variety of coverage levels under
the program. More specifically, a
grower can obtain multi-peril crop
insurance at levels between 50 and
75 percent of his or her APH yield,
using 5-percent increments.20
Growers can also select a price
coverage level of up to 100 percent
of the established price set by
RMA. Coverage above the CAT
level, up to a maximum of 75/100
(the first number refers to the
yield coverage and the second
number to the price coverage
level), is termed “buy-up” coverage.
Producers receive indemnities
under the program according to
the following equation:
Indemnity = Max [(Guaranteed
Yield - Actual Yield), 0] * 
Price Guarantee.
Within this equation, the guaran-
teed yield is calculated by multi-
plying the producer’s APH yield by
the coverage level that he or she
selects. To illustrate, assume that
a soybean producer has an APH
yield of 40 bushels per acre, and
selects a coverage of 75 percent.
The guaranteed yield is then 30
bushels per acre (0.75 * 40). If the
actual yield is 20 bushels in a
given year, an indemnity would be
paid on the 10 bushels (30 - 20) of
shortfall from the yield guarantee.
If the actual yield is above the
guarantee, the farmer receives no
indemnity. The price guarantee
places a dollar value on the loss. If
the farmer chooses a $5.50 price
election, for example, his or her
indemnity would total $5.50 * 10
bushels, or $55 per acre.
Except at the CAT level, producers
must pay a premium for coverage
under the multi-peril crop insur-
ance program. The key to insur-
ance rate setting is the accurate
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18Before 1999, producers paid an admin-
istrative fee of $50 for CAT coverage.
Beginning in 1999, the fee is $60.
19Starting in 1999, CAT coverage
declined from 50-percent yield and 60-per-
cent price coverage to 50-percent yield and
55-percent price coverage.
20Starting in 1999, APH coverage is
available at the 85-percent yield coverage
level in selected areas and for selected
crops. Various revenue insurance products
(see upcoming discussion, p. 52) will also
allow 85-percent coverage in selected loca-
tions and for selected crops. Higher level
coverage is also available under the Group
Risk Plan (see upcoming discussion, p. 52).In effect, insurers must set actuari-
ally sound premium rates so that
the premiums collected are in bal-
ance with total expected indemni-
ties. Under an actuarially sound
program with no subsidization, the
average insured individual would,
in the long run, expect to receive
the same amount in indemnities as
is paid in premiums.
While actuarially fair rates pro-
vide a starting point, insurance
premiums generally must cover
additional costs. Private insurance
companies must price their prod-
ucts in order to recover overhead,
operating costs, and a desired
return on equity. When these costs
are added into the premium, the
cost of insurance over time exceeds
indemnities that will be paid out.
Individuals are willing to accept
such contracts for automobile,
medical, and other private insur-
ance products (as well as hail and
livestock insurance) due to risk
aversion (see appendix 2). In short,
private insurance is priced accord-
ing to the following formula:
Premium = (Actuarially Fair
Premium + Administrative Costs)
> Expected Indemnity.
In contrast, Federal multi-peril
crop insurance attempts to encour-
age participation by providing four
primary types of subsidies. These
categories include the following:21
• Premium subsidy—The premium
paid by producers has been sub-
sidized since 1980, with the sub-
sidy depending on the level of
coverage. Currently, the maxi-
mum subsidy for multi-peril crop
insurance (other than for CAT,
which is subsidized at 100 per-
cent), is 41.7 percent of the total
premium, and is offered at the
65/100 coverage level. The sub-
sidy varies with other levels of
coverage and by type of product.
• Delivery expense reimburse-
ment—The private companies
delivering policies to farmers are,
as of 1998, reimbursed for their
sales and service expenses at 11
percent of (implicit) total premi-
um for CAT coverage and 24.5
percent of total premium at buy-
up levels. In the absence of gov-
ernment involvement, private
companies would include this
expense in the premium paid by
the producer.
• Reinsurance—The Government
reinsures private companies that
sell policies (that is, the Govern-
ment shares in the risk of loss) to
help reduce financial losses in
years of widespread disasters.
Companies can also earn under-
writing gains when certain condi-
tions are met, as determined in
the Standard Reinsurance
Agreement signed between
USDA and the companies.
• Excess losses—Indemnities are
paid to qualifying farmers
regardless of the level of premi-
um income. Such “excess losses”
are paid by the Government in
years when indemnity payments
exceed total premiums. The
Federal Crop Insurance Reform
Act of 1994 legislates that oper-
ation of the program (including
the setting of premiums) is to be
conducted in a manner so that
the loss ratio (total indemnities
divided by total premium) is not
to exceed an expected maximum
of 1.075 over the long run.
Thus, premiums charged the
farmer under multi-peril crop





































21In addition, the administrative costs
associated with funding USDA's Risk
Management Agency are appropriated
annually by Congress. This funding sup-
ports RMA's development of rates and poli-
cy terms for the multi-peril crop insurance
program, the research and development
costs associated with new RMA product
introductions, compliance functions associ-
ated with private companies delivering
policies, and other activities.Premium = (Actuarially Fair
Premium - Premium Subsidy) <
Expected Indemnity.
As a result, farmers have two
incentives for obtaining multi-peril
crop insurance. Because the pro-
gram is subsidized, participants
are expected to receive indemnities
in excess of their premium cost,
resulting in a positive net return.
In addition, research has confirmed
the risk-reducing effectiveness of
crop insurance, particularly in situ-
ations of high yield variability.
Risk protection is greatest when
crop-yield insurance (which pro-
vides yield risk protection) is com-
bined with forward pricing or
hedging (which provide price risk
protection). Using an example,
research indicates that a corn pro-
ducer in North Carolina—a fairly
high-risk corn-producing area—
would expect that his or her rev-
enue would fall below 70 percent
of expected revenue about 23 per-
cent of the time. With the purchase
of 75/100 crop insurance, the per-
centage falls to 17 percent, and
with the use of both crop insur-
ance and an optimal hedge, the
percentage falls to 7 percent.
Generally, revenue insurance pro-
vides protection similar to the
combination of crop insurance and
an optimal hedge (Harwood,
Heifner, Coble, and Perry).
Since 1990, Congress and the
Administration have become
increasingly interested in encour-
aging the development of new
types of policies. Group Risk Plan
(GRP) insurance, which is based
on county (rather than individual)
yields, was first introduced on a
pilot basis in 1993, and has since
been expanded to nearly all major
field crops in the late 1990’s
(Skees, Black, and Barnett).
Because it is based on area (not
individual) yields, producers with
significant yield losses may find
themselves unprotected because
the county yield does not warrant
an indemnity payment. Various
studies have shown that GRP is
most effective at protecting indi-
vidual yield risk when a strong
correlation exists between individ-
ual and county-level yields
(Miranda; Skees; Glauber,
Harwood, and Skees).
In addition, both producers and
policymakers have expressed con-
siderable interest since the early
1980’s in the concept of revenue
(and cost of production) insurance.
In the 1981 Farm Act, for example,
Congress mandated a study on the
feasibility of revenue insurance. In
the 1994 Federal Crop Insurance
Reform Act, Congress mandated a
cost of production insurance plan
that was to compensate producers
for reductions in yield and/or price
resulting from an insured cause.
And, in the 1996 Federal Agricul-
ture Improvement and Reform
(FAIR) Act, Congress clearly sig-
naled the need for introducing pilot
revenue insurance programs.
As of 1998, three revenue insur-
ance products were available to
producers of major field crops in
selected areas: Crop Revenue
Coverage, Income Protection, and
Revenue Assurance (see appendix
3). These products complement
many strategies, such as the use
of diversification, and provide a
more comprehensive alternative to
the use of multi-peril crop insur-
ance. In designing these alterna-
tives, policymakers, program ana-
lysts, and insurance companies
have benefited from witnessing
Canada’s experience with the
Gross Revenue Insurance
Program (GRIP) in the early
1990’s. Canada’s GRIP was expen-
sive (in terms of both government
and farmer costs) and interfered
with market signals and planting
decisions, largely because it used
long-term average prices in estab-
lishing the guarantee (Sands;
Turvey and Chen). Based on this
experience, U.S. revenue insurance


































kprice guarantee, rather than a
guarantee based on long-term
average prices.
Revenue insurance was first intro-
duced in the United States in 1996.
The Income Protection product was
developed by USDA’s Risk Manage-
ment Agency in 1996. Crop Reve-
nue Coverage, which was designed
by American Agrisurance, Inc., a
private company, was also intro-
duced in 1996. These programs
were expanded from limited cover-
age in 1996 to new geographic
areas in 1997 and 1998. A more
recent product, Revenue Assur-
ance, was offered in 1997 for corn
and soybeans in Iowa, and was
developed by the Iowa Farm
Bureau. Research has indicated
that the effectiveness of revenue
insurance in reducing farm-level
income risk can be substantial, and
is similar to the effectiveness of
combining the purchase of crop
insurance with hedging (Harwood,
Heifner, Coble, and Perry).
As implemented for 1998 crops,
these three plans have many simi-
lar features, but also differ in many
ways. Each of the products com-
bines price and yield risk protec-
tion in one program. Indemnities
under each plan equal the amount,
if any, by which guaranteed rev-
enue exceeds the revenue realized
at harvest. All calculate guaran-


































Several Types of Livestock Insurance Are
Available Through the Private Sector
Several types of insurance covering livestock are widely available in
the United States through the private sector. Like private hail insur-
ance, these products are not subsidized by the Federal Government.
Livestock and hail insurance are quite different from multi-peril crop-
yield and crop-revenue insurance in that coverage is typically limited
to those losses that are independent geographically, such as hail (in
the case of hail insurance) or fire, lightning, hail, collision, and other
such perils (in the case of livestock).
One of the most popular private products used by livestock producers is
a blanket farm personal property policy. Under this type of policy, live-
stock coverage is included as part of the farm’s business property, and is
subject to the same terms, conditions, and limitations faced by other
property associated with the farm business. The insured selects an
amount of protection and pays premium on that amount, with each pol-
icy limiting the actual cash value or market value per animal. Typical
per animal values are $2,000 per head of cattle and $500 per head of
swine (Anderson). At least one insurer offers an endorsement to their
blanket policy, for an added premium, that includes coverage for freez-
ing or smothering in blizzards or snowstorms (Skees and Pyles).
An alternative to a blanket policy is a “stated value” policy. Under this
type of policy, the insured provides the insuring company with a list of
the value of individual animals to be insured. Coverage is for animal
death caused by named perils for animals on the farm or in transport
to another location. Perils typically covered by such policies include
fire, lightning, aircraft or falling objects, collision with a vehicle,
smoke, vandalism, and theft (Anderson).
A third type of insurance is livestock mortality coverage, which is all-
risk term life insurance.This coverage is typically used to insure high-
value show or performance animals and covers loss due to death or
theft. Livestock insured under such policies must pass a veterinarian’s
inspection and their values must be substantiated at the time of poli-
cy issuance (Anderson).farm yields and from futures prices
at signup and at harvest time.
They all use policy terms associat-
ed with basic coverage under the
multi-peril crop insurance pro-
gram. In addition, each product
requires that producers pay a pre-
mium for coverage, which is subsi-
dized by the Federal Government
in a manner similar to multi-peril
crop insurance. The Federal
Government also reinsures private
companies against a portion of the
losses associated with each of the
products, and provides reimburse-
ment for delivery expenses. The
uniqueness of each product, in
terms of the specification of the
guarantee and other variables
establishing the producer’s cover-
age, is explained in the appendix.
In addition, each product is unique
in its rating methodology and the
producer’s ability to subdivide
acreage into individual parcels for
loss adjustment purposes.
Among the revenue insurance
products currently available, Crop
Revenue Coverage (CRC), which is
available over the widest geo-
graphic areas and has been the
most widely publicized, has the
highest enrollment. Despite CRC’s
higher premium rates, sales were
strong relative to multi-peril
(APH) crop insurance in 1996 and
1997 in many areas (see figs. 9 and
10 for 1997 data). Indeed, little
correlation appears to exist
between premium rates (relative
to APH) and the proportion of
acreage covered by CRC.
CRC sales were particularly strong
for corn and soybeans in Iowa and
Nebraska in 1997. Two factors like-
ly explain this result. First, Iowa
and Nebraska were the only States
having prior experience with CRC
in 1996, and producers were likely
more familiar with the program
than in locations in which 1997
was the first year of CRC coverage
availability. Second, Nebraska has
a large American Agrisurance, Inc.
(the CRC-developing company)
sales force, and agent enthusi-
asm—a key to the successful mar-
keting of insurance policies—was
likely strong. Third, American









































Proportion of corn Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) acres to all
buy-up insured corn acres, 1997
Note: Shaded areas include counties with at least 500 acres planted to corn.
Source: Estimated by ERS from USDA, Risk Management Agency, electronic experience and yield
record database, 1996 and 1997.erable time and effort in promo-
tional activities (such as agent and
commodity group meetings) in
Iowa and Nebraska (Cleaveland).
O Of ff f- -F Fa ar rm m  E Em mp pl lo oy ym me en nt t  a an nd d  O Ot th he er r
T Ty yp pe es s  o of f  O Of ff f- -F Fa ar rm m  I In nc co om me e
Earning off-farm income is anoth-
er strategy that farmers may use
to mitigate the effects of agricul-
tural risk on farm family house-
hold income. Not only can off-farm
income supplement household
income, it may also provide a more
reliable stream of income than
farm returns. In essence, off-farm
income can offer a form of diversi-
fication. The incentives for diversi-
fying income sources depend on
the level and variability of returns
when considering a risk-averse
producer. If farm households are
risk averse, then they will be will-
ing to supply relatively more labor
to stable off-farm occupations than
they would otherwise (Mishra and
Goodwin, 1997). Or, they may seek
out other types of off-farm income
(such as interest and dividends) to
counter negative fluctuations in
farm income.
According to USDA’s ARMS data, a
large percentage of farm families
earn off-farm income, and the lev-
els of off-farm income relative to
farm income can be significant.
ARMS data for 1996, for example,
indicate that 82 percent of all farm
households had off-farm income
that exceeded their farm income
(Hoppe). For each farm type catego-
ry (including very large farms), at
least 28 percent of the households
within the category had off-farm
income exceeding farm income.
Farm household income can be cat-
egorized as earned off-farm income
(wages and salaries), unearned off-
farm income (social security, pen-
sions, and investments), and farm
net cash income (fig. 11). As illus-
trated in the figure, reliance on off-
farm income is related to farm
size. About 10 percent of farm
households were classified as pri-
marily engaged in farming and
having sales between $100,000
and $249,999 in 1996. These farms
relied on off-farm sources for about
57 percent of their total household
income. In contrast, households
operating very large farms (those
Off-farm income 
can offera form 
ofdiversification.






























Proportion of soybean Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) acres to all 





Note: Shaded areas include counties with at least 500 acres planted to soybeans.
Source: Estimated by ERS from USDA, Risk Management Agency, electronic experience and yield
record database, 1996 and 1997.with sales of $500,000 or more)
accounted for 3 percent of all
farms and relied on off-farm
sources for a relatively small 
percentage of their average income
(Hoppe).22
Several studies have modeled fac-
tors, such as off-farm work, that
affect inequality in the distribu-
tion of income among farmers.
Gardner (1969) found that off-farm
work reduced both shortrun and
longrun income inequality, and
postulated that off-farm work may
enable poor farmers to add to their
own capital stock. A study focusing
on New York farmers reached sim-
ilar conclusions, finding that if
incomes are improved by increas-
ing income from nonfarm sources,
inequality among farm families
would likely be reduced (Boisvert
and Ranney). Using 1991 ARMS
data, another study found that the
distribution of income in the North
Central region was most equal
among U.S. regions, and most
unequal in the West (El-Osta,
Bernat, and Ahearn). In addition,
results indicated that farm opera-
tor households that did not partici-
pate in off-farm employment expe-
rienced higher income inequality
as a group than did their partici-
pating counterparts.
Research has also addressed the
decision to engage in off-farm work
and the hours of off-farm work
supplied by farmers. One study,
focusing on off-farm labor supply
in Illinois, found that off-farm
work was quite sensitive to eco-
nomic incentives, and that a 10-
percent increase in the off-farm
wage entailed an 11-percent
increase in hours of off-farm work,
holding other factors constant
(Sumner). A study focusing on
Massachusetts farmers in 1986/87
concluded that the hours of work
supplied by the farm operator
depended on the participation
decision of the spouse. In addition,
family and farm characteristics
were important to both the partici-
pation decision and hours worked
by the farm operator (Lass,
Findeis, and Hallberg).
Various empirical studies have
examined the relationship between
Evidence suggests
thatthe riskiness of












































Source:  USDA, ERS, 1996 Agricultural Resource Management Study, special analysis.
Sales class
Figure 11
Farm household income by sales class, 1996
1
1
Note:  For sales classes less than $250,000, the operator's principal occupation is farming.
 Farm operator households are associated with farms organized as individual operations, 
partnerships, or family corporations, and are generally closely held by the operator household. 
Household income includes income from farming activities and earnings from nonfarm sources 
by all household members in the reporting year.
22For more information on historical off-
farm earnings, see Hoppe and others;
Hamrick; Kassel and Gibbs.off-farm employment and farm
income variability. In one study, a
times series analysis of aggregate
data indicated that the fraction of
total farm family income earned
from off-farm sources was higher
in the 1980’s than in the early
1970’s, and suggested that the
riskiness of farm income is posi-
tively related to working off the
farm (Kyle). A study focusing on
producer responses to a survey in
Dodge County, Georgia, in the
1980’s indicated that risk and low
incomes were major disadvantages
associated with full-time farming
(Bartlett). In another study, farm
household total income was found
to be significantly less variable if
producers and their spouses
worked off the farm (Sander).
More recent research has more
explicitly linked the decision to
work off the farm with farm
income variability and other fac-
tors (Mishra and Goodwin, 1997).
Mishra and Goodwin’s analysis,
using a simultaneous-equation
Tobit model, confirmed that the
off-farm labor supply of farmers is
positively correlated with the risk-
iness of farm income among
Kansas farmers. Their results also
indicated that off-farm work (for
both the farmer and spouse) is
positively correlated with off-farm
experience and with the degree of
leverage associated with the farm.
Further, operators of larger farms
and those receiving government
supports were less likely to work
off the farm. In a followup study,
Mishra and Goodwin (1998) also
found a positive and significant
correlation between farm income
variability and the decision by
farm operators in North Carolina
to work off the farm.
Although the focus of this section
has been on off-farm employment,
off-farm income may be derived
from other sources as well (such as
interest and dividends). Indeed,
several studies have concluded
that the low correlation between
financial assets (stocks, bonds, cer-
tificates of deposit) and farm
assets suggests that diversifying
into financial assets may yield
important gains in risk efficiency
for farm households. A quadratic
programming analysis of a repre-
sentative Illinois grain farm, for
example, indicated that various
levels of diversification could
reduce the relative variability of
the farm’s rates of return on assets
by 15-25 percent compared with
holding farm assets alone (Young
and Barry). Conversely, other
research has focused on nonfarm
equity investment in agriculture,
generally concluding that investors
can gain from inclusion of farm
assets in their investment portfo-
lios (Crisostomo and Featherstone;
Moss, Featherstone, and Baker).
O Ot th he er r  W Wa ay ys s  o of f  M Ma an na ag gi in ng g  R Ri is sk k
The strategies and tools just dis-
cussed in detail are by no means
all inclusive. Many other diverse
strategies for farm risk manage-
ment are commonly used by pro-
ducers on their operations. Some of
these additional strategies include
the following:
• Adjusting inputs and outputs—
Producers can respond to risk by
altering output levels, input use,
or some combination of the two.
Research indicates that greater
output price risk results in
lower levels of both input use
and final output. Given that
preferences toward risk and cir-
cumstances can vary greatly
across producers, the final input
and output levels chosen by pro-
ducers can, accordingly, vary
considerably for individuals in
similar situations. (See Sandmo;
Hawawini; Ishii; Robison and
Barry; and Just and Pope for
more detail.)
• Cultural practices—Cultural
practices can be used to reduce
yield and, hence, income risk.




































5 57 7that mature earlier in the sea-
son, protecting against the risk
of early frost and yield loss.
Supplemental irrigation due to
abnormal weather is another
means to protect against yield
loss.
• Excess machine capacity—A
farmer may have enough
machine capacity so that plant-
ing and harvesting crops can
occur more rapidly than needed
under normal weather condi-
tions. By having such resources,
the farmer can avoid delays at
either planting or harvest that
may reduce yield losses.
Other methods of risk manage-
ment in farming are also impor-
tant, and focus on other types of
issues than those specific to pro-
duction, marketing, and finance.
Legal risks and issues associated
with farm liability, for example,
have become increasingly impor-
tant. In addition, tax concerns are
a key issue in managing the
income risks associated with year-
to-year income flows, as well as
estate transfers from generation to
generation (Keller; Keller and
Rigby-Adcock; Baquet, Hambleton,
and Jose). Government pay-
ments—such as contract payments
under the 1996 Farm Act—can
also be used to provide liquidity,
for example, or to pay the premi-
um for an options contract or a
“buy up” crop insurance policy.
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P
revious sections in this report
have focused on addressing the
myriad strategies that producers
can use to manage their farm-level
risks and their effectiveness. This
section, in contrast, addresses the
questions: “How have producers
used these tools and strategies on
their farming operations?” “What
factors are associated with farm-
ers’ use of different strategies?”
Several surveys of farmers’ use of
various risk management strate-
gies have been conducted over the
past 10-15 years. These surveys
typically focus on asking producers
whether or not they use hedging,
crop insurance, and forward con-
tracts, as well as whether they
manage risk through diversifica-
tion, keeping cash on hand, and
other strategies.
Two difficulties are present in
assessing and interpreting the
results of these surveys, which
must be kept in mind while read-
ing the results presented in the
next paragraphs. First, many of
the surveys are focused on specific
States or areas. Because different
questions are asked of different
groups of farmers at different
times, it is difficult to compare
responses on a “one-for-one” basis
across studies or across time.
Second, farmers are typically ques-
tioned as to their use of a strategy
to manage risk. Some producers
may indicate that they use a given
strategy (such as diversification or
hedging), even though profit maxi-
mization (and not risk reduction)
may be their primary motivation.
The most comprehensive survey of
farmers’ use of selected risk man-
agement strategies is USDA’s
Agricultural Resource Manage-
ment Study (ARMS). Results of
the 1996 ARMS survey, conducted
shortly after passage of the 1996
Farm Act, indicate that operators
in the largest gross income cate-
gories (more than $250,000 annu-
ally) are most likely to use hedg-
ing, forward contracting, and virtu-
ally all other risk management
strategies. In contrast, operators
with less than $50,000 in sales
were less likely to use forward con-
tracting or hedging, and signifi-
cantly fewer reported diversifica-
tion as a method for reducing risk
(fig. 12). Keeping cash on hand for
emergencies and good buys was
the number one strategy for every
size farm, for every commodity
specialty, and in every region.
The 1996 ARMS survey also asked
producers about the impact of the
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Several surveys of farmers’ use of risk management strate-
gies have been conducted over the past 10-15 years. The
results vary. Results of the 1996 Agricultural Resource
Management Study (ARMS), for example, conducted shortly
after passage of the 1996 Farm Act, indicate that operators
in the largest gross income categories (more than $250,000
annually) are most likely to use virtually all risk manage-
ment strategies. In contrast, operators with less than
$50,000 in sales were less likely to use forward contracting
or hedging. Keeping cash on hand for emergencies and good
buys was the number one strategy for every size farm, for
every commodity specialty, and in every region.1996 Farm Act in influencing
whether or not they were consider-
ing the use of new strategies. At
the U.S. level, about one-third of
the producers responding to the
survey reported receiving direct
government commodity payments.
Of those receiving government
payments, between 5 and 8 per-
cent indicated that they increased
their use of at least one risk man-
agement strategy or tool (forward
contracting, futures hedging, use of
options, use of insurance, or other
strategy) in 1996 in response to
the 1996 Farm Act.23 Responses
were fairly consistent across all
U.S. regions. With less government
intervention in farming and
greater trade liberalization, farm-
ers appear to be increasingly rely-
ing on forward contracting and
other risk management tools to
reduce their farm-level risks.
A recent Farm Futures survey also
questioned its readers nationally as
to their use of various risk manage-
ment strategies. The 690 respon-
dents reflect a nonrandom pool of
the magazine’s readers. These read-
ers are generally in the top 10 per-
cent of all U.S. farmers, with about
75 percent located in the Corn Belt
and almost all have sales exceeding
$100,000 annually. Commonly used
strategies reported by a high pro-
portion of these respondents includ-
ed using government farm pro-
grams, diversifying into both crops
and livestock, planting varieties
with different maturity dates, con-
tracting inputs to lock in a favor-
able price, buying crop insurance,
and using crop-share rental
arrangements (table 16).
Several surveys of producers’ use
of risk management strategies
have been conducted by university
extension specialists. In a survey
conducted in the mid-1990’s,
Nebraska producers were ques-
tioned about their use of alterna-
tive marketing tools, including
cash forward contracts, hedging
with futures, hedging with options,
hedge-to-arrive contracts, basis
contracts, and minimum price con-
tracts. They were also asked the
percentage of their crops for which
these tools, if any, were used, with









response to the 1996
Farm Act.




























































Source:  USDA, ERS, 1996 Agricultural Resource Management Study, special analysis.
Sales class
Note:  For all sales classes, the principal occupation of the operator may or may not be farming.
Percent
Figure 12
Farmers’ use of alternative risk management strategies by sales 





23This is approximately 1-3 percent of
all U.S. farmers.important if it was used to market
more than 50 percent of the pro-
ducer’s crop (Jose and Valluru).
The results indicate that cash for-
ward and basis contracts were the
most commonly used marketing
tools for any percentage of the
Nebraska producers’ crops. Of
those using cash forward con-
tracts, about 47 percent indicated
the use of this tool to price 75-100
percent of their crop. Similarly, of
those using basis contracts, 49 per-
cent indicated use of this tool to
price 75-100 percent of their crop.
Among the responding producers
participating in Top Farmer Crop
Workshops held at Purdue
University in 1993, 1994, and
1995, about two-thirds indicated
that they used cash forward con-
tracts. Producers participating in
the workshops indicated that these
contracts were, on average, used to
price 20-30 percent of their corn
and soybean crops. Hedging was
used by approximately 10-20 per-
cent of the participants, depending
on the specific crop and year
(Patrick, Musser, and Eckman;
Musser, Patrick, and Eckman).
Evidence also exists from the
Great Plains. A 1992 survey of
Kansas producers indicated that
over 30 percent of the respondents
used forward contracting to price a
portion of their wheat, corn, and
soybean crops during the 1990-92
period. Corn was hedged in futures
most frequently (reported by 11
percent of the respondents), fol-
lowed by cattle (8 percent of the
respondents). Nearly 15 percent of
the wheat producers and about 10
percent of the cattle and corn pro-
ducers had used options compared
with less than 5 percent of soy-
bean, grain sorghum, and hog pro-
ducers (Goodwin and Schroeder).
Several surveys provide informa-
tion historically on the use of for-
ward contracting and futures hedg-
ing, and suggest that the use of
these strategies may have
increased over time. In a 1986
Wisconsin study, for example,
about 20 percent of the respon-
dents had used cash forward con-
tracts at least once in the most
recent 5 years, and 8 percent had
used futures within that period
(Campbell and Shiha). The survey
also indicated that large-scale pro-























































Table 16—Results of a Farm Futures magazine questionnaire on farmers’ use of
various risk management strategies, 1997
Percentage of respondents indicating
Tool or strategy use of tool or strategy
Percent
Used government farm program 69
Diversified operation by raising crops and livestock 39
Planted seed varieties with different maturity dates 39
Contracted inputs to lock in a good price 35
Bought crop insurance 30
Used crop-share land rents 25
Kept a credit line open to take advantage 
of attractive input prices 20
Used multiyear leases 16
Irrigated 13
Shared expenses with landlord 10
Refinanced loans to take advantage of lower interest rates 8
Hired custom operator to reduce machinery expenses 6
Hired custom operator to improve timeliness of crop operations 6
Diversified by growing crops not normally grown in the area 3
Leased equipment rather than bought 3
Rented equipment rather than bought 2
Source: Excerpted by ERS from Knorr, Bryce A., editor of Farm Futures magazine, Testimony before the
Subcommittee on Risk Management and Specialty Crops, U.S. House of Representatives, April 10, 1997.both forward contracting and
futures than were small-scale pro-
ducers.24 In another study, only 7
percent of Kansas grain producers
reported hedging in 1983, and 18
percent had forward contracted at
any time in prior years (Tierney;
Mintert). Based on a different sam-
ple, the Kansas Crop and Livestock
Reporting Service reported that
less than 5 percent of farmers
hedged any of their grain in each of
the years 1980-85.
Data from the 1996 ARMS survey
indicate that more farmers in
many areas may be using various
risk managements strategies—
such as forward contracting, diver-
sifying, hedging, or keeping cash
on hand—than reported in region-
al and State-level studies in the
early- and mid-1980’s (fig. 13). For
example, about 40 percent of pro-
ducers in the Corn Belt and
Northern Plains regions used for-
ward contracting and approxi-
mately 25 percent used futures in
1996. Producers in the Southern
Plains were somewhat less likely
to use many of the risk manage-
ment strategies listed than those
in the Corn Belt or Northern
Plains, as were producers in the
Northeast and Appalachia.
Empirical studies have at times
extended survey data and exam-
ined the relationship between the
use of various strategies and pro-
ducer characteristics. A study of 41
selected farmers in Indiana in
1985, for example, found that the
use of hedging was positively
related to the farmer’s perception
of the income-stabilizing potential





































































Note:  For all regions, the principal occupation of the operator may or may not be farming.
Figure 13
Farmers' use of alternative risk management strategies by 
selected regions and United States, 1996
Source:  USDA, ERS, 1996 Agricultural Resource Management Study, special analysis.
24ARMS survey results from 1983 pro-
vide information on the value of sales mar-
keted by various methods regionally, and
implicitly support the idea that large-scale
producers are more likely to use forward
contracts. The ARMS data indicate that
between 50 and 60 percent of corn sales
delivered at harvest in 1983 in Illinois,
Iowa, Minnesota, and Ohio were priced by
forward contract, while less than 30 per-
cent of corn sales in Kansas, Michigan, and
Missouri were priced using this method
(Harwood, Hoffman, and Leath). Similarly,
more than 50 percent of soybean sales
delivered off-farm at harvest were forward
contracted in Illinois and Minnesota in
1982 and 1983 compared with fewer than
25 percent of sales in Kansas and many
Southeastern States (Leath). In contrast,
less than 15 percent of wheat sales at har-
vest were forward contracted in 1983 in
most major wheat-producing States, includ-
ing Kansas and North Dakota (Hoffman,

















































Risk Management Education Can 
Use Many Avenues 
Risk management education has been an important initiative, as witnessed by a fiscal year 1998 effort jointly spon-
sored by USDA’s Risk Management Agency, USDA’s Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service,
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. These efforts have focused on the use of a wide variety of work-
shops, education programs, information events, and research to better help educate producers and understand the
needs of farmers in the learning process. These efforts complement longstanding work undertaken in the coopera-
tive extension community (Anderson and Mapp; Schroeder, Parcell, Kastens, and Dhuyvetter).
In theory, a producer’s decision to obtain the human capital necessary to adopt a new technology—whether involv-
ing a new conservation technique or a new forward pricing strategy—is based on factors related to the expected
returns and costs associated with adoption and the producer’s risk attitude. Producers evaluate the discounted
value of their expected returns from education (net of investment costs) to evaluate whether or not they should
participate. If discounted expected net returns are positive, a producer would tend to participate (Ben-Porath).
Using an example, discounted expected returns to investment in education fall as the time horizon decreases.
Thus, the expected returns to education are expected to decline with the age of the producer, meaning that older
farmers are less likely to participate in educational programs than younger farmers.
This theoretical basis was used to evaluate Kansas producers’ participation in risk management and marketing
education programs in 1992 (Goodwin and Schroeder). This research found, as expected, that more experienced
(older) farmers are less likely to participate in educational programs. The percentage of crop acres on the farm,
total farm acres, the degree of farm leverage, the educational level of the operator, and a preference for risk were
all positively related to participation. Similarly, preference for farm-related education, measured by hours per
week spent reading farm publications, also had a significant positive effect on seminar attendance. Importantly,
the authors found that participation in marketing and risk management education seminars and programs sig-
nificantly increased farmers’ adoption of forward pricing techniques.
Farmers use many educational sources other than seminar attendance. Ford and Babb, for example, found that
farm magazines, other farmers, and family and friends were among the most important information sources for a
sample of producers in Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Georgia in the 1980’s. In another study conducted in the 1980’s,
researchers conducting a random survey of Ohio cash grain producers found that older farmers and operators of
small farms often cited radio and television broadcasts as the most useful source of marketing information, while
operators of larger farms and those with at least some college education tended to cite marketing professionals as
most useful (Batte, Schnitkey, and Jones).
Further, a nonrandom sample of large, commercial farm operations in the Corn Belt in 1991 found that producers
spent an average of $2,578 per year on information sources, and that consultants accounted for 60 percent of total
expenditures (Ortmann, Patrick, Musser, and Doster). Despite the importance of consultants, the use of “own farm
records/budgets” were the highest-rated information source for production, marketing, and financial decisions for
these producers. These results support recommendations by the extension service and others encouraging pro-
ducers to keep and use farm records and to prepare farm budgets for planning purposes.
A series of questions included on USDA’s 1996 Agricultural Resource Management Study provides information on
priority educational needs. In this section of the survey, producers were questioned as to changes that they would
make in their farming operation under adverse circumstances (“what would you do differently if faced with finan-
cial difficulty?”). The respondents were provided a listing of production, marketing, and financial activities from
which to choose. Producers in the $50,000 and higher sales classes indicated consistently that they would adjust
their costs, improve their marketing skills, restructure their debt, and spend more time on management (see
table). These responses indicate the wide-ranging—yet interrelated—risk management education needs of pro-
ducers, and can be effectively provided by both private and public sector interests.
Changes that producers would make in their operations if faced with financial difficulty, 1996
Sales Class
Item Less than $50,000 $50,000-$249,999 $250,000-$499,999 $500,000+ All
Percent
Restructure debt 24.3 47.7 45.8 48.7 30.3
Sell assets 31.1 27.8 31.2 28.5 30.4
Use more custom services 7.4 17.5 17.4 19.9 10.1
Scale back 25.6 23.1 20.0 23.7 24.8
Diversify 11.8 22.9 20.9 20.6 14.5
Spend more time 
on management 18.7 37.7 47.3 44.4 24.3
Use advisory services 18.8 22.1 28.0 26.3 20.1
Adjust costs 33.9 54.0 58.8 57.2 39.5
Improve marketing skills 29.5 47.2 53.1 53.4 34.6
Source: USDA, ERS, 1996 Agricultural Resource Management Study, special analysis.of hedging, debt position, and farm
size (Shapiro and Brorsen).
Contrary to expectations, educa-
tion was found to be inversely
related to hedging, a result that
may be peculiar to the sample of
producers analyzed in the study. In
addition, risk attitudes were not
significantly related to the use of
forward pricing methods.
Other studies of this type have
been based on larger participant
samples. A survey of 677 Iowa
grain, swine, and fed cattle pro-
ducers in 1988, for example, indi-
cated that use of hedging for
grains was positively and signifi-
cantly related to gross farm sales
and the use of other forward pric-
ing tools over the prior 2 years
(Edelman, Schmiesing, and
Olsen). These same variables also
had the greatest significance in
explaining use of futures to hedge
swine and fed cattle.
In a study of 595 producers partic-
ipating in USDA’s Futures and
Options Marketing Program
between 1986 and 1988, model
results indicate that prior use of
forward contracts, possession of a
bachelor’s degree or above, mem-
bership in a marketing club, and
gross sales had the greatest posi-
tive impact on the probability of
using futures and options (Makus,
Lin, Carlson, and Krebill-Prather).
A survey of 1,963 Kansas farms in
1992 found that the use of forward
pricing techniques is positively
and significantly related to years
of formal education, cropland
acreage, total farm acres, leverage,
risk preference, input intensity,
marketing seminar participation,
and the use of crop insurance
(Goodwin and Schroeder).
These studies, by providing infor-
mation on producer characteristics
and the use of forward pricing
techniques, suggest strategies for
producer education (see box).
Operators of larger farms, those
that are most highly leveraged,
and those with prior experience
using forward contracts would be
most likely to be interested in
using futures or options. In con-
trast, education on cash forward
contracts would likely be more
effective for the general farm pop-
ulation than education on futures
and options. At least one study has
found that the use of marketing
clubs (which often emphasize a
learning-by-doing approach)
appears to be quite effective in
introducing producers to futures
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W
e have seen in the “How
Farmers Can Manage Risk”
section of this report that risk
management strategies can
reduce farmers’ risk of income
loss, at times substantially. This
section provides a detailed analy-
sis of the effectiveness of several
risk management tools on income
uncertainty within the year
(intrayear income risk), income
uncertainty between years (multi-
year income risk), and farmers’
average returns.
The analysis focuses on selected
tools including futures hedges,
cash forward contracts, crop insur-
ance, and revenue insurance,
rather than the many tools dis-
cussed earlier. There are several
reasons. First, forward pricing and
insurance are widely available to
farmers and among the more effec-
tive risk-reducing tools. They are
fairly easy to use and involve no
commitment beyond the current
crop year. Second, their optimal
use is somewhat independent of 
differences between farms in
wealth, debt, rental arrangements,
off-farm earning opportunities, and
the use of other risk management
tools. Third, focusing on this limit-
ed set of tools allows results for a
few representative farms to have
wide applicability.
E Ef ff fe ec ct ts s  o on n  I In nc co om me e  U Un nc ce er rt ta ai in nt ty y
W Wi it th hi in n  t th he e  Y Ye ea ar r
The many different options avail-
able for managing income risk lead
to questions about their effective-
ness across different producing
regions and about how they can
best be combined to reduce produc-
ers’ risks. A producer’s choice
among strategies is particularly
complicated when both price and
yield (output) risk is present—the
case for a farmer with a growing
crop in the field. In this situation,
the degree to which strategies,
such as forward contracting or
hedging, reduce income risk
depends on yield variability, the
correlation between price and
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To what extent can hedging, forward contracting, and crop
and revenue insurance reduce uncertainty within the year
(intrayear) and over longer periods (multiyear), and change
farmers’ average returns? All of these tools tend to reduce
intrayear income uncertainty, but have only small or negli-
gible effects on multiyear uncertainties. Some strategies—
such as the combined use of insurance and forward pric-
ing—tend to complement each other in reducing risks. Their
risk-reducing effectiveness varies by crop and location,
depending on yield variability and the degree to which farm
yields and prices move together. In addition, crop and rev-
enue insurance likely increase average returns slightly for
most farmers because they are subsidized, but forward con-
tracting and hedging, lacking subsidies, have little direct
impact on average or expected returns.yield, and whether or not the crop
is insured.25
Recent research at the Economic
Research Service (ERS) examined
the effectiveness of several strate-
gies—use of hedging,26 crop insur-
ance, and revenue insurance—in
reducing farmers’ income risks
over the growing season in various
corn-growing locations. These
strategies were compared with the
use of a “no risk-reducing strategy,”
which assumes that producers sell
their crops at harvest for the local
cash market price and do not
insure. Four counties with differing
yield variabilities and yield-price
correlations were selected for the
analysis, including the following:
• Iroquois County—Located in
east central Illinois, this county
has relatively low yield variabil-
ity and a strongly negative
yield-price correlation.
• Anderson County—In east cen-
tral Kansas, this county repre-
sents an area with relatively
high yield variability and a high
yield-price correlation.
• Lincoln County—In west central
Nebraska, Lincoln County repre-
sents an irrigated area where
both yield variability and yield-
price correlation are low.
• Pitt County—In east central
North Carolina, this county rep-
resents an area of relatively
high yield variability and low
yield-price correlation.
For each county, a “hypothetical”
corn farm was specified, and risk
reduction was estimated. The risk
measure used is the probability of
revenues falling below 70 percent
of their average or expectation.
This measure is unit free (as it is
expressed in percentage terms),
and facilitates comparisons across
farms having different average
yields.
The results indicate that a repre-
sentative corn farm in Anderson
County, Kansas, or Pitt County,
North Carolina, has a much higher
likelihood of very low revenues
when no strategy is used (a cash
sale at harvest and no crop insur-
ance) than a corn farm in Iroquois
County, Illinois, or Lincoln County,
Nebraska (fig. 14). The probabilities
are 21 percent in Anderson County,
25 percent in Pitt County, 9 percent
in Iroquois County, and 8 percent in
Lincoln County. The risk of cata-
strophically low returns is consider-
ably higher in the Kansas and
North Carolina counties because
yields vary more in those counties
than in counties where crops are
irrigated (as in Nebraska) or where
weather risk is inherently low (as
in central Illinois).
In addition, the “natural hedge”
(the price-yield correlation) is a fac-
tor in explaining risk outcomes. In
major producing areas in the Corn
Belt, such as in Iroquois County,
widespread low yields can signifi-
cantly increase prices. Conversely,
low prices are often associated with
bumper-crop years. This negative
relationship between prices and
yields tends to stabilize farmer rev-
enues in these areas, and con-
tributes to the low risk of loss in
Iroquois County. Pitt County, in
contrast, is more likely to have low
corn prices and low yields (or high
prices and high yields) at the same
time, making corn revenues inher-
ently more variable. This is
because such areas have less
impact than the central Corn Belt
on national output and prices.
Revenue riskin corn
growing tends to be
higheroutside than
inside the Corn Belt.




























25As discussed earlier, the absence of
yield risk greatly simplifies decisionmak-
ing. In the extreme case, the absence of
both yield risk and basis risk means that
either forward contracting or hedging can
eliminate revenue uncertainty completely.
For example, the owner of a harvested crop
can lock in a return to storage by contract-
ing for a fixed price at the end of the stor-
age period. When output is known for cer-
tain, but basis risk is present, hedging can
reduce (but not completely eliminate)
income risk.
26Although hedging is used in this
example, the results associated with for-
ward contracting are similar.Hedging an optimal level of ex-
pected output (shown by the sec-
ond set of bars) modestly reduces
revenue risk compared with the
no-strategy case, although the
impact varies greatly across loca-
tions.27 The greatest impact is in
Lincoln County, Nebraska, where
the probability of income below 70
percent of expected income is
reduced from 8 to 2 percent. The
impact is most pronounced in this
county because it has low yield
variability due to irrigation and a
weak price-yield correlation. In
such locations, establishing an
expected price (less harvest basis)
greatly reduces revenue risk.
Strong yield-price correlations or
yield variabilities that exceed price
variabilities prevent hedging from
greatly reducing risk.
Crop insurance is generally more
effective than hedging in reducing
the risks of very low revenues
across the four counties. When
crop insurance alone is used by a
producer (the third bar associated
with each county),28 the probabili-
ty of very low revenues is reduced
greatly in all counties except
Lincoln County, Nebraska. In this
county, irrigation is widely used,
which protects against yield short-
falls and essentially substitutes for
insurance. In the other locations,
crop insurance has an advantage
over forward pricing because farm-
level yields generally are relatively
more variable than prices.
The fourth set of bars for each
county represents risk reduction
when 75-percent crop insurance
coverage is combined with opti-
mal hedging. As shown in the fig-
ure, risk is reduced substantially
in each of the locations, and the
use of crop insurance and hedging
in concert is much more effective
at reducing risk than either tool






































27Optimal hedging, as defined for the
calculations, involves selling December
futures in March, with the hedge magni-
tude set at the level resulting in the great-
est risk reduction. More specifically, the
optimal hedge ratio–defined as the propor-
tion of expected output that is hedged to
minimize risk–ranges from 40 percent in
Anderson County, Kansas, to 60 percent in
Lincoln County, Nebraska, and Pitt County,
North Carolina.






Forward price through hedging
Crop insurance
Forward price and crop insurance
Revenue insurance
Source:  Estimated by ERS.
Probability of revenue less than 70 percent of expectation
Figure 14
Effect of forward pricing (hedging) and insurance on probability 
of revenue less than 70 percent of expectation
28We assumed 75-percent yield 
coverage.yield and price, the combined use
of both tools is very effective, par-
ticularly in areas with a weak
price-yield correlation and high
yield variability.
The combined effects of crop insur-
ance and hedging on risk reduc-
tion are similar to the situation
where producers use revenue
insurance (see the last set of bars
associated with each county). (The
revenue insurance plan assumed
here is an intraseasonal guarantee
based on individual farm yields
and a futures price projection, and
does not include a replacement
coverage component—only a basic
revenue guarantee. Thus, it is
more similar to the Income
Protection product than to Crop
Revenue Coverage.) Such coverage
reduces the probability of revenues
less than 70 percent of expecta-
tions to near zero, except for the
risks associated with differences
between local prices and futures
prices at harvest (e.g., basis risk).
E Ef ff fe ec ct ts s  o on n  I In nc co om me e  U Un nc ce er rt ta ai in nt ty y
B Be et tw we ee en n  Y Ye ea ar rs s
Farmers, like everyone else, face
uncertainty about future incomes
as well as current income. In par-
ticular, the payments required on
the substantial debt needed to
finance investments in land,
machines, and equipment make a
regular cash flow particularly
important in farming. The impor-
tance of future income compared
with current income partly depends
on the farmer’s ability to borrow or
draw from savings to cover tempo-
rary income shortfalls. Producers
who have low savings and little
borrowing capacity must focus on
covering their current expenses and
loan obligations. In contrast, those
with liquid savings or short-term
borrowing capacity sufficient to
cover temporary income shortfalls
may be more concerned with pro-
tecting future income flows or
wealth. The question posed in this
section is “Can the use of hedging
and crop insurance help protect
against income variability beyond
the current year?”
The risks in farming would be sub-
stantially less if outputs could be
insured and priced forward over
periods more nearly matching the
expected life of the specialized
machines and equipment required
for production. However, active
trading in contracts that mature
more than 18 months in the future
has not evolved for agricultural
commodities, and crop insurance is
offered only on the current year’s
yields. Thus, hedging (or forward
contracting) and crop insurance
cannot directly assure farmers’
incomes beyond 9 to 18 months.
At the same time, the use of crop
insurance may indirectly help farm-
ers stabilize their incomes around
longer term trends. For example, a
producer can anticipate expected
yields in future years because
insured yields change only gradual-
ly as each new yield is added to the
farm’s yield history. Thus, knowing
that insurance will be available in
future years can reduce uncertainty
about those future years’ incomes,
even though the farmer cannot yet
obtain such insurance.
The multiyear variability issues
surrounding hedging (or forward
contracting) are more complex.
Unlike crop insurance, where yield
guarantees change only gradually
over time, the preplanting futures
price quotes at which hedges can
be made often vary markedly
across years, depending on old crop
stocks and anticipated demand.
Tomek and Gray concluded that
forward prices before planting are
more stable from year to year than
harvest prices for commodities
that cannot be stored between crop
years, such as potatoes. They also
concluded that little stability was
to be gained by forward pricing


































kFigures 15 and 16 illustrate how
futures prices for harvest delivery
varied over the season for corn and
soybeans for the years 1977-96.
The charts suggest that the prices
at which those crops can be
hedged vary almost as much from
year to year as harvest prices.
There is, however, a weak tenden-
cy for harvest futures prices for
corn and soybeans to be less vari-
able in January than at contract
maturity (tables 17 and 18),
although this does not seem to be
the case for July wheat in the pre-











































1978 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
Cents per bushel
Source:  Constructed by ERS from Chicago Board of Trade prices.
Figure 16









1978 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
Cents per bushel
Source:  Constructed by ERS from Chicago Board of Trade prices.
Figure 15
First of month price for December corn futures, 
1977-96 contractsLack of futures contracts with
more distant maturities has led to
the consideration of using futures
contracts that mature in the cur-
rent year to hedge subsequent
year’s production. This could be
accomplished by selling futures
contracts to cover more than 1
year’s crop production, and then
sequentially rolling over the
futures positions to later years as
the later maturing contracts
became available for trading.
Gardner concluded in 1989 that
such rollover hedging would not be
very effective in reducing risk.
Indeed, the difficulties arising
when this year’s futures contracts
are used to hedge next year’s
crops was demonstrated in 1996.
Some corn and soybean producers
who had entered hedge-to-arrive
contracts on their 1995 crops, and
lost out on the subsequent price
rise, hoped to roll over the con-
tracts to allow delivery of 1996
crops. How-ever, the low prices of
futures on 1996 crops compared
with 1995 crops made such
rollovers unprofitable. Moreover,
the elevators involved were anx-
ious to settle the contracts, close
out their futures hedges, and
recover the large margin deposits
that had been required.
E Ef ff fe ec ct ts s  o of f  H He ed dg gi in ng g,,  F Fo or rw wa ar rd d
P Pr ri ic ci in ng g,,  a an nd d  I In ns su ur ra an nc ce e  o on n
A Av ve er ra ag ge e  R Re et tu ur rn ns s
While many risk management
tools involve trading off consider-
able expected return to reduce
risk, forward pricing and insur-
ance often can reduce risk with lit-
tle or no sacrifice in average
returns. Indeed, the use of crop
insurance may increase average
returns over time for many farm-
ers due to the Government’s subsi-
dization of many crop and revenue
insurance products. The costs of
forward pricing, while not zero,
generally are small. Thus, the
farmer’s optimal forward pricing
and insurance strategy often can
be closely approximated by mini-
mizing risk.
The subsidization of crop and rev-
enue insurance policies creates an
interesting situation regarding the
expected returns to producers.
Crop (and revenue) insurance pre-
































Table 17—Mean and standard deviation of first-of-month December corn futures
prices, 1977-96 
Statistic January July December
Dollars per bushel
Mean 2.62 2.73 2.54
Standard deviation 0.41 0.52 0.52
Source: Calculated by ERS from Chicago Board of Trade data.
Table 18—Mean and standard deviation of first-of-month November soybean
futures prices, 1977-96 
Statistic January July November
Dollars per bushel
Mean 6.37 6.56 6.29
Standard deviation 0.78 1.07 1.08
Source: Calculated by ERS from Chicago Board of Trade data.
Table 19—Mean and standard deviation of first-of-month July wheat futures
prices, 1978-97 
Statistic August January July
Dollars per bushel
Mean 3.45 3.49 3.50
Standard deviation 0.69 0.65 0.65
Source: Calculated by ERS from Chicago Board of Trade data.indemnities are approximately in
balance with total premium. Total
premium is shared between the
farmer and the Government, with
the Government paying 41.7 per-
cent of the total premium cost at
the 65/100 coverage level. In addi-
tion, the Government pays for any
excess of indemnities over total
premium (excess losses) in the
event of disasters. Thus, subsidiza-
tion of these programs causes
indemnities to exceed producer-
paid premiums, resulting in
increased average returns to farm-
ers as a group over the long run.
Based on these concepts, an indi-
cator of a farmer’s expected return
to obtaining crop-yield insurance
or crop-revenue insurance is the
amount of indemnity per dollar of
producer-paid premium. For crop
years 1994-97, this return measure
(in aggregate, across all crops and
regions) ranged from $0.87 to
$2.14 per dollar of farmer-paid
premium (table 20). Over time,
rates charged for insurance have
been increased to bring expected
indemnities closer in line with
total premiums, reducing over the
long run the likelihood of substan-
tial excess losses to the Govern-
ment. When total indemnities are
divided by total premiums (includ-
ing the subsidy), the resulting data
in recent years are well below 1.0.
As can be seen from the subsidy
structure, those producers who
confront the highest total premium
receive the largest premium sub-
sidy because the dollar value of
the premium subsidy is calculated
as a percentage of total premium.
Total per acre premium may be
high due to the yield risk associat-
ed with production of that crop in
the area, the value of the crop, and
other factors. Figure 17 maps the
per acre premium subsidy for
wheat, in dollar value terms,
across major growing areas in the
United States. As examples, farm-
ers in Montana received a premi-
um subsidy of $2.85 per acre for
65/100 coverage, while wheat
growers in North Dakota received
an average subsidy at the 65/100
level of about $2.66 per acre.
In contrast to crop and revenue
insurance, where government sub-
sidies result in increased incomes
on average for most participants,
hedging and forward contracting
may lower average incomes due to
commissions or other costs, or from
slightly lower prices received (see
earlier box, “The Cost of Forward
Pricing,” p. 35). On the other hand,
forward pricing may raise farmers’
income if any of the following hold:
(1) the farmer can time sales to hit
higher than average prices; (2)
reduced risks obtained through
forward pricing allow the farmer
to borrow at lower interest rates
and/or expand operations; or (3)
price information provided by
futures quotes enables the farmer








farmers as a group
overthe long run.




























Table 20—Indemnities, premiums, and loss ratios, 1994-971
Item 1994 1995 1996 1997
Million dollars
Indemnities:
Total 601 1,400 1,342 947
Premiums:
Total 949 1,087 1,409 1,425
Producer-paid 694 654 856 872
Ratio
Loss ratios (no units):
Based on total premiums 0.63 1.29 0.95 0.66
Based on producer-paid premiums 0.87 2.14 1.57 1.09
1Data for 1995-97 are based on buyup policies only.
Source: Calculated by ERS from USDA, Risk Management Agency, Crop Insurance Actuarial Information
Public Access Server, FTP download page, http://www.act.fcic.usda.gov/actuarial/ftpdwnld.htmlIf the farmer can forecast futures
price changes, hedges can be timed
and adjusted to take advantage of
the forecast. For example, if the
futures price is expected to rise, a
smaller short hedge or no hedge
may be indicated. Alternatively, if
the futures price is expected to
fall, a larger short hedge may be
indicated. The possibilities for tim-
ing trades are unlimited, ranging
from hedging as soon as the
futures or options contract is
opened for trading on the ex-
change to simply selling at deliv-
ery. Futures contracts for corn,
soybeans, and wheat are now list-
ed for trading up to 3 years before
delivery, although trading volume
generally is light for contracts
maturing more than 18 months in
the future. Moreover, a farmer
might change his/her futures posi-
tion several times during the year,
particularly if he/she were very
confident in predicting prices.
To profitably time hedges requires
the same price forecasting skills as
pure speculation. Forecasts can be
derived in many ways, ranging
from simply looking for repeating
patterns in price behavior (techni-
cal analysis) to analyzing supply/
demand conditions (fundamental
analysis). Grossman and Stiglitz
noted that when information is
costly, markets cannot reflect all
possible information, which leaves
room for speculative profits for
those with superior access to infor-
mation or analytical ability.
Indications are that some specula-
tors do profit, but the majority
apparently lose (Zulauf and Irwin).
The difficulties in forecasting
futures price changes can be visu-
alized by examining historical
futures price behavior, which
reflects traders’ expectations for
the market price at contract matu-
rity. As new information becomes
available in the market, expecta-
tions change. Seasonal movements
in the December corn and
November soybean futures con-
tracts for 20 years are shown in
figures 15 and 16, with each line
in the figures connecting succes-
sive beginning-of-month futures
prices for one contract over the 12
months preceding the contract’s







































Illustration of the per acre premium subsidy, for wheat implicit in 






Note: Shaded areas include counties with at least 500 acres planted to wheat.
Source: Estimated by ERS from USDA, Risk Management Agency, electronic experience and yield
database, 1997.reflect the transition to each suc-
cessive year’s harvest contracts.
The figures show that futures
price movements over the season
differ markedly from year to year.
In 13 of the 20 years, for example,
prices fell from January (the first
month of trading) to December for
the corn contract, and from
January to November for the soy-
bean contract. The average
declines were $0.08 for corn and
$0.08 for soybeans (see tables 17
and 18). In comparison, the July
wheat futures prices increased
from the preceding August to July
in 11 of 20 years by an average of
$0.05 (table 19).
The figures suggest that corn and
soybean futures prices tend to peak
in midsummer. For example, the
average price of the December corn
future on July 1 during the 1977-
96 period was $2.73 per bushel,
while the average price on Decem-
ber 1 was $2.54. Producers who
routinely sold forward in early July
thus averaged a $0.19 larger
return per bushel than those who
routinely sold immediately after
harvest in December. November
soybean prices exhibited a similar
pattern during 1987-96, but not
during the 1977-86 period.
If such seasonal patterns contin-
ued, pure speculators as well as
producers could profit easily by
routinely selling in July and buy-
ing in November or December. As
more traders followed this prac-
tice, however, July prices would be
driven down and harvest prices
would be driven up, diminishing
the potential for trading profits.
Indeed, such profit potentials can
be expected to virtually disappear
under the intense competition of
futures trading. The result would
be an “efficient market,” where the
current price captures all available
information about the price to be
expected at contract maturity.
There is much difference of opin-
ion among those who advise farm-
ers about timing sales in forward
markets. Numerous studies have
found possibilities for profits from
particular strategies. Other stud-
ies show that futures markets
appear to be quite efficient, leav-
ing little room for profiting from
timing trades. In reviewing the
various studies, Zulauf and Irwin
conclude that, for most producers,
such strategies have limited abili-
ty to enhance income.
Can farmers convert lower risks
obtained through hedging into
higher average incomes? This
depends on how much risks are
lowered, on the farmer’s financial
situation, and on whether his or
her lender is willing to increase
loans when the farmer hedges or
prices forward.
Do futures quotes provide informa-
tion that farmers can use to
improve production and storage
decisions? For example, can farm-
ers gain by storing if and only if
the difference between the price
for the future that matures at the
end of the storage period exceeds
the current futures price by more
than the marginal cost of storage?
Heifner (1966) found some evi-
dence that this would work for
storage, as did Tomek. However,
others have found little evidence to
support this possibility for produc-




































7 73 3F Fa ar rm me er rs s  o of ft te en n  
m mu us st t  c ch ho oo os se e
b be et tw we ee en n  h hi ig gh he er r  
a av ve er ra ag ge e  r re et tu ur rn ns s
a an nd d  l lo ow we er r  r ri is sk ks s..
R
isk management implies differ-
ent things for different people,
depending on their attitudes
toward risk, their financial situa-
tions, and the opportunities avail-
able to them. In some cases, man-
aging risk involves minimizing risk
for a given level of expected output
or revenue. In other cases, it
involves keeping risk within
bounds while seeking higher
expected returns. More generally,
the goal of risk management is to
obtain the best available combina-
tion of expected income and income
certainty, given the individual’s
resources and risk preferences.
F Fa ar rm me er rs s  O Of ft te en n  A Ar re e  W Wi il ll li in ng g  T To o
A Ac cc ce ep pt t  H Hi ig gh he er r  R Ri is sk ks s  T To o  O Ob bt ta ai in n
H Hi ig gh he er r  I In nc co om me es s
Farming, like any business enter-
prise, involves taking risks to
obtain a higher income or higher
satisfaction than might be
obtained otherwise. Some farmers
appear to virtually disregard risk.
But for most, the amount of risk
that can be accepted is limited.
Thus, risk management is not a
matter of minimizing risk, but of
determining how much risk to
take, given the farmer’s alterna-
tives and preference tradeoffs
between risk and expected return.
To use an example, consider a pro-
ducer who has just harvested
10,000 bushels of corn and is exam-
ining three alternatives: (1) selling
the crop and placing the income in
a certificate of deposit (CD); (2)
storing the corn until March, or (3)
selling the crop and using the
returns to custom feed cattle.
Figure 18 shows expected outcomes
for the three strategies in terms of
expected profit on the horizontal
axis and the probability of return
less than $25,000 on the vertical
axis. The CD provides zero proba-
bility of loss and the lowest expect-
ed profit, the cattle feeding alterna-
tive offers the highest risk and
highest expected return, and the
storage alternative is in the middle.
For farmers having similar wealth
and farming situations, the most
risk averse would likely choose the
certificate of deposit. Those who
are less risk averse would be more
likely to choose storage. The least
risk-averse farmers would tend to
choose feeding cattle, the riskiest
choice among the alternatives, but
also the strategy with the highest
expected return. In short, optimal
choices under risk for producers in
similar situations can differ widely
among individuals.
C Cr ro op p  I In ns su ur ra an nc ce e  a an nd d  F Fo or rw wa ar rd d
P Pr ri ic ci in ng g  G Ge en ne er ra al ll ly y  C Ca an n  R Re ed du uc ce e
I In nc co om me e  U Un nc ce er rt ta ai in nt ty y  a at t  V Ve er ry y  
L Lo ow w  C Co os st t  
Reducing risk generally involves
some cost or reduction in expected














































S So om me e  P Pr ra ac ct ti ic ca al l  A As sp pe ec ct ts s  o of f  F Fa ar rm m  
R Ri is sk k  M Ma an na ag ge em me en nt t
To get desirable combinations of risk and return, farmers
must selectively and carefully use the various risk manage-
ment tools available to them. Only tools that have good
prospects for reducing income uncertainty or increasing
expected income are candidates. This section considers cer-
tain practical aspects of risk management, which are easily
overlooked or contrary to intuition.income. Consider Farmer Smith,
for example, who is contemplating
diversification, but knows that his
expected net returns are maxi-
mized by planting continuous cot-
ton. By diversifying into other
crops, all of which have fairly sta-
ble (but relatively low) yields,
Farmer Smith estimates that he
reduces his average net return by
about 15 percent. He calculates
that the standard deviation in his
income, however, is likely to be
about 20 percent lower because
the net returns to the various dif-
ferent crops he is considering are
less than perfectly correlated. In
this example, undertaking a risk-
reducing strategy results in sub-
stantially lower net returns to
Farmer Smith, which he must
weigh relative to the benefits of
lower income risk.
In contrast, strategies, such as
hedging in futures, buying options,
or forward contracting with a local
elevator, tend to lower risk with
little change in expected net
returns. The low cost of forward
pricing occurs because futures
prices exhibit little bias, meaning
that the price for each trade close-
ly approximates the price then
expected to prevail when the con-
tract matures. Most studies have
found little or no bias in futures
prices for commodities, such as
grains, with active trading and
substantial long as well as short
hedging, but not all analysts agree
(see Zulauf and Irwin).
Farmers who hedge directly in
futures incur costs for commis-
sions and interest forgone on mar-
gin deposits, but these generally
sum to less than 2 percent of the
value of the product. When options
are used, a premium must be paid
but, on average, the option holder
gets the premium back as gains
from exercising or selling the
options. Farmers’ costs also typi-
cally are low when crops are for-
ward priced through contracts
with local buyers. No commissions
or margins are required from the
farmer, although the buyer typical-
ly incurs such costs to hedge his or
her position. Many country eleva-
tors appear willing to bear these
costs in order to assure a timely
flow of commodities into their
facilities. Some may pass along




with little sacrifice in
expected returns.
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Figure 18
Risk and return for alternative uses of a 10,000-bushel corn crop







feed cattleers through a wider basis and thus
a slightly lower price for forward
contracts than expected to prevail
at harvest time.
Unlike most risk management
tools, crop-yield insurance and the
new crop-revenue insurance prod-
ucts—which are subsidized by the
Government—provide a special
case where income risk is reduced
and expected returns are
enhanced. Because the private
companies delivering policies to
farmers are reimbursed directly
for their selling expenses (which
include agent sales commissions
and data processing costs), such
expenses are not incorporated in
the total premium. Moreover, the
total premium is also subsidized
by the Government, meaning that
total indemnities exceed farmer-
paid premiums over time. As a
result, buying crop-yield or crop-
revenue insurance raises average
returns as well as reduces risk for
most participating farmers. In
short, the relationship between
risk and returns depends on the
given tool or strategy, and the
unique situations confronted by
individual producers.
R Ri is sk k  R Re ed du uc ct ti io on n  F Fr ro om m  F Fo or rw wa ar rd d
P Pr ri ic ci in ng g  C Ca an n  B Be e  Q Qu ui it te e  S Sm ma al ll l  f fo or r
F Fa ar rm ms s  W Wi it th h  H Hi ig gh h  Y Yi ie el ld d  V Va ar ri ia ab bi il li it ty y
o or r  S St tr ro on ng gl ly y  N Ne eg ga at ti iv ve e  Y Yi ie el ld d- -P Pr ri ic ce e
C Co or rr re el la at ti io on ns s
Farmers can reduce their price
uncertainty through several mech-
anisms, including hedging in
futures or options or entering into
cash forward contracts. The effec-
tiveness of these forward pricing
tools, however, can vary greatly,
depending on the yield risks faced
by the given farmer, the interac-
tions between price and yield, and
the other risk management tools
that are used on the operation.
Table 21 illustrates the effective-
ness of hedging and crop insurance
on farms that have different price-
yield correlations and yield vari-
abilities. Although futures hedging
is used as a proxy in the table for
all types of forward pricing strate-
gies, results for hedging with com-
modity options, or forward con-
tracting, would be similar.
More specifically, the table illus-
trates how crop insurance and
futures hedging work together to
























































Table 21—Effect of futures hedges and crop insurance on the probability of
returns less than 75 percent of expectations 
Yield coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean)
Price-yield Risk
correlation strategy 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0 None 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.25
MPCI .12 .15 .18 .18 .20
MPCI+hedge .06 .08 .12 .14 .18
-0.1 None .14 .17 .20 .22 .25
MPCI .12 .14 .15 .17 .18
MPCI+hedge .06 .06 .11 .15 .17
-0.2 None .13 .17 .20 .21 .24
MPCI .11 .13 .14 .16 .17
MPCI+hedge .06 .06 .10 .14 .16
-0.3 None .13 .15 .19 .20 .23
MPC .11 .12 .13 .14 .16
MPCI+hedge .06 .06 .10 .13 .14
-0.4 None .12 .15 .18 .19 .22
MPCI .10 .11 .10 .13 .14
MPCI+hedge .06 .07 .10 .11 .13
-0.5 None .11 .14 .17 .19 .20
MPCI .10 .10 .09 .12 .13
MPCI+hedge .06 .07 .08 .10 .11
Source: Estimated by ERS.ent risk situations. Yield risk
increases from left to right across
the table, while negative yield-
price correlations increase down
the left column. The entries in the
cells reflect the probabilities of
revenues falling below 75 percent
of expectations. Price volatility is
assumed to be 20 percent, regard-
less of yield variability or the
price-yield correlation.
Because the table is constructed
using a wide range of parameters,
it applies to many different farm-
ing situations. Corn producers in
the Corn Belt, who confront fairly
low yield variability and a strongly
negative price-yield correlation,
tend to lie near the lower left cor-
ner of the table. Dryland wheat
growers and corn growers in areas
distant from the Corn Belt tend to
lie near the upper right corner.
Producers who irrigate tend to lie
near the upper left corner, as they
experience low yield variability
and tend to be outside major pro-
ducing areas. The lower right cor-
ner, in contrast, is of minor inter-
est because yield-price correlations
are generally not strong where
yield variability is highest.
Three risk management strategies
are shown: no insurance or hedg-
ing (denoted by “none” in the
table), crop insurance at the 75-
percent yield coverage level
(“MPCI”), and crop insurance com-
bined with a minimum-risk
futures hedge (“MPCI + hedge”).
Risk-reducing effectiveness can be
gauged by comparing the probabil-
ities of low revenues across the dif-
ferent strategies. As expected, the
risk-reducing effectiveness of crop
insurance increases as yields
become more variable. In contrast,
the added risk reduction obtained
by hedging an insured crop dimin-
ishes as the yield coefficient of
variation increases. Thus, the
effects of changes in yield variabil-
ity or price-yield correlation on the
total risk reduction obtained from
insurance and hedging can differ
substantially for farmers in differ-
ent situations.
E El li im mi in na at ti io on n  o of f  D De ef fi ic ci ie en nc cy y
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M Ma an ny y,,  B Bu ut t  N No ot t  N Ne ec ce es ss sa ar ri il ly y  A Al ll l,,
P Pr ro od du uc ce er rs s  o of f  P Pr ro og gr ra am m  C Cr ro op ps s
Replacing commodity programs
(deficiency payments and supply
management programs) with fixed
Agricultural Market Transition
Act (AMTA or contract) payments
and planting flexibility in the 1996
Farm Act dramatically altered
decades of significant government
intervention in the markets for
program crops.29 Deficiency pay-
ments were in effect between 1973
and 1995, and provided compensa-
tion in years of low prices by pay-
ing farmers the difference, if posi-
tive, between a pre-established
target price, and the higher of the
average market price for the crop
over a specified period or the loan
rate. These payments averaged
over $5 billion annually between
1990 and 1995, and accounted for
more than one-half of total farm
program outlays over that period
(USDA, 1998). Their elimination
has raised concerns about greater
risk in farming, with some
observers arguing that the elimi-
nation of deficiency payments—
and their replacement with “con-
tract payments”—removes the
safety net in low-price years
(Conrad).
One recent study, however, indi-
cates that the effectiveness of defi-
ciency payments in stabilizing
income risk varied, depending on
the correlation between individual
and aggregate yields and the rela-
tionship between aggregate yields
and prices (Glauber and Miranda).
The study suggests that deficiency
payments were least effective in





















































29Program crops eligible for deficiency pay-
ments between 1973 (the start of the pro-
gram) and 1995 included corn, sorghum,
barley, oats, wheat, cotton, and rice.areas where farm-level yields and
prices are strongly negatively cor-
related. In the study, about 29 per-
cent of corn acreage and 26 percent
of wheat acreage was found to be
located in counties where revenues
were destabilized by deficiency
payments. In several situations—
such as that for Illinois corn and
North Dakota wheat—the propor-
tion of output in counties where
income was destabilized was
greater than 50 percent (table 22).
The relationship between local
yields and prices is significantly
related to the effectiveness of defi-
ciency payments. In major produc-
ing areas, high prices tend to offset
low yields (which can be strongly
correlated with national yields),
and vice versa. In the absence of
deficiency payments, this relation-
ship tends to stabilize revenues
and is termed the “natural hedge.”
In major producing areas where
the natural hedge is strong, defi-
ciency payments may actually
increase income variability by pro-
viding producers higher-than-aver-
age incomes in high-yield (low-
price) years, while having only a
small effect in low-yield (high-
price) years. Outside major grow-
ing areas, the natural hedge is
weaker, and deficiency payments
tend to stabilize incomes compared
with situations where producers
depend only on the market. Thus,
in markets where incomes are
inherently most variable, deficien-
cy payments, by stabilizing price,
work to reduce revenue risk.
Demand considerations are also
important in judging the risk-
reducing effectiveness of deficiency
payments. Such payments may
provide even producers in major
growing areas some protection
against prolonged slumps in
demand, such as might accompany
a worldwide downturn in economic
conditions. Thus, deficiency pay-
ments would likely be relatively
more effective in protecting pro-
ducer incomes in years like 1998,
when large worldwide supplies
and low prices resulted in weak





on less than one-
third ofU.S.corn and
wheatfarms.














































Table 22—Effects of deficiency payments on farm revenue variability

























Source: Excerpted by ERS from Glauber, Joseph W., and Mario J. Miranda, “Price Stabilization, Revenue
Stabilization, and the Natural Hedge,” Working Paper, U.S. Dept. Agr., Office of the Chief Economist, and Ohio
State University, October 30, 1996.S Sp pr re ea ad di in ng g  S Sa al le es s  B Be ef fo or re e  H Ha ar rv ve es st t
T Te en nd ds s  T To o  R Re ed du uc ce e  R Ri is sk k,,  W Wh hi il le e
S Sp pr re ea ad di in ng g  S Sa al le es s  A Af ft te er r  H Ha ar rv ve es st t
T Te en nd ds s  T To o  I In nc cr re ea as se e  R Ri is sk k
Spreading sales over time appears,
on the surface, to be a form of diver-
sification, which is a sound means
for reducing risk. Indeed, spreading
pre-harvest sales of a crop over time
to increase the amount forward
priced as yield or output becomes
more certain can reduce risk for
producers in many cases. The risk-
reducing effectiveness of such for-
ward pricing actions depends on the
degree of price-yield correlation and
the yield variability confronted by
the farmer. For most farmers, the
minimum-risk forward sale at the
time of planting is no more than 70
percent of the expected crop, and it
may approach zero for farmers with
a strong “natural hedge” or very
high yield variability (Grant; Miller
and Kahl; Lapan and Moschini;
Coble and Heifner). It is higher for
farmers with low yield variability or
who carry crop insurance.
In contrast, once production is
known with certainty, risk is mini-
mized by fixing the price regard-
less of the time of delivery, if a
competitive forward market is
available. This is because forward
prices tend to follow “random
walks,” meaning that successive
changes are determined by chance
and independent of one another.
When producers postpone estab-
lishing the price for such activities
as grain storage or livestock feed-
ing, where output is known, risk
actually is increased because the
final price realized equals the cur-
rent price, plus a series of
unknown random price changes.
Postponing the pricing of all or
part of an assured output makes
sense only for producers who confi-
dently expect that prices will rise
in the future. In such cases, the
farmer takes greater risk in the
hope of obtaining a higher expect-
ed return.
F Fo or rw wa ar rd d  P Pr ri ic ci in ng g  M Ma ay y  H He el lp p
R Re ed du uc ce e  P Pr ri ic ce e  U Un nc ce er rt ta ai in nt ty y  N No ot t
O On nl ly y  i in n  t th he e  C Cu ur rr re en nt t  Y Ye ea ar r,,  b bu ut t  
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Forward pricing with futures,
options, or cash forward contracts
reduces or eliminates price uncer-
tainty between the time the for-
ward sale is made and delivery
time. It serves farmers mainly as a
tool for reducing uncertainty about
prices for commodities to be sold,
or bought, within the year. How-
ever, forward pricing offers some
opportunities to reduce price
uncertainty over a longer horizon.
Futures for corn and soybeans are
now traded up to 2 or more years
ahead of maturity, allowing farm-
ers to forward price more than 1
year’s crop. However, low trading
volume in the later maturing con-
tracts means that hedgers must be
more concerned about liquidity
and possible price bias.
Another possibility is to hedge
future years’ anticipated produc-
tion in contracts that mature this
year or next, and then roll over the
positions to contracts that mature
in successive years as they become
available for trading. For example,
a farmer might sell contracts in
this year’s harvest time futures to
cover parts of several future years’
expected crops, and then succes-
sively roll over the contracts to
later maturing contracts that
would be bought back as each
future year’s crop is marketed.
Although superficially appealing,
this strategy holds little promise
either for increasing average
returns or decreasing risk. It is
ineffective in projecting a high
price for the current year’s crop
into future years because rolling
over the contract generally would
involve buying the old crop future
at a high price and selling the new
crop future at a lower price.
Moreover, such interyear rollover
strategies hold little promise for























































7 79 9of interyear spreads (price differ-
ences between contracts maturing
in different years) (see Gardner,
1989). In addition, trading costs
would be substantial.
Simply forward pricing each year’s
expected output before planting
reduces uncertainty about returns
in future years, to the extent that
planting time forward prices
diverge less from longrun equilib-
rium prices than do harvest time
prices. Tomek and Gray showed
that such forward selling was
more effective in stabilizing
returns for nonstorable commodi-
ties, such as potatoes, than for
storable commodities, such as
grains and oilseeds. For storables,
a large or small crop tends to
affect prices for more than 1 year
because stocks are carried from
one year to the next. The current
year’s price is affected to the great-
est extent by a very large or very
small crop, but the impacts can
resonate over a period of years.
Table 23 shows that corn and soy-
bean futures prices for harvest
delivery have been slightly less
variable from year to year in
March than at harvest.
The effectiveness of forward pric-
ing in reducing uncertainty about
returns in future years depends on
yield variability and the yield-
price correlation, as previously
shown for current-year risks.
Finally, forward pricing cannot
protect against longer term varia-
tions in demand, such as might
arise from business cycles.
F Fu ut tu ur re es s  P Pr ri ic ce es s  P Pr ro ov vi id de e
I In nf fo or rm ma at ti io on n  U Us se ef fu ul l  i in n  M Ma ak ki in ng g
P Pr ro od du uc ct ti io on n  a an nd d  S St to or ra ag ge e
D De ec ci is si io on ns s  
Futures prices, which represent
the best estimates of well-informed
traders at a given point in time,
reflect the foreseeable effects of
potential production adjustments.
Thus, no forward pricing rule
based on price levels, or price lev-
els relative to costs, is likely to be
consistently profitable for either
hedgers or speculators (see Zulauf
and Irwin). In other words, the
farmer who bases forward pricing
decisions on future price levels
generally takes on more price
uncertainty than necessary with
little assurance of a higher aver-
age return.
Although the level of futures
prices relative to costs provides lit-
tle guidance about whether to
price forward, it does provide
information useful in deciding
whether to produce or store. The
appropriate rule is “produce (or
store) when variable costs can be
covered,” not “price forward only
when costs can be covered.”
Variable production costs are those
costs, such as for seed, fertilizer,
custom work, and rent for land or
storage space, that vary with the
level of output. This contrasts with
fixed costs, such as interest and
depreciation on buildings and
equipment, which must be met
regardless of the level of output. If
the price covers both fixed and
variable costs, production likely
will be profitable. If it covers vari-
able costs, but not fixed costs, loss
is minimized by producing. If it
Forward pricing is


















































Table 23—Standard deviations of first-of-month prices for harvest-time futures
in March and at harvest-time, 1977-961
Month December corn contract November soybean contract
Dollars per bushel
March 0.41 0.77
Last full month of trading .51 1.11
1Calculations are based on annual observations.
Source: Calculated by ERS from Chicago Board of Trade data.does not cover variable cost, loss is
minimized by not producing.
Forward markets allow price set-
ting and delivery at different
times. Being able to price forward
gives farmers opportunities to lock
in returns when storage is prof-
itable. Indeed, farmers can use
market signals, together with for-
ward pricing, to both increase
their profits and reduce the risks
associated with crop storage. For
example, farmers can profitably
store crops after harvest if their
own storage costs are lower than
the “market price of storage.” The
price of storage offered by the mar-
ket is indicated by spreads
between futures prices for succes-
sive months.
To illustrate, suppose that it is
November and a farmer with new
crop corn in a local elevator is
deciding whether to store the corn
until March. The local price for
corn is $2.40 a bushel, the March
futures contract is trading for
$2.75, and the expected basis in
March is $0.20 under. The elevator
storage charge is $0.025 per
bushel per month, all of which is
variable cost since it can be avoid-
ed by not storing. Should the
farmer store or sell the corn? The
expected return from storage is
$2.75 - $0.20 - $2.40, or $0.15 per
bushel. The cost of bin space for 4
months is 4 * $0.025, or $0.10 per
bushel. In addition, the farmer
must cover the cost of interest on
the grain. If the farmer’s interest
rate is 6 percent, the interest cost
per bushel is 0.06 * 1/3 year *
$2.40 = $0.05 per bushel. Thus,
storage is a break-even operation
at current prices. This is because
the cost of bin space plus interest
($0.10 + $0.05 = $0.15) equals the
expected return from storage. If
the local cash price should fall rel-
ative to the March future, then
storage would be profitable; other-
wise, it is not profitable. The pro-
ducer can minimize the risk of
storage by entering a fixed price
forward sale for delivery in March,
or by selling March futures con-
tracts in an amount equal to the
quantity in storage.
The importance of variable costs
can also be illustrated by consider-
ing a second producer, who is hold-
ing corn in his own bins, which oth-
erwise would be empty. The costs for
the bin, including interest, deprecia-
tion, and insurance, are fixed and
cannot be avoided by not storing.
This farmer’s variable (or added)
cost for storing an additional 4
months is $0.02 per bushel for
insurance on the grain and insect
control plus $0.05 per bushel for
interest, equaling $0.07 per bushel.
The expected return above variable
cost for storage is $0.15 - $0.07, or
$0.08 per bushel. If the $0.08 more
than covers the total cost of the bin,
the farmer would make a profit. If
the total cost associated with the
bin exceeds $0.08 per bushel, the
producer would be sustaining a loss
over the long run. The farmer is,
however, still better off to store than
to leave the bin empty because he
can cover his variable costs, plus a
portion of his fixed costs that would
be incurred anyway.
The return per month from corn
storage declines after harvest as
month-to-month storage charges
accumulate (see table 24 for an
example). In the example, a pro-
ducer with storage costs of 2-1/2
cents per bushel per month, for
example, might expect to store his
crop until May. At this point in
time, the per month expected
return to storage is $0.05 3/4
divided by 2 months, or $0.0288,
while the variable cost of storage
is nearly equal, at $0.025. A pru-
dent policy for this farmer involves
selling the May or July futures
contract when the corn was put in
storage in October, and holding it
until the expected return from
storage no longer covers storage
costs. At that time, the producer
would sell the corn crop in the
























































effects are small at
insurance levels up
to 75 percent.














































futures contract. On average, those
farmers with the lowest costs of
storage would want to store for a
longer period of time. Unlike deci-
sions about crop production or live-
stock feeding, decisions regarding
storage can be reversed at any
time when the forward price no
longer covers costs.
R Re ev ve en nu ue e  I In ns su ur ra an nc ce e  G Ge en ne er ra al ll ly y
D Do oe es s  N No ot t  F Fu ul ll ly y  S Su ub bs st ti it tu ut te e  f fo or r
F Fo or rw wa ar rd d  P Pr ri ic ci in ng g
By protecting against both price
declines and low yields, revenue
insurance partially substitutes for
both forward pricing and crop
insurance. It does not in all cases,
however, completely replace hedg-
ing or forward contracting in pro-
tecting against price declines. This
is because revenue insurance guar-
antees no more than 75 percent of
expected revenue (85 percent for
some commodities and locations),
whereas forward pricing can guar-
antee as much as 100 percent of the
expected market price. Thus, for
example, a farmer with irrigated
land and low yield risk (or a farmer
with crop insurance) might reduce
risk to a greater degree by guaran-
teeing 100 percent of the expected
price with an at-the-money put
option (or a short futures hedge)
than with the purchase of 75-per-
cent revenue insurance.
Recent research shows how rev-
enue insurance as well as crop
insurance affects risk-minimizing
hedge ratios for corn producers
(Coble and Heifner). The effect of
different levels of yield and rev-
enue insurance on optimal hedge
Table 24—Expected return from storing corn between futures delivery months,
1997 crop1
Futures Futures price, Difference from Storage Expected return
contract month 10/31/97 previous delivery month interval to storage
$ per bushel Months $ per bushel 
per month 
December 1997 2.79 ¾ -- -- --
March 1998 2.89 ¼ 0.09 ½ 3 0.0317
May 1998 2.95 0.05 ¾ 2 0.0288
July 1998 2.99 ¼ 0.04 ¼ 2 0.0212
September 1998 2.91 -0.08 ¼ 2 -0.0412
-- = Not applicable.
1Estimates based on October 31, 1997, futures prices.
Source: Calculated by ERS from Chicago Board of Trade data.ratios for Iroquois County, Illinois,
is illustrated in figure 19, where
the minimum-risk hedge without
insurance is estimated to be 25
percent (see Heifner and Coble,
1998). The figure shows that with
50-percent yield or revenue insur-
ance, the optimal hedge is essen-
tially the same as with no insur-
ance. With 75-percent yield insur-
ance, the optimal hedge ratio rises
to 40 percent, while it remains at
near 25 percent with 75-percent
revenue insurance. In other words,
75-percent revenue insurance has
little impact on the optimal
amount to hedge. The figure shows
that higher levels of revenue
insurance, if available, would
reduce optimal hedge ratios.

























































Source:  Estimated by ERS.
Yield insurance
Revenue insurance
Note:  Assumes expected utility maximization for a farmer with 500 acres of corn, a 
$300,000 net worth, and average risk aversion.
Figure 19
Effect of insurance level on optimal hedge ratio, 
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1 10 01 1“Actual Production History”
(APH) yield—The basis for deter-
mining the producer’s guarantee
under either the multi-peril crop
insurance program or most feder-
ally subsidized revenue insurance
policies. The producer’s APH yield
is calculated as a 4- to 10-year
simple average of the producer’s
actual yield on the insured parcel
of land. If a producer does not
have actual yields, the series (up
to 4 years) is filled in with a “tran-
sition yield,” based on either coun-
ty or program yields.
Actuarial soundness—An insur-
ance term describing the situation
where indemnities paid out, on
average, equal total premiums
and the insurance program
“breaks even.”
Adverse selection—A situation in
which an insured has more infor-
mation about his or her risk of loss
than does the insurance provider,
and is better able to determine the
soundness of premium rates.
Agricultural Resource
Management Study (ARMS)—A
probability-based annual survey of
farmers and ranchers in the con-
tiguous 48 States conducted by the
Economic Research Service and
the National Agricultural
Statistics Service of USDA. The
sample data can be expanded by
using appropriate weights to rep-
resent all farms. The ARMS was
previously known as the Farm
Costs and Returns Survey (FCRS).
Basis—The difference between a
specific futures price and a specific
cash price for the same or related
commodity.
Basis contract—A forward con-
tract that calls for the price to be
determined by applying a specified
difference (the basis) to a particu-
lar futures contract price to be
observed at a future time, as
selected by one of the trading par-
ties. Both contracting parties are
left with price level risk until the
final price is established.
Basis risk—The risk associated
with an unexpected widening or
narrowing of the basis between the
time a hedging position is estab-
lished and the time that it is lifted.
Call option—An option contract
that entitles the holder the right,
without obligation, to buy a
futures contract at a specified
price during a specified time peri-
od. The buyer pays a premium to
the seller for this right. A call
option is purchased to protect
against, or with the expectation of,
a potential rise in the futures
price.
Cash renting—A type of land
rental agreement between a land-
lord and tenant. Typically, the ten-
ant rents the land for a fixed
amount per acre that is pre-speci-
fied in the agreement.
Certainty equivalent—The cer-
tain return that would provide an
individual the same level of satis-
faction as a specified uncertain
prospective return. The largest cer-
tainty equivalent outcome is pre-
ferred when comparing alternative
risky choices.
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3 30 0
30For additional definitions on futures
and options terms, see Heifner, Glauber,
Miranda, Plato, and Wright; Commodity
Futures Trading Commission.Coefficient of variation (c.v.)—
A measure of variability in a data
set. It is calculated as the stan-
dard deviation of the data, divided
by the mean (or average). The
lower the c.v., the smaller the rela-
tive variability of that data set.
Commodity Futures Trading
Commission—The Federal agency
established in 1974 that regulates
futures and commodity options
trading under the Commodity
Exchange Act.
Contract payments—Direct pay-
ments to producers of program
crops authorized by the 1996 Farm
Act. These payments are in effect
for fiscal years 1996-2002, totaling
$35 billion over that time horizon.
Contract payments do not vary
depending on market prices or pro-
duction levels. They are also
known as Agricultural Market
Transition Act (AMTA) payments.
Cooperative State Research,
Education, and Extension
Service—A U.S. Department of
Agriculture agency that helps fund
and administer research and edu-
cational programs done jointly
with land grant universities and
other institutions.
Deficiency payments—A govern-
ment payment initiated under the
1973 Farm Act and eliminated
with the 1996 Farm Act. Deficiency
payments were made to farmers
who participated in wheat, feed
grains, rice, or cotton programs.
The payment rate (expressed in
per bushel or per pound terms)
was based on the difference
between the price level established
by law (the target price) and the
higher of the market price during
a period specified by law or the
price per unit at which the
Government provided loans to
farmers to enable them to hold
their crops for sale at a later date
(the loan rate). The payment
equalled the payment rate, multi-
plied by the acreage planted for
harvest, up to the maximum pay-
ment acres, and then multiplied by
the program yield established for
the particular farm.
Deferred price contract—(1)
Any forward contract where price
is left to be determined later. (2) A
forward contract that transfers
ownership before price is deter-
mined.
Delayed price contract—A for-
ward contract that transfers own-
ership of a commodity from a
farmer to a buyer while providing
for price to be set and payment to
be made at a later date. May also
be called a “deferred price con-
tract” or a “price later” contract.
Delayed payment contract—-A
forward contract that establishes
price and transfers ownership of a
commodity from the farmer to the
buyer while providing for payment
to be made at a later date. Used by
farmers for shifting income
between years for tax purposes.
May also be called a “deferred pay-
ment contract.”
Efficient market—A market in
which price fully reflects all rele-
vant information.
Empirical probability distribu-
tion—A table or figure describing
the likelihood of events that is
based entirely on observed relative
frequencies without making any
assumptions about the shape of
the distribution.
Exercise (or strike) price—The
price specified in an option con-
tract at which the option holder
can buy (call) or sell (put) a
futures contract.
Farm Service Agency—The U.S.
Department of Agriculture agency
that administers various farm pro-
grams, including contract pay-
ments and farm ownership and
operating loans.









1 10 03 3Flat (or fixed) price contract—
A forward contract that establish-
es the specific price to be paid by
the buyer to the seller.
Forward contract—An agree-
ment between two parties calling
for delivery of, and payment for, a
specified quality and quantity of a
commodity at a specified future
date. The price may be agreed
upon in advance, or determined by
formula at the time of delivery or
other point in time.
Forward pricing—Agreeing on
price for later delivery. “Forward
pricing” is used broadly in this
report to refer both to hedging in
futures or options, or forward con-
tracting.
Futures contract—An agreement
priced and entered on an exchange
to trade at a specified future time
a commodity, or other asset, with
specified attributes (or in the case
of cash settlement, an equivalent
amount of money).
Hedge-to-arrive contract—An
agreement between a farmer and
buyer that calls for the farmer to
deliver and the buyer to pay for a
commodity on a future date at the
current futures price plus a differ-
ential (basis) to be determined at
delivery time. Some hedge-to-
arrive contracts allow for rolling
over to later maturing futures con-
tracts. From a farmer’s standpoint,
a hedge-to-arrive contract is simi-
lar to a short hedge in that the
futures price is fixed but the basis
is left to be determined later.
Hedging—Taking a position in a
futures or options market which
tends to reduce risk of financial
loss from an adverse price change.
Idiosyncratic risk—Risk that is
specific to an operation and that is
not common to all producers in the




contract that would yield a posi-
tive return to the holder if exer-
cised. An option is in-the-money if
the strike price exceeds the mar-
ket price for a put, or is less than
the market price for a call. The
magnitude of this difference is the
intrinsic value of the option.
Indemnity—The compensation
received by an individual for quali-
fying losses paid under an insur-
ance program. The indemnity com-
pensates for losses up to the level
of the insurance guarantee.
Intrinsic value—The value of an
option if immediately exercised.
The amount by which the current
price for the underlying commodity
or futures contract is above the
strike price of a call option, or
below the strike price of a put
option.
Leverage—Use of borrowed funds
to finance a business, such as
farming, or an investment.
Liquidity—The extent to which
assets can be quickly converted to
cash without accepting a discount
in their value. An asset is perfectly
liquid if its sale generates cash
equal to, or greater than, the
reduction in the value of the firm
due to the sale. Illiquid assets, in
contrast, cannot be quickly sold
without a producer accepting a
discount, reducing the value accru-
ing to the firm by more than the
expected sale price.
Long hedging—Purchasing a
futures contract or a call option to
offset the risk of a price increase
in the cash market.
Margin—The money or collateral
guaranteeing the customer’s
futures or options trades, deposit-
ed by a customer with his or her
broker for the purpose of insuring
the broker against a loss on an
open futures contract. The initial
margin is the amount required to
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yenter a futures position. The main-
tenance margin is the amount
required to continue a futures
position without receiving a mar-
gin call.
Margin call—A request from a
broker to a customer for additional
margin to cover the customer’s
futures position after a price
change unfavorable to the cus-
tomer. The broker may close out
the customer’s position if the mar-
gin call is not met.
Marketing contract—A verbal or
written agreement between a
processor or handler and a grower
establishing an outlet and a price,
or a formula for determining the
price, for a commodity before har-
vest or before the commodity is
ready to be marketed.
Minimum price contract—A
contract providing the farmer with
protection against a decline in
price below a minimum level,
while leaving the final pricing
until a later date.
Moral hazard—The ability of an
insured to increase his or her
expected indemnity by actions
taken after buying the insurance.
Natural hedge—A tendency for
yield and price deviations from
expectations to offset each other in
their effects on crop revenue. This




distribution that is widely used in
statistical analysis because it
closely approximates many
observed distributions. Normal dis-
tributions are fully described by
their means and variances.
Off-exchange option—An agree-
ment between two parties entered
without the services of an organ-
ized exchange that gives one party
the right to buy or sell an asset at
a specified price over a specified
time interval.
Optimal hedge—The size of the
futures or options position that
minimizes a hedger’s risk. Often
expressed as a ratio of the futures
or options position to the cash
position. Yield risk and/or basis
risk generally cause the optimal
hedge ratio to be less than 1.0.
Option contract—A contract that
gives the holder the right, without
obligation, to buy or sell a futures
contract at a specific price within a
specified period of time, regardless
of the market price of the futures.
Out-of-the-money option—An
option contract that cannot be
profitably exercised at the current
market price. An option is out-of-
the-money if the market price
exceeds the strike price for a put
or is less than the strike price for
a call.
Premium—An amount of money
paid to secure risk protection.
Option buyers pay a premium to
option sellers for an options con-
tract. Similarly, the purchaser of
an insurance policy pays a premi-
um in order to obtain coverage.
Price-yield correlation—A sta-
tistical measure of the closeness of
the relationship between prices
and yields.
Production contract—A verbal
or written agreement between a
processor (integrator) and a grow-
er that usually specifies in detail
the production inputs supplied by
the processor, the quality and
quantity of a particular commodity
that is to be delivered, and the
compensation that is to be paid to
the grower. In return for relin-
quishing complete control over
decisionmaking, the producer is
often compensated with a price
premium or lower market risk.









1 10 05 5Put option—An option contract
that gives the holder the right,
without obligation, to sell a futures
contract at a specific price (the
“strike price”) within a specified
period of time, regardless of the
market price of the futures. A put
option normally is purchased to
protect against a cash price decline
(hedger) or with the expectation of
a futures price decline (speculator).
Reinsurance—A method of
spreading insurance companies’
risk over time and space. For
approved agricultural insurance
programs (Federal crop insurance
and approved revenue insurance
products), the Risk Management
Agency shares the risk of loss with
each private insurance company
delivering policies to producers.
Private reinsurance is also avail-
able, where one insurance compa-
ny transfers part of the risk to
another company by agreements,
which vary as to the terms appli-
cable to the risk transferred.
Revenue insurance—An insur-
ance program offered to farmers
that pays indemnities based on
revenue shortfalls. As of 1998,
three revenue insurance programs
were offered to producers in select-
ed locations. These three programs
(Crop Revenue Coverage, Income
Protection, and Revenue
Assurance) are subsidized and
reinsured by the Risk
Management Agency.
Risk—Uncertainty in outcomes
that are not equally desirable to
the decisionmaker, and that may
involve, among other outcomes,
the probability of making (or los-
ing) money, harm to human
health, repercussions that affect
resources (such as credit), or other
types of events that affect a per-
son’s welfare. Risk is uncertainty
that “matters.”
Risk aversion coefficient—A
measurement of an individual’s
preference for a certain outcome
over an uncertain outcome with
equal expected value.
Risk Management Agency—
The U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture agency that provides over-
sight, subsidization, and reinsur-
ance for approved risk manage-
ment programs, such as the
Federal multi-peril crop insurance
program and various revenue
insurance programs.
Share renting—Renting land
under a contract that calls for the
crop to be divided between the ten-
ant and the landlord in fixed per-
centages. May also provide for
sharing certain inputs.
Short hedging—Selling a futures
contract to offset the risk of a price
decline in the cash market.
Standard deviation—One of the
most widely used measures of dis-
persion, calculated as the square
root of the variance.
Time value—The portion of an
option’s premium that exceeds the
intrinsic value. It reflects the prob-
ability that the option will move
in-the-money, or deeper in-the-
money. The longer the time
remaining until expiration of the
option, the greater its time value.
Unbiasedness—Characterizes an
estimate, forecast, or forward
(including futures) price that is
neither systematically high or low,
but correct on average.
Uncertainty—Lack of sure knowl-
edge or predictability because of
randomness.
Utility function—A mathemati-
cal expression that can be used to
represent a decisionmaker’s risk
preferences.
Variance—One of the most widely
used measures of dispersion, calcu-
lated as the average squared devia-
tion from the mean or expectation.
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isk must be quantified in order
to evaluate whether various
risk management tools and strate-
gies are effective in achieving pro-
ducers’ risk reduction goals. This
process involves measuring uncer-
tainty and quantifying the rela-
tionship between uncertainty and
an individual’s well being. This
section discusses how risks can be
quantified and provides represen-
tative estimates for selected loca-
tions—focusing on price variabili-
ty, yield variability, and the corre-
lation between prices and yields
(the extent to which prices and
yields move together).
M Me ea as su ur ri in ng g  U Un nc ce er rt ta ai in nt ty y
The measurement of uncertainty
involves estimating the probabili-
ties of future outcomes. Estimates
may be made, for example, of the
probability of yield less than 100
bushels per acre, the probability of
price falling below $2.25 per
bushel, or the probability of rev-
enue less than $200 per acre. More
generally, one would like to esti-
mate the joint probability distribu-
tion of yield, price, and revenue so
that one might, for example, speci-
fy the probability of revenue
falling below any specified level. To
estimate such probabilities, we
generally start by observing his-
torical outcomes and separating
random variability from systemat-
ic variability.
To illustrate, appendix figure 1
(and appendix table 1) show corn
yields for Iroquois County, Illinois
(in the east central part of the
State) for the years 1956-95. The
jagged line links the actual yields,
averaged across the county, for
each year, while the straight line
represents the systematic upward
trend in yields. This upward trend
may be considered to be a “known”
source of variation that will repeat
itself in the future. It has been
caused by several factors, includ-
ing the development of higher
yielding varieties and the intro-
duction of improved chemicals and
fertilizers. In contrast, the yield
deviations from trend—mainly
caused by weather—constitute the
random variability.31
Quantifying yield randomness gen-
erally involves summarizing what
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A Ap pp pe en nd di ix x  1 1::  T Te ec ch hn ni iq qu ue es s  f fo or r  M Me ea as su ur ri in ng g  R Ri is sk k
Understanding how risk is measured is a starting point for
helping farmers make choices about the most appropriate
strategies for their individual situations. This appendix
provides information on the different approaches that can
be used to quantify risk, and illustrates how probability dis-
tributions can be used to characterize the outcomes associ-
ated with risky choices. In order to make the best decisions
for their individual operations, farmers and other decision-
makers often use historical and current information about
prices, yields, weather conditions, and other variables to
estimate future risk.
31Whether the yields shown are ade-
quately represented by a linear trend can
be questioned. Linear yield trends often are
used for forecasting, but there is no strong
reason why yield trends should be linear, or
follow any other specific mathematical
form. Trend projections inevitably involve a
degree of subjectivity, not only in choosing
the mathematical function to use, but also
in selecting the years to be included in cal-
culating the trend.is known about deviations from
expected yields, as measured by
trend. Randomness can be
described by converting such devi-
ations into a frequency distribu-
tion, or histogram, as depicted in
appendix figure 2.32 Each bar on
the figure shows the number of
times that yield deviations from
trend in Iroquois County fell with-
in a particular 10-bushel-per-acre
range. For example, the bar
labeled “-5 to +5” illustrates that
yields fell between -5 bushels and
+5 bushels from trend in 7 of the
40 years between 1956 and 1995,
and the bar labeled “5 to 15” illus-
trates that yields fell between 5
bushels and 15 bushels above
trend in 9 of the years. Frequen-
cies are greatest near the middle
and the least at the lower and
upper ends, which is typical of
yields, prices, and revenues. This is
because extreme weather events—
such as the 1988 drought—are less
likely than weather events having
a more modest effect.
The degree of randomness is
reflected in the width of the distri-
bution and in the number of obser-
vations that are distant from the
mean. Note that appendix figure 2
is not symmetrical (like the tradi-
tional bell curve), but that the
lower tail is longer than the upper
tail. This so-called negative skew-
ness is typical of yield distributions.
This shape occurs because devas-
tating weather can cause very sig-
nificant yield declines (as low as
zero), while very good weather is
likely to only moderately boost
yields above trend due to the physi-
ological limitations of the plant.
For many purposes, a single num-
ber is a more convenient measure
of randomness (or dispersion) than
is an entire distribution. The most
widely used measures of random-
ness are the variance and its
square root, the standard deviation.
Variance is the average squared
deviation from the mean, or trend.
By using the variance of deviations
from trend, a large part of the sys-
tematic variation is removed.
One problem with the variance
and standard deviation is that
Managing Risk in Farming: Concepts, Research, and Analysis Economic Research Service,USDA




















































Note:  Actual yield is county average.
Appendix figure 1
Actual and trend-adjusted corn yields, Iroquois County, Illinois, 
1956-95
Source: Constructed by ERS from USDA, NASS electronic county yield files, 1997.
32To construct appendix figure 2, ran-
domness was assumed to have remained
unchanged, although appendix figure 1
suggests that it may be increasing over
time.they are difficult to interpret with-
out knowing the level or magni-
tude of the underlying variable. A
variance of 10 bushels, for exam-
ple, has quite different implica-
tions for the tightness of the distri-
bution when the mean yield
(adjusted for trend) is 50 bushels
per acre than when it is 160
bushels. As a result, proportional
variability—or variability relative
to the mean—is often measured to
facilitate comparisons. The most
commonly used measure of rela-
tive variability is the coefficient of
variation, which equals the stan-
dard deviation divided by the
mean.
The variance (or alternatively, the
standard deviation or coefficient of
variation) is a good measure of
variability for approximately sym-
metric, bell-shaped distributions.
It fully describes the variability in
a normal distribution, which is a
particular bell-shaped mathemati-
cal distribution that closely
approximates many observed dis-
tributions. Most yield distribu-
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Appendix table 1—Calculation of yield variability for Iroquois County, Illinois
Year Actual yield Trend-adjusted Deviation 
yield (actual minus trend)
Bushels per acre
1956 73.4 75.7 -2.2
1957 65.8 77.0 -11.1
1958 66.1 78.3 -12.2
1959 60.2 79.6 -19.4
1960 71.8 80.9 -9.1
1961 76.6 82.3 -5.7
1962 90.4 83.6 6.9
1963 92.0 84.9 7.1
1964 85.3 86.2 -0.9
1965 100.6 87.5 13.0
1966 87.8 88.9 -1.0
1967 100.4 90.2 10.2
1968 87.6 91.5 -3.9
1969 108.0 92.8 15.2
1970 85.8 94.1 -8.3
1971 118.6 95.5 23.1
1972 113.8 96.8 17.0
1973 99.1 98.1 1.0
1974 83.5 99.4 -15.9
1975 115.0 100.7 14.2
1976 113.3 102.1 11.2
1977 90.7 103.4 -12.7
1978 110.1 104.7 5.4
1979 123.6 106.0 17.5
1980 74.6 107.3 -32.8
1981 118.9 108.7 10.2
1982 136.7 110.0 26.7
1983 85.3 111.3 -26.0
1984 111.4 112.6 -1.3
1985 143.2 113.9 29.3
1986 117.9 115.3 2.6
1987 134.7 116.6 18.1
1988 59.6 117.9 -58.3
1989 137.1 119.2 17.8
1990 127.6 120.5 7.0
1991 66.9 121.9 -54.9
1992 148.6 123.2 25.5
1993 113.7 124.5 -10.8
1994 161.2 125.8 35.4
1995 99.0 127.1 -28.1
Note: The equation estimated from these data for detrending yields is: E(Yt) = 1.72 + 1.32(T), where T is the
year, minus 1900.
Source: Calculations made by ERS from USDA, NASS, electronic county yield files, 1997.tions, however, appear to be non-
normal with long lower tails as
shown in appendix figure 2.
Moreover, some tools used to man-
age farmers’ risks, particularly
crop insurance and commodity
options, impose non-normality by
setting bounds or limits on the
lower tails of the yield or price dis-
tributions realized by the farmer.
Producers generally prefer yield
and price distributions that are
bounded from below because it
limits their losses. However, the
standard deviation may not pro-
vide a satisfactory measure of risk
under such distributions, which
clearly are non-normal.
Other measures of variability or
dispersion may be useful for distri-
butions that are clearly non-nor-
mal. One such measure is the
probability of outcomes below
some critical level. The probability
of yield less than 70 percent of its
expectation, for example, might be
a useful measure of risk for some
farmers. If the trend yield is 127
bushels per acre, the 70 percent
point would equal 0.70 * 127, or 89
bushels per acre. This is 38
bushels below trend. In appendix
figure 2, the probability of such a
yield (or lower) is two occurrences
in 40 years, or a probability of 2/40
= .05. Individual farmers might
choose higher or lower cutoff
points, depending on their differ-
ing financial circumstances and
degrees of risk aversion.
E Es st ti im ma at ti in ng g  P Pr ro ob ba ab bi il li it ti ie es s  o of f
F Fu ut tu ur re e  E Ev ve en nt ts s
Farmers, like other decisionmakers,
are fundamentally concerned with
randomness in future events, not
the distribution of past outcomes as
illustrated in the previous section.
They are concerned about the prob-
abilities of outcomes to be observed
in the future and the effects of
these outcomes on their economic
welfare. The probability associated
with any given outcome indicates
the strength of one’s belief that
such an outcome will occur, ranging
from zero (which represents no pos-
sibility) to 1 (representing absolute
certainty).
Two sources of information about
such probabilities are available:
logic and experience. In pure
games of chance, logic rules. For
example, in flipping a coin, two
equally likely outcomes are possi-
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10-bushel ranges below and above trend
Appendix figure 2
Frequency distribution of corn yield deviations from trend, 
Iroquois County, Illinois, 1956-95
Source: Constructed by ERS from USDA, NASS electronic county yield files, 1997.
Frequency (number of occurrences)ble—heads or tails—and thus a
probability of 0.5 can be assigned
to each. In business decisions,
however, historical observations
often must be relied upon to esti-
mate probabilities. Each of the fre-
quencies illustrated in appendix
figure 2, for instance, could be
divided by the total number of
years, 40, to obtain estimates of
the probabilities of yields within
each of the intervals. The resulting
distribution is often referred to as
an “empirical” probability distribu-
tion because it is estimated
through the use of a specific set of
historical observations. Suppose
that the projected mean yield is
130 bushels per acre. Referring to
appendix figure 2, the estimated
probability of the yield falling
between 115 and 145 bushels (that
is, between -15 and +15 bushels
from the trend expectation) is
23/40 = 0.575.
An alternative way to describe dis-
persion graphically is to plot prob-
abilities of outcomes falling at or
below specific values. This is called
a cumulative distribution.
Appendix figure 3 is a cumulative
distribution of the Iroquois County
yield deviations. Cumulative dis-
tributions are particularly useful
for representing continuous vari-
ables because probabilities can be
read directly from the vertical axis
instead of by summing areas
under a curve. Cumulative distri-
butions are useful in safety-first
analysis and stochastic dominance
analysis, which are discussed in
the next section of this report.
Relative frequencies derived from
historical observations are not nec-
essarily the best estimates of
future probabilities. Sometimes,
the decisionmaker has additional
information—such as regarding
recent rainfall or temperature con-
ditions—which needs to be taken
into account. Moreover, most his-
torical series include events that
have small probability of recur-
ring, or fail to catch events, that
though uncommon, have a non-
zero likelihood. To reduce the
impacts of such sampling errors,
forecasters often impose smooth-
ness and a degree of symmetry by
fitting mathematical distributions
to historical observations.
The normal distribution, which is
symmetrical and bell-shaped, is
frequently used as an approxima-
























































10-bushel ranges below and above trend
Cumulative probability
Appendix figure 3
Cumulative probability of corn yield deviations from trend, 
Iroquois County, Illinois, 1956-95
Source: Constructed by ERS from USDA, NASS electronic county yield files, 1997.tion. Although yield distributions
are typically negatively skewed, as
discussed earlier, the normal dis-
tribution is computationally con-
venient because it is fully
described by its mean and vari-
ance. In addition, yield deviations
from normality may not be great.
The mean and variance in appen-
dix table 1, for example, can be
used as parameters of a normal
distribution of yield deviations
from trend. Appendix figure 4
illustrates realized corn yields for
Iroquois County over the 1956-95
period and a projected probability
density function for the 1997 yield.
The projected distribution reflects
the belief that the true probability
function is continuous and recog-
nizes that observed historical
observations between 1956 and
1995 are only a sample of the pos-
sible outcomes.
Managing Risk in Farming: Concepts, Research, and Analysis Economic Research Service,USDA






















































Projected 1997 corn yield distribution for Iroquois County, 
Illinois, based on 1956-95 observationsT
he following sections examine
selected approaches that are
commonly used by economists in
analyzing decisionmaking under
risk. The approaches discussed
here range from one of the sim-
plest (the “safety-first” approach)
to one of the more complex (the
use of “expected utility”).
“Certainty equivalence” also is dis-
cussed, which involves measuring
risk in terms of differences in
expected income. The use of these
different approaches allows
researchers to rank alternative
strategies, and to help producers
make optimal choices in different
situations.
T Th he e  ““S Sa af fe et ty y- -F Fi ir rs st t””  A Ap pp pr ro oa ac ch h
The “safety-first” approach to risk
management applies if a decision-
maker first satisfies a preference
for safety (such as minimizing the
probability of bankruptcy) when
making choices as to the firm’s
activities. Only when the safety
first goal is met at a threshold
level can other goals (such as max-
imizing expected returns) be
addressed. Thus, attaining the
highest-priority goal serves as a
constraint on goals that have suc-
cessively lower priorities (Robison,
Barry, Kliebenstein, and Patrick).
Safety-first methods are particu-
larly applicable where survival of
an individual or business is the
paramount concern. However, in
most business risk management
situations, the use of safety-first
methods is somewhat arbitrary
because no single goal is clearly
dominant.
The safety-first criteria can be
specified in various ways in empir-
ical applications. One of the first
uses of this approach was devel-
oped in 1952, and involves choos-
ing the set of activities with the
smallest probability of yielding an
expected return (Y) below a speci-
fied disaster level of return (Y-min)
(Roy). To aid in understanding the
various safety-first criteria, appen-
dix table 2 shows the expected
income and the probability of
income less than the disaster level,
which is assumed to be $50,000,
for three hypothetical strategies,
A, B, and C. For strategy B, for
example, the expected return is
$500,000, and the probability that
returns under this strategy will
fall below $50,000 is 4 percent.
Strategy A has the highest expect-
ed return and the highest risk
among the strategies illustrated,
while strategy C has the lowest
expected return and lowest risk.
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A Ap pp pe en nd di ix x  2 2::  A An na al ly yt ti ic ca al l  T To oo ol ls s  f fo or r  A As ss se es ss si in ng g
t th he e  E Ef ff fe ec ct ti iv ve en ne es ss s  o of f  R Ri is sk k  M Ma an na ag ge em me en nt t
S St tr ra at te eg gi ie es s
Different modeling approaches are used by economists to
capture decisionmaking in risky situations. These
approaches are based on the idea that each risky strategy
offers farmers a different probability distribution of income,
and that determining the best strategy involves describing
the different distributions and developing rules to choose
among them. These approaches differ, however, in the ways
in which they incorporate risk attitudes, and in the degree
of flexibility allowed in specifying risk-return trade-offs.Under Roy’s safety-first criteria,
the optimal activity choice occurs
where the probability of expected
return falling below the $50,000
threshold is minimized. Strategy
C, which has the lowest probability
of disaster, best meets this criteria.
When returns are normally dis-
tributed, the solution occurs where
the disaster level (Y-min) is the
greatest number of standard devi-
ations away from the expected
income. Roy’s criteria can be
expressed mathematically as:
Minimize Prob (Y < Y-min) 
A second type of approach, intro-
duced by Telser in 1955, assumes
that the decisionmaker maximizes
expected returns, E(Y), subject to
the constraint that the probability
of a return less than or equal to a
specified minimum disaster level
(Y-min) does not exceed a given
probability (P). Mathematically,
Telser’s approach is expressed as:
Maximize E(Y)
subject to: Prob (Y < Y-min) £ P
To apply the Telser criterion to the
example in appendix table 2, sup-
pose that the critical probability is
4 percent. Then, the Telser criteri-
on would choose strategy B, which
maximizes expected income among
those strategies for which P is not
greater than 4 percent. Alter-
natively, if the critical probability
were 3 percent, then strategy C
would be selected, while if it were
5 percent, strategy A would be
selected. This example illustrates
that safety-first results can be
quite sensitive to initial assump-
tions about what constitutes a crit-
ical loss.
The topics that have been
addressed by these various types
of safety-first criteria vary widely.
They include: optimal hedging
(Telser), dynamic cropping deci-
sions in southeastern Washington
(Van Kooten, Young, and
Krautkraemer), farm extension
programs (Musser, Ohannesian,
and Benson), and attitudes toward
risk regarding fertilizer applica-
tions among peasants in Mexico
(Moscardi and de Janvry).
The safety-first approach has both
advantages and disadvantages. It
does not require the specification
of a farmer’s risk aversion coeffi-
cient (see accompanying box on
risk aversion, p. 119), and it is not
limited to specific distributional
assumptions, other than that utili-
ty increases with returns (subject
to varying constraints depending
on the specification) (appendix
table 3). As a result, it is straight-
forward to use. On the downside,
however, it is limited in its ability
to address producers’ varying lev-
els of aversion to risk (although
the threshold probability can serve
as a proxy for risk aversion), and
difficulties can also arise in choos-
ing the critical cutoff level for dis-
aster returns. In addition, any out-
come below the cutoff is treated as
equivalent to any other. In reality,
observations far below the cutoff
disaster level are more adverse to
the farmer than those that are
nearer the cutoff point.
Managing Risk in Farming: Concepts, Research, and Analysis Economic Research Service,USDA





















































































Appendix table 2—Comparison of Roy’s safety-first approach with Telser’s 
safety-first approach
Strategy Expected Minimum disaster Probability of falling
income return below minimum
E(Y) (Y-min) disaster return (P)
Dollars Percent
A 1,000,000 50,000 5
B 500,000 50,000 4
C 200,000 50,000 3
Source: Hypothetical example developed by ERS.T Th he e  ““E E- -V V””  A Ap pp pr ro oa ac ch h  a an nd d  
Q Qu ua ad dr ra at ti ic c  P Pr ro og gr ra am mm mi in ng g
A classic problem in risk analysis
involves determining an optimal
allocation of resources across an
array of risky alternatives. The
problem was first solved by
Markowitz in the context of select-
ing optimal stock portfolios. His
solution was to find the set of allo-
cations that maximize expected
total return for different levels of
variance of total return. This is
called the “expected value-variance
(or E-V) efficient” set or frontier.
The heavy line in appendix figure
5 represents an E-V efficient fron-
tier. On this frontier, expected
return can be increased only by
accepting a larger variance of
return. The optimal portfolio is
presumed to come from this fron-
tier and depends on the decision-
maker’s preference tradeoffs
between expected return and vari-
ance of return.33
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Appendix table 3—Methods for ranking probability distributions, and 
assumptions and parameters required for each
Method Assumptions required Parameters required
about utility to use method
Roy’s safety-first Increases with prob (Y > L) Prob (Y < L)
Telser’s safety-first Increases linearly with Y if
prob (Y < L) < P, is zero otherwise E(Y) and prob (Y < L)
E-V efficiency Increases with Y at a decreasing
rate plus normality or quadratic utility E(Y) and Var(Y)
1st degree 
stochastic dominance Increases with Y Complete distribution of Y
2nd degree Increases with Y at a 
stochastic dominance decreasing rate Complete distribution of Y
Expected utility and Complete distribution of Y
certainty equivalents Known function of Y and utility function
Note:Y = income; E(Y) = expected income; L = critical level of income; P = critical probability.
Source: Compiled by ERS.
33The E-V efficient set will include the
portfolio that maximizes expected utility if
the decisionmaker's utility function is
quadratic or returns on all activities are
normally distributed. See subsequent sec-
tion on "The Expected Utility Approach."







Example E-V efficient frontier and indifference curvesThe E-V efficiency criterion can be
used in allocating a farm’s
resources among alternative risky
enterprises. A risk-averse farmer
desires high expected return and
low variance of return, which
involves moving upward and/or to
the left in the figure. The optimal
combination of activities for the
farmer occurs at the point on the
E-V frontier that provides the pre-
ferred combination of expected
return and variance of return. To
illustrate the farmer’s preferences,
three indifference curves are
shown as dashed lines. Each con-
nects combinations of risk and
expected return that are equally
desirable to the producer. The opti-
mal point on the E-V frontier is
the point that touches the highest
attainable indifference curve.
This approach has on many occa-
sions been applied to farming deci-
sions, particularly to decisions
about enterprise choice and diver-
sification. E-V efficient combina-
tions of crop and livestock enter-
prises can be identified and the
combination that offers the pre-
ferred mix of expected return and
variability of returns can be cho-
sen. Determining E-V efficient
combinations requires estimates of
the variances in returns and the
correlations of returns for those
enterprises under consideration, as
well as estimates of expected
returns for those enterprises.
The attractiveness of E-V analysis
is that it leads to relatively conven-
ient solutions using quadratic pro-
gramming. The exact formulation
of the problem can vary. One
approach is to maximize a quadrat-
ic function of activity levels subject
to linear constraints as follows:
subject to:
where:
xi = the level of the ith
activity;
ui = the expected return
per unit of the ith activity;
l= the risk-return trade-
off;
sij = the covariance of
return on activities i and j;
aji = coefficients in m lin-
ear constraints on the
activity levels.
bj = levels of the linear
constraints.
To trace out the E-V frontier, the
quadratic programming problem
must be solved parametrically as
the risk aversion coefficient, l,
varies from 0 to ¥. This is a rather
complicated problem, but computer
algorithms are available. If the
farmer is risk neutral (l=0), the
problem collapses to a an income
maximization problem, which can
be solved with ordinary linear pro-
gramming. As risk becomes
increasingly important, the risk
aversion coefficient increases and
the E-V portfolio becomes increas-
ingly diversified (Anderson, Dillon,
and Hardaker). Other factors, such
as limitations imposed by resource
constraints, may also lead to a
diversified portfolio.
The quadratic programming
approach has been applied to farm
enterprise selection by many
researchers. The first application,
for example, involved the evalua-
tion of four production activities
and several resource constraints
on a representative farm in east-
ern North Carolina (Freund).
Quadratic risk programming has
since been applied to many other
evaluations of optimal farm enter-
Managing Risk in Farming: Concepts, Research, and Analysis Economic Research Service,USDA












































































































== = åå å -
11 1
lsprise choice, including studies by
Barry and Willman, and Musser
and Stamoulis.34
The use of the E-V approach has
both advantages and disadvan-
tages. As in the case of “safety-
first” analysis, E-V analyses may
or may not include an explicit
measure of the producer’s risk
aversion (as illustrated in the
example above). E-V analysis is
limited, however, in that it
assumes that the producer has an
outcome distribution that is nor-
mal35 or, alternatively, a utility
function (which expresses risk
preferences) that is quadratic. In
addition, the farmer is assumed to
always prefer more (rather than
less) of the variable in question
(such as income), and is assumed
universally not risk preferring
with respect to that variable
(Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).
As with various approaches to risk
analysis, estimation of the vari-
ance-covariance matrix can pres-
ent methodological pitfalls (Mapp
and Helmers).
T Th he e  S St to oc ch ha as st ti ic c  D Do om mi in na an nc ce e
A Ap pp pr ro oa ac ch h
Unlike E-V analysis, which is
based on the mean and variance of
a distribution, stochastic domi-
nance involves comparing points
on two or more entire distribu-
tions. That is, when stochastic
dominance is used, alternatives
are compared in terms of the full
distributions of outcomes. Because
comparisons must be made at each
specified point along each distribu-
tion in a pairwise fashion, the con-
ceptual complexity and computa-
tional task associated with this
approach are greater than when E-
V analysis is used (Hardaker,
Huirne, and Anderson).
The first concept of stochastic effi-
ciency was formalized in the early
1960’s, and is known as “first-
degree” stochastic dominance. This
approach rests on the notion that
decisionmakers prefer more of a
given variable (such as income) to
less. Using an example, suppose
there are three plans, A, B, and C,
each having a probability distribu-
tion of income outcomes, “x.” The
cumulative density functions
(CDFs) associated with the plans
are FA (x), FB (x), and FC (x),
respectively, as shown in appendix
figure 6. The CDFs reflect the
“accumulated” area under the
probability density function (PDF)
at each level of income for each
plan. At the extreme right side of
the chart, the entire PDF is
summed, and the probability of
realizing an income for any of the
plans that is equal to or less than
the amount designated on the axis
is 1.00.
For one plan to dominate another
in the first-degree sense, the CDF
for the first plan must nowhere be
higher than the CDF for the sec-
ond plan, and it must lie below the
CDF for the second plan at some
point. Mathematically, first degree
stochastic dominance (FSD) can be
expressed, for two representative
plans A and B, as:
FA (x) £ FB (x), for all levels of x
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34Other risk programming methods are
available. MOTAD programming, for exam-
ple, minimizes the mean absolute deviation
in net income, which simplifies the problem
to one of linear programming (Hazell).
Target MOTAD, developed in 1983, mini-
mizes deviations from a target level of
income (Tauer). Discrete stochastic pro-
gramming can also be used to determine
efficient enterprise choices for farmers. For
a discussion of the advantages and disad-
vantages of these approaches, as well as
examples, see Hardaker, Huirne, and
Anderson; Musser, Mapp, and Barry; Mapp,
Hardin, Walker, and Persaud; and Walker
and Helmers.
35The normality assumption may be
reasonable, particularly if the number of
risky prospects is not too small and the
risky prospects are diverse (Anderson,
Dillon, and Hardaker). In addition, several
studies have concluded that the E-V
approach is quite robust to violations of the
normality assumption (Levy and
Markowitz; Kroll, Levy, and Markowitz).In appendix figure 6, FC (x) domi-
nates FA (x) in the first-degree
sense, meaning that the probabili-
ty of exceeding any given level of
income is greater under plan C
than plan A, and that plan A can-
not be a member of the first-
degree stochastic dominant (FSD)
set. Because the CDF for plan B
crosses both plans A and C, plan B
does not dominate, and is not dom-
inated by, either A or C in the first
degree sense (Hardaker, Huirne,
and Anderson).
Second-degree stochastic domi-
nance (SSD) is applicable if the
decisionmaker is risk averse and
prefers higher incomes to lower
incomes. In contrast to first-degree
stochastic dominance, SSD
involves the comparison of areas
under the CDFs for various plans,
and, in general, has more discrimi-
natory power than does FSD (King
and Robison). For a representative
plan, A, to be SSD over another
plan, B, requires that:
In appendix figure 6, for example,
note that the accumulated area
under FB(x) is less than under
FA(x) at all levels of income. Thus,
B exhibits SSD over A. C also
exhibits SSD over A. However, C
does not exhibit SSD over B
because there is a range in the
lower tail where the accumulated
area under C exceeds that under
B. This example illustrates the
stronger discriminatory power of
SSD compared to FSD while show-
ing that SSD does not discriminate
among all distributions.
As with other approaches to risk
analysis, the use of stochastic dom-
inance methods has both pros and
cons. Although it provides a rigor-
ous assessment, the number of
efficient sets may remain unduly
large. SSD is more discriminating
than FSD, but nearly one-half of
randomly generated farm plans in
one study, for example, were found
to be within the SSD set (King and
Robison). The assumption of risk
aversion required by SSD may not
always hold, and the pairwise com-
parisons that are necessary in
determining the efficient set can
be computationally burdensome.
Managing Risk in Farming: Concepts, Research, and Analysis Economic Research Service,USDA
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Different Approaches Can Be Used 
to Estimate Risk Aversion
To determine a farmer’s best risk management strategy, information is
needed about his or her risk preferences among the different income
distributions generated by those alternative strategies. Individuals
who accept a lower average return to reduce the variability of returns
are said to be risk averse. Many individuals are believed to be risk
averse, as evidenced by the widespread demand for automobile, prop-
erty, and health insurance. Premium costs for these products general-
ly exceed expected indemnities due to administrative costs, but buyers
often find the price acceptable to mitigate potentially disastrous out-
comes.
While risk aversion is acknowledged as widespread, the degree of risk
aversion varies among individuals and is difficult to ascertain. Two
general approaches typically have been used in empirical analyses.
The first approach measures risk aversion directly by confronting the
decisionmaker with a choice (either actual or hypothetical) among sev-
eral alternatives, at least some of which involve risk (Newbery and
Stiglitz). Such approaches have been used to determine risk aversion
among farmers in northeast Brazil (Dillon and Scandizzo) and rural
India (Binswanger), among others.
Measuring risk preferences directly can, however, lead to unstable
results. Interview methods, in particular, are faced with the inevitable
problem that individuals may not be able to reveal their attitudes
toward decisions they have never taken or seriously contemplated
(Binswanger). In addition, such studies have typically focused on a
small-scale basis. Recently, work has been undertaken to measure
farmers’ risk attitudes on a large-scale basis, using rating scales of risk
management questions to ascertain farmers’ risk preferences (Bard
and Barry).
The second approach does not involve interviews with decisionmakers
or experimental determination of attitudes toward risk. Rather, this
category involves: 1) focusing on testing hypotheses econometrically
regarding risk preference structure; or 2) directly estimating utility
functional forms or risk aversion coefficients using data on actual firm
choices (Saha, Shumway, and Talpaz; Antle; Love and Buccola).
Several studies have used this second category, with estimates of rela-
tive risk aversion ranging widely.
More technically, measures of either “absolute” or “relative” risk aver-
sion can be used to quantify an individual’s attitude toward risk. Both
measure the curvature of the utility function, and represent the degree
to which the satisfaction obtained from an additional unit of income
declines as income increases. The units of measurement must be con-
sidered in interpreting estimates of absolute risk aversion, whereas
relative risk aversion is unit free.
Varying estimates of relative and absolute risk aversion result from
different approaches and data sets. Researchers generally agree that a
reasonable relative risk aversion coefficient, for example, is in the
neighborhood of 2.0, or “rather risk averse.” Relatively risk-averse
farmers would be likely to maintain substantial financial reserves as
protection against income shortfalls, while those who are less risk
averse would be inclined to borrow to near their limit in order to
increase their expected incomes (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).Further, once the efficient set of
plans is determined, identification
of the optimal choice within this
set depends on knowing more
about a decisionmaker’s preference
than merely that an unquantified
aversion to risk exists (Anderson,
Dillon, and Hardaker).
T Th he e  E Ex xp pe ec ct te ed d  U Ut ti il li it ty y  A Ap pp pr ro oa ac ch h
If a decisionmaker’s risk prefer-
ences can be described mathemati-
cally and the probability distribu-
tions associated with each risky
alternative are known, his or her
choice among the risky alternatives
can be optimized directly. Expected
utility provides a convenient way to
represent risk preferences. The
basic idea is that decisionmakers
maximize expected utility, where
utility is an indicator of satisfaction
measured in arbitrary units. Utility
increases less than proportionately
with income for decisionmakers
who are risk averse. In other words,
utility is an increasing, but down-
ward bending, function of income
for such persons (Anderson, Dillon,
and Hardaker; Robison and Barry;
Laffont; Takayama).
Many different specifications can
be used to capture the curvature of
the utility function, and each rep-
resents the degree to which the
satisfaction obtained from an addi-
tional unit of income changes as
income increases. One such utility
function specification can be
expressed as:
U = 100 - (1,000,000/Y)
As can be seen from this equation,
an increase in Y, say from $20,000
to $30,000 (50 percent), results in
an increase in utility from 50 to 67
(32 percent). This utility function
exhibits constant relative risk
aversion, which means that the
degree of risk aversion decreases
with income. The coefficient of rel-
ative risk aversion in this example
is 2, which is considered by many
economists to be about average.
To illustrate the use of expected
utility, suppose that Farmer Smith,
whose utility function is specified
as above, is choosing between two
strategies: (1) continuing to farm,
and (2) taking a job in town. Under
the first strategy, Smith has an 80-
percent chance of a net income of
$70,000 and a 20-percent chance of
a net income of $20,000. Working
in town provides a sure income of
$55,000. The expected income and
standard deviation in income for
each strategy are shown in appen-
dix table 4. Neither strategy domi-
nates the other from the stand-
point of E-V efficiency because the
first strategy has the highest
expected income, while the second
has the lowest standard deviation
in income (zero in this case).
Using Smith’s utility function, the
resulting utilities for each level of
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Appendix table 4—Expected income and standard deviation of income under
two strategies available to Farmer Smith
Standard
Probabilities of expected incomes Expected deviation of
Strategy $20,000 $55,000 $70,000 income income
Percent Dollars
1 0.2 0.0 0.8 60,000 20,000
2 0.0 1.0 0.0 55,000 0
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Certainty Equivalence Allows Estimation of Risk in
Dollars of Expected Income 
Decisionmakers often would like the losses from risk or the gains
from risk reduction to be measured in terms of dollars of expected
income. A sure outcome that an individual finds equally desirable to
a given risky prospect is called a certainty equivalent outcome
(Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker; Laffont). Knowing certainty equiva-
lent outcomes allows one not only to rank risky alternatives, but also
to estimate the cost of risk, or the premium that the individual would
pay to avoid the risk. Certainty equivalence simultaneously accounts
for the probabilities of the risky prospects and the preferences for the
consequences (Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker). Because decision-
makers seldom have similar attitudes toward risk, certainty equiva-
lents vary among individuals, even for the same risky prospect
(Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).
Certainty equivalents can be calculated when E-V analysis is used or
when the utility function is known and expected utility analysis is
used. In the latter case, a certainty equivalent can be calculated by
first calculating expected utility and then finding the sure outcome
that would provide equal utility. This involves applying the inverse of
the utility function to expected utility. For the utility function above
this gives:
CE(Y) = 1,000,000 / [100 - E(U)]
Applying this inverse function to the expected utilities calculated in
the accompanying table gives the estimates shown in the accompany-
ing table. These results, shown in the last column, indicate that the
first strategy yields a certainty equivalent income of $46,667, com-
pared to an expected income of $60,000. In other words, the cost of
uncertainty in farming for Smith is $60,000 - $46,667 = $13,333.
Thus, Smith prefers the second strategy, which gives a certainty
equivalent income of $55,000, and is $8,333 higher than obtained if
he had chosen the first strategy.
Certainty equivalent estimates must be used with care, primarily
because they tend to convey an unwarranted sense of precision. They
must be taken as rather rough approximations, and depend heavily
on how accurately the underlying utility functions and probability
distributions are estimated. Utility functions, in particular, differ
markedly among individuals, are not directly observable, and are
likely estimated with substantial errors in most cases.






Source: Hypothetical example developed by ERS.Expected utility under each strat-
egy is calculated by weighting
each utility level by its probability.
The results for the two strategies,
shown in appendix table 5, indi-
cate that the second strategy
yields a slightly higher expected
utility and is therefore preferred.
Expected utility results can also
be used to estimate certainty
equivalents (see accompanying
box, p. 121).
The use of expected utility has
both advantages and disadvan-
tages. One advantage is that this
approach is quite generalizable,
allowing a wide choice of utility
functions and probability distribu-
tions. Unlike stochastic dominance
and E-V efficiency criteria, which
typically leave some alternatives
unranked, expected utility general-
ly ranks all alternatives. The
major drawback of the approach is
that utility functions are difficult
to estimate and known only
approximately, at best. Moreover, it
assumes that decisionmakers
exhibit a high level of rationality,
which does not always seem to be
the case.
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Appendix table 5—Example calculation of expected utility under two strategies
for farmer Smith
Probabilities of expected utilities Expected
Strategy 50.0 81.8 85.7 utility
Probability
1 0.2 0.0 0.8 78.6
2 0 1.0 0 81.8
Source: Hypothetical example developed by ERS.T
he accompanying tables illus-
trate the mechanics of several
types of federally-subsidized crop
and revenue insurance. These
types are:
Catastrophic (CAT) coverage—
A type of Federal crop insurance
that guarantees 50 percent of the
producer’s actual production histo-
ry (APH) yield at 55 percent of the
price election under crop insurance
reform. Producers pay a processing
fee of $60 per crop. The processing
fee is tied to persons who have an
interest in the land, not the
acreage itself.
“Additional” (or Buy Up) cover-
age—A type of Federal crop insur-
ance that refers to coverage that
equals or exceeds a 50-percent
yield guarantee at 100 percent of
the price election. Farmers must
pay a processing fee and a premi-
um in order to receive added cov-
erage.
Income Protection (IP)—A type
of revenue insurance that protects
producers against reductions in
gross income when a crop’s price
or yields decline from early-season
expectations. Indemnities are paid
if the producer’s gross income (as
measured by the product of the
producer’s realized yield and the
harvest futures price) falls below a
predetermined guarantee. Thres-
hold trigger levels are based on a
producer’s APH yield and a plant-
ing-time price for the harvest
futures contract. Coverage is based
on enterprise units. Coverage
options in most areas range from
50 to 75 percent in 5-percent incre-
ments.
Crop Revenue Coverage
(CRC)—A type of revenue insur-
ance that provides revenue insur-
ance plus replacement-cost protec-
tion to producers. Indemnities are
paid if the producer’s gross income
(as measured by the product of the
producer’s realized yield and the
actual harvest price) falls below a
predetermined guarantee (as
measured by the product of the
producer’s APH yield and the high-
er of the early-season price projec-
tion or the actual harvest price).
Since CRC uses the higher of the
planting-time price for the harvest
futures contract or the actual
futures contract quote at harvest,
the producer’s guarantee may
increase over the season, allowing
the producer to purchase “replace-
ment” bushels if yields are low and
prices increase during the season.
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Appendix table 6—Example of a Catastrophic Crop Insurance Policy 
for YIELD Loss 
50 percent yield coverage and 55 percent of price election
The producer pays no premium
AB C
Unit Yield #1 Yield #2 Yield #3
Step Item (30) (13) (0)
1 Net indemnity to producer $/acre 0 15.40 44.00
2=   Indemnity paid to producer $/acre 0 15.40 44.00
3=   Calculated yield loss bu/acre 0 7 20
4 = Yield guarantee bu/acre 20 20 20
5 = percent of yield coverage percent 50.0 50.0 50.0
6 * APH yield guarantee bu/acre 40 40 40
7 - Actual harvested yield bu/acre 30 13 0
8 * Producer price election $/bu 2.20 2.20 2.20
9 = percent of price election percent 55.0 55.0 55.0
10 * FCIC price election $/bu 4.00 4.00 4.00
11 - Producer premium $/acre 0 0 0
12 = Total premium per acre $/acre 4.50 4.50 4.50
13 - Premium subsidy per acre $/acre 4.50 4.50 4.50
14 = Subsidy percent percent 100 100 100
15 * Total premium per acre $/acre 4.50 4.50 4.50
Source: Excerpted from Jagger, Craig, and Joy Harwood. “Module 6: Crop Insurance and Revenue Insurance,”
USDA’s Crop/Commodity Programs After the 1996 Farm Act. USDA Graduate School Course, winter quarter,
1999.
Appendix table 7—Example of a Multi-Peril Crop Insurance Policy 
for YIELD Loss 
The producer chooses: percent yield coverage and percent of price election 
The producer pays part of the premium
AB C
Unit Yield #1 Yield #2 Yield #3
Step Item (30) (13) (0)
1 Net indemnity to producer $/acre -3.50 48.50 100.50
2=   Indemnity paid to producer $/acre 0 52.00 104.00
3=   Calculated yield loss bu/acre 0 13 26
4 = Yield guarantee bu/acre 26 26 26
5 = percent of yield coverage percent 65.0 65.0 65.0
6 * APH yield guarantee bu/acre 40 40 40
7 - Actual harvested yield bu/acre 30 13 0
8 * Producer price election $/bu 4.00 4.00 4.00
9 = percent of price election percent 100 100 100
10 * FCIC price election $/bu 4.00 4.00 4.00
11 - Producer premium $/acre 3.50 3.50 3.50
12 = Total premium per acre $/acre 6.00 6.00 6.00
13 - Premium subsidy per acre $/acre 2.50 2.50 2.50
14 = Subsidy percent percent 41.7 41.7 41.7
15 * Total premium per acre $/acre 6.00 6.00 6.00
Source: Excerpted from Jagger, Craig, and Joy Harwood. “Module 6: Crop Insurance and Revenue Insurance,”
USDA’s Crop/Commodity Programs After the 1996 Farm Act. USDA Graduate School Course, winter quarter,
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Appendix table 8--Example of an Income Protection Insurance Policy 
for REVENUE Loss
The producer chooses: percent of revenue coverage
The producer pays part of the premium 
AB C
Unit Yield #1 Yield #1 Yield #1
Step Item Price #1 Price #2 Price #3
1 Net indemnity to producer $/acre 10.68 -3.32 -3.32
2 = Indemnity paid to producer $/acre 14.00 0 0
3 = Revenue guarantee 
= planting guarantee $/acre 104.00 104.00 104.00
4 = Harvest price as projected 
at planting time $/bu 4.00 4.00 4.00
5 * APH yield  bu/acre 40 40 40
6 * Revenue coverage level percent 65.0 65.0 65.0
7 - Realized revenue $/acre 90.00 120.00 150.00
8 = Realized harvest price $/bu 3.00 4.00 5.00
9 * Actual yield bu/acre 30 30 30
10 - Producer premium $/acre 3.32 3.32 3.32
11 = Total premium per acre $/acre 5.70 5.70 5.70
12 - Premium subsidy per acre $/acre 2.38 2.38 2.38
13 = Subsidy percent percent 41.7 41.7 41.7
14 * Total premium per acre $/acre 5.70 5.70 5.70
Source: Excerpted from Jagger, Craig, and Joy Harwood. “Module 6: Crop Insurance and Revenue Insurance,”
USDA’s Crop/Commodity Programs After the 1996 Farm Act. USDA Graduate School Course, winter quarter,
1999.
Appendix table 9--Example of a Crop Revenue Coverage Insurance Policy for
REVENUE Loss 
The producer chooses: percent of revenue coverage 
The producer pays part of the premium 
AB C
Unit Yield #1 Yield #1 Yield #1
Step Item Price #1 Price #2 Price #3
1 Net indemnity to producer $/acre 8.35 -5.66 -5.66
2 = Indemnity paid to producer $/acre 14.00 0 0
3 = Revenue guarantee 
= higher of (a) or (b) $/acre 104.00 104.00 104.00
4 (a) Harvest guarantee $/acre 78.00 104.00 130.00
5 = Realized harvest price $/bu 3.00 4.00 5.00
6 * APH yield  bu/acre 40 40 40
7 * Revenue coverage level percent 65.0 65.0 65.0
8 (b) Planting guarantee $/acre 104.00 104.00 104.00
9 = Harvest price as projected
at planting time $/bu 4.00 4.00 4.00
10 * APH yield bu/acre 40 40 40
11 * Revenue coverage level percent 65.0 65.0 65.0
12 - Realized revenue $/acre 90.00 120.00 150.00
13 = Realized harvest price $/bu 3.00 4.00 5.00
14 * Actual yield bu/acre 30 30 30
15 - Producer premium $/acre 5.66 5.66 5.66
16 = Total premium per acre $/acre 7.80 7.80 7.80
17 - Premium subsidy per acre $/acre 2.15 2.15 2.15
18 = Subsidy percent percent 27.5 27.5 27.5
19 * Total premium per acre $/acre 7.80 7.80 7.80
Source: Excerpted from Jagger, Craig, and Joy Harwood. “Module 6: Crop Insurance and Revenue Insurance,”
USDA’s Crop/Commodity Programs After the 1996 Farm Act. USDA Graduate School Course, winter quarter,
1999.